



Centre for  
Human Rights and  
Restorative Justice

# HISTORY REFERENCES

South Africa Truth Commission

## Abstract

Notes on discussions of history, as well as a list of coding themes and references to history in the South Africa Truth Commission.

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## Researcher Notes

### Report details:

- published in 1998
- pdf has 4554 pages
- chapter dedicated to history
  - chapter is 20 pages
- according to NVivo's text search, the word history (using stems) is referenced 185 times, representing 0.04% coverage
- after deleting references from the bibliography, notes or headers, there are **157 broad references** to history in the content of the report
- discussions of history largely confined to historical context

### History is referenced in the following ways:

- commission argues that South Africa needs to deal with its history and that legacy
- history and findings of commission will be controversial
- commission has contributed more to uncovering the truth about the past than all the court cases in the history of apartheid
- greatest contribution of the commission the shelves that will be filled at the National Archive for all to use
- challenge of allowing victims to share stories of trauma and recognizing the importance of due process that ensures the rights of alleged perpetrators
- discussions about terminology - how they refer to various groups in the report and how not everyone is in agreement on those terms
- need to face recent history to move forward
- racism and apartheid defining features of the period
- discussions of communism and nationalism in the cold war period
- decades dominated by conflict of minority which reserved power for itself and majority who resisted
- only a small part of a much larger story of human rights abuses in South and southern Africa
- 1913 Land Act reshaped the social map of the country - divided whites and Africans, destroyed thriving African landowning and agricultural sector, forced removals, and death
- discussions of violence of the gun, law, and structural institutions
- first time liberation movement called for an investigation of past regime as well as the actions of their own members
- recover the past of the national memory that has been forgotten
- error of equating forgiveness with reconciliation
  - reconciliation requires more than forgiveness and remembrance - need individual justice and social justice
- human rights violations not based solely on quantitative data but also stories, histories etc.

- only scratched the surface of this history
- former government destroyed records and incriminating evidence to sanitize the past
- occasionally alleged perpetrators were able to give their side of the story at the same hearings as their accusers
- commission trying to identify trends in human rights violations that were committed
- despite big businesses claim of noncollaboration, historical record shows they adopted, implemented, and modified apartheid policies
  - businesses sold weapons to police and defense forces
  - apartheid labour laws benefited business community
  - mining industry harnessed state to supply cheap labour
- role of medical professionals in covering deaths or beatings for police and military
  - powerful medical bodies did not speak out or take a stand
- Afrikaans press did not report on human rights violations and promoted white superiority over people of colour
- authorities systematically attacked children
- youth became shock troops educated in the streets
- distinction must be made between those who fought for and against apartheid
- to move forward to reconciliation, need to acknowledge country's divided history and regional burden
- all citizens were drawn into human rights violations both as victims and perpetrators - sometimes both
- protect records from future destruction
- national archives to fill the gaps in memory through oral history projects and collection of non-public records
- some cannot deal with the contradictions of what they once believed in being considered a crime now
- some saw themselves as victims and are now presented as perpetrators
- white racism continues
- people are willing to forgive but they need to know who and for what
- victims need to be able to deal with their own trauma and feel safe to speak out and not face reprisals and have protection for them
- need to look at local and intra-community dynamics as well
- giving the truth as they see it - there will be exaggerations or second hand accounts but this is how they view the past
- need to frame history as to include both perpetrators and victims as the victims of the ultimate perpetrator - the conflict of the past
- threat to our future is ideological divisions that polarizes the nation
- other countries have done commissions but ours regarded as the most ambitious
- must consider reparations for victims - look to reparations to holocaust survivors, about recovering material property and humanity they were deprived
- amnesty application forms from Afrikaners and right wingers made reference to a romantic image of the Boer nation
- some people chose to not come forward to tell their stories because they disagreed with the granting of amnesty

History and truth are discussed in the following ways:

- commission is focussed on uncovering the truth
- idea that truth obscured across the country - victims traumatized, suspicious, or unable to share their stories
- secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth
- truth may not always lead to reconciliation, but there can be no lasting reconciliation without truth
- report also discusses different conceptions of truth (e.g. personal, narrative, factual, social, etc.).

\*References of history and truth appear under the highlighted coding theme/section **True or Accurate** starting on page 115

## Links to Data Visualization

This section contains links to all data visualization for the South Africa report.

### Word Frequency Cloud

- [word frequency cloud](#)
- [excel sheet of word frequency cloud findings](#)

### Word Trees

- [history](#)
- [women](#)
- [children](#)
- [youth](#)
- [forgive](#)
- [victim](#)
- [truth](#)
- [reconciliation](#)
- [land](#)

\*NVivo software can only edit word trees by changing the central search term and branch sizes. Word trees includes references from bibliography, headers, and notes that cannot be edited out using NVivo software. Researchers will need to manually remove unsightly branches using editing software (e.g., paint, photoshop, etc.)

### History Hierarchy Coding Chart

- [history hierarchy coding chart](#)
- [excel sheet of history hierarchy coding chart results](#)

## History Coding for the South Africa Report

The following chart breakdowns the child nodes used for coding history references based on themes and discussions surrounding history in the South Africa report.

History	All references or discussions of history in South Africa report
Apartheid	References or discussions of apartheid - policies, leadership, etc.
Archives	References or discussions of archives
Commemorate	References or discussions of commemoration, remembrance, heritage etc.
Economy	References or discussions of the economy
Ethnicity	References or discussions of ethnicity, ethnic lines, ethnic division etc.
Forgive	References or discussions of forgiveness or forgiving
Human rights	References or discussions of human rights, human rights violations, and human rights codes
Invoking others	References or discussions of other countries and their history, politics, international relations etc.
Land	References or discussions of land, land Acts or legislation, landowners etc.
Legacy	References or discussions of the legacy of colonialism and apartheid
Medical community	References or discussions of the medical community, doctors, etc.
Nation	References or discussions of the nation, nationalism and national identity
Police	References or discussions of the police, police officers, etc.
Politics	References or discussions of politics, politicians, or political parties
Press	References or discussions of the press, media, journalists, etc.
Racism	References or discussions of racism, discrimination etc.
Reconciliation	References or discussions of reconciliation
Responsibility	References or discussions of responsibility or accountability
True or accurate	References or discussions of true, genuine, accurate, forgotten or lesser known history
Victims	References or discussions of victims - their experiences or actions against them

Violence	References or discussions of violence, violent acts, or violent events
Youth	References or discussions of youth, children, etc.



## History References

This section contains all references to history from the South Africa report.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 157  
references coded [0.33% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

1 All South Africans know that our recent history is littered with some horrendous occurrences - the Sharpsville and Langa killings, the Soweto uprising, the Church Street bombing, Magoo's Bar, the Amanzimtoti Wimpy Bar bombing, the St James' Church killings, Boipatong and Sebokeng. We also knew about the deaths in detention of people such as Steve Biko, Neil Aggett, and others; necklacings, and the so-called 'black on black' violence on the East Rand and in KwaZulu Natal which arose from the rivalries between IFP and first the UDF and later the ANC. Our country is soaked in the blood of her children of all races and of all political persuasions.

2 It is this contemporary history - which began in 1960 when the Sharpsville disaster took place and ended with the wonderful inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically-elected President of the Republic of South Africa - it is this history with which we have had to come to terms. We could not pretend it did not happen. Everyone agrees that South Africans must deal with that history and its legacy. It is how we do this that is in question - a bone of contention throughout the life of the Commission, right up to the time when this report was being written. And I imagine we can assume that this particular point will remain controversial for a long time to come.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

will fill many shelves in the National Archives. This material will be of great value to scholars, journalists and others researching our history for generations to come. From a research point of view, this may be the Commission's greatest legacy.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

This report has been constrained by a number of factors - not least by the extent of the Commission's mandate and a number of legal provisions contained in the Act. It was, at the same time, driven by a dual responsibility. It had to provide the space within which victims could share the story of their trauma with the nation; and it had to recognise the importance of the due process of law that ensures the rights of alleged perpetrators. Several court rulings emphasised the importance of the latter. Obviously, the Commission respected these judgements. They did, however, sometimes make our efforts to obtain information about the past more difficult. This, in its turn, caused us to err on the side of caution in making our findings. Despite these difficulties, however, we can still claim, without fear of being contradicted, that we have contributed more to uncovering the truth about the past than all the court cases in the history of apartheid.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

13 From the late 1960s and 1970s, the Black Consciousness Movement campaigned for the use of the word black to describe all those defined as other than white. However, this was by no means universally accepted and many members of the so-called black group still prefer to be described as coloured, Indian and so on. Another debate arises around the term African. Does this or can this refer only to black Africans? The debate is not really capable of being resolved. Generally in this report, black Africans are referred to as Africans. Coloured people, people of Indian or Asian origin and white people are referred to as such. No disrespect is intended to any group or political perspective. It is simply impossible to write a history of South Africa without erring on one side or another of the argument.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

20 We could not make the journey from a past marked by conflict, injustice, oppression, and exploitation to a new and democratic dispensation characterised by a culture of respect for human rights without coming face to face with our recent history. No one has disputed that. The differences of opinion have been about how we should deal with that past; how we should go about coming to terms with it.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This means that we cannot hope properly to understand the history of the period under review unless we give apartheid and racism their rightful place as the defining features of that period. People would be surprised if anyone wanting to describe or understand the post World War II period were to ignore Soviet Communism or not give it a central, indeed pivotal, place in the geopolitics of that period. We know that nations defined themselves in terms of their relationship to Communism. That is what determined the politics, economics and foreign policies of the different protagonists at the time. It is what determined the nature of the Cold War period. The attitude towards Communism defined who one's allies and enemies were, what sort of defence budget was necessary and which surrogate states to support. The threat was seen as so serious that the world's greatest Western democracy saw nothing wrong with supporting some of the world's worst dictatorships - for example, Pinochet's Chile, other Latin American military dictatorships and

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

64 I want to suggest that apartheid and racism played a similar defining role in the history of the period under review. The vast majority, if not all, of the gross violations of human rights that were perpetrated in this period happened at the hands either of those who sought to defend the unjust apartheid and racist dispensation or those who sought to resist and ultimately overthrow that system.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and a majority who

sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights became a major casualty of this conflict ... the legitimacy of the law itself was deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged in the face of this tragic conflict ...

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

3 Before starting on the long journey through these volumes, two major points or themes need to be developed in order to place their context in fuller political and historical perspective. The first of these relates to the fact that this report covers only a small fraction of time - although possibly the worst and certainly, in regard to the wider region, the bloodiest in the long and violent history of human rights abuse in this subcontinent. The second point to be made is that the report tells only a small part of a much larger story of human rights abuse in South and southern Africa.

4 In developing these two themes in this chapter, special attention will be given to the role and contribution of two phenomena or factors in the shaping of this country's history, namely violence and the law, and the relationship between them.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

8 It is also important to remember that the 1960 Sharpsville massacre (with which the mandate of the Commission begins) was simply the latest in a long line of similar killings of civilian protesters in South African history. It was, for example, not a National Party administration but the South African Party government, made up primarily of English-speaking South Africans, that in July 1913 crushed a series of miners' strikes on the Reef - sending in the army and killing just over one hundred strikers and onlookers. Thrice in 1921 and 1922, this same governing party let loose its troops and planes: first, against a protesting religious sect, the Israelites at Bulhoek, killing 183 people; second, against striking white mineworkers on the Reef in 1922, resulting in the deaths of 214 people<sup>3</sup>; and third, when the Bondelswarts people, a landless hunting group of Nama origin in South West Africa, in rebellion against a punitive dog tax in 1922, were machine-gunned from the air. One hundred civilians, mostly women, were killed.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

11 Indeed, one of most ambitious and far-reaching attempts at social engineering in twentieth century South African history was introduced by the first post-unification South African Party government in the form of the 1913 Land Act. No other piece of legislation in South African history more dramatically and drastically re-shaped the social map of this country. Not only did it lay the basis for the territorial separation of whites and Africans; it destroyed, at a stroke, a thriving African landowning and peasant agricultural sector. It did so by prohibiting African land ownership outside of the initial 7 per cent of land allocated to the so-called traditional reserves and ending sharecropping and non-tenancy arrangements on white-owned farms. The Land Act set in motion a massive forced removal of African people that led, amongst other things, to the deaths of many hundreds of people who found themselves suddenly landless.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

### ■ THE LAW AND VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

68 Violence has been the single most determining factor in South African political history. The reference, however, is not simply to physical or overt violence - the violence of the gun - but also to the violence of the law or what is often referred to as institutional or structural violence.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

7 Soon afterwards, Asmal's call became a firm proposal of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, following an investigation of accusations that the ANC in-exile had perpetrated human rights violations in some of its camps. In response to the allegations, the ANC set up its own internal commissions of enquiry, the Stuart, Skweyiya and Motsuenyane commissions. The reports of these commissions confirmed that gross human rights violations had taken place in the camps. The National Executive Committee accepted the criticisms levelled at the organisation. It expressed the view, however, that the violations committed by the ANC should be seen against the background of the human rights violations that had taken place in South Africa over a much longer period. It proposed the appointment of a truth commission as a way of achieving this. This was perhaps the first time in history that a liberation movement or government-in-waiting had called for an independent investigation of this kind, aimed at enquiring into allegations of violations of human rights not only by the previous regime, but also by its own members.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

146 These norms governing the use of legitimate state power are particularly difficult to apply to the period of South African history prescribed by the Commission's mandate. The large majority of people inside and outside the country increasingly rejected the legitimacy of the state, and activists fighting against apartheid were defined as criminals through the enforcement of harsh, unjust and discriminatory laws.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

Krog, a South African writer and poet, "the road of... restoring memory and humanity".<sup>7</sup> It is what Oxford University historian, Timothy Garton Ash, sees as "the most promising" way – a way that offers "history lessons" as an alternative to political trials, uncovering what happened and identifying lessons for the future.<sup>8</sup> As such, the Commission sought to recover parts of the national memory that had hitherto been officially ignored.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

52 This means that one must guard against such simplistic platitudes as 'to forgive is to forget'. It is also crucial not to fall into the error of equating forgiveness with reconciliation. The road to reconciliation requires more than forgiveness and respectful remembrance. It is, in this respect, worth remembering the difficult history of reconciliation between Afrikaners and white English-speaking South Africans after the devastating Anglo-Boer/South African War (1899-1902). Despite coexistence and participation with English-speaking South Africans in the political system that followed the war, it took many decades to rebuild relationships and redistribute resources - a process that was additionally complicated by a range of urban/rural, class, and

linguistic and other barriers. Reconciliation requires not only individual justice, but also social justice.

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

13 See Michael Marrus, 'History and the Holocaust in the Courtroom', paper delivered at a conference, Searching for Memory and Justice: the Holocaust and Apartheid, Yale University, 8-10 February 1998. He identifies a range of factors inherent to the due process of law, concluding that criminal trials are "far less effective vehicles than many people think for registering a historical account" of past atrocities. He contends that: "Knowing what happened in the past demands an alternative method of enquiry".

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof...Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.<sup>14</sup>

#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

105 A pertinent question is the extent to which individual South Africans can be regarded as responsible for the premises and presuppositions which gave rise to apartheid. The kindest answer consists of a reminder that history suggests that most citizens are inclined to lemming-like behaviour - thoughtless submission rather than thoughtful accountability. This is a tendency that needs to be addressed in ensuring that the future is different from the past and serves as a reminder that the most penetrating enquiry into the past involves more than a witch-hunt. It involves, rather, laying a foundation against which the present and all future governments will be judged.

#### Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

19 However, the data gathered from the human rights violations statements do permit the kinds of analyses to which they are subjected in the various chapters of this report. It is important to note that the Commission's data were based on corroborated findings. This means that, at a minimum, these violations (if not many more) definitely happened in these places at these times. Furthermore, none of the conclusions in the Commission report are based on quantitative data alone; in each case, the quantitative data is linked to the accounts of contemporary journalists, histories of the various regions, and analyses of reported situations by NGO human rights groups.

#### Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

21 The Commission's database represents an unequalled collection of data on a set of events that took place during a unique period of South Africa's history. It may only have scratched the surface, but that surface has been scratched in unprecedented detail.

#### Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared, sometimes mysteriously, and most of them no longer survive to tell their tales. Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.

#### Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

■ INTRODUCTION 1 The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation's memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory – much of it contained in countless documentary records. The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. As this chapter will demonstrate, the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state.

#### Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

surgery. In that instance, the investigating officer was killed, and other detectives were afraid to pursue their investigations. Ms Mary de Haas of the University of Natal gave a background submission on the political history of the area, and the failure of the SAP and KZP to investigate properly and deal with the situation.

#### Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

33 Staff went to a lot of trouble to identify different types of cases for the human rights violation hearings so that both high and low profile cases were heard, witnesses from across the political spectrum were given a voice, and both individual and group cases were heard. Occasionally alleged perpetrators were able to give their side of the story at the same hearings as their accusers. The hearing at Lusikisiki, for example, became a landmark in uncovering the history of rural rebellions from the early 1960s.

#### Reference 26 - 0.01% Coverage

1 Lusikisiki (24 - 26 March 1997). The hearing took place in a deep rural area and was hampered by logistic problems, such as the lack of electricity. However, it was successful in giving insights into lesser-known South African history, like the 1960 Pondoland revolt.

#### Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

The history of security legislation in South Africa is very convoluted. Only those laws mentioned in the Race Relations Surveys (RRS and SRR) and John Dugard's Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) are listed. In particular, those laws relating to the tightening up of detention legislation are included. Only a brief description of the various state of emergency regulations is given.

#### Reference 28 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The Commission attempted to resolve these difficulties by identifying patterns and trends in the gross violations reported, as well as patterns of behaviour in groups and parties responsible for their perpetration. In so doing, it aimed to achieve a broader and more accurate picture of the history of human rights violations during the mandate period, 1960–94.

#### Reference 29 - 0.01% Coverage

28 The history of resistance in South Africa was frequently associated with shifts in the patterns and forms of gross violations of human rights, as well as in the changing identities of perpetrator groups. In response to the events of 1960 and the liberation movements' adoption of the armed struggle, the former state invoked the full force of its security legislation to curb resistance. Detention of political activists became the primary means of intensifying repression. Torture of detainees and other abuses associated with detention were the main forms of violation reported to the Commission for this early period. The most frequently reported perpetrator grouping was the security police.

#### Reference 30 - 0.01% Coverage

47 In 1961, responsibility for the police was added to Justice Minister Vorster's portfolio. In 1962, he appointed Lieutenant General JM Keevy as commissioner of police and, in 1963, Hendrik van den Bergh as head of the Security Branch. According to the official history of the SAP, the three were a formidable triumvirate whose major objective was "to safeguard and protect the country."<sup>2</sup> They obtained significant increases in the police budget, a large proportion of which was absorbed by the Security Branch, which grew substantially in the 1960s.

#### Reference 31 - 0.01% Coverage

312 In January 1987, Rouget left the Comores and moved to South Africa where he worked as a representative of the Europe-Africa Export company. This position required him to visit Europe frequently. Ms Forkel accepted that Rouget was not one of the killers as his looks did not correspond with the description of the two killers, but her conclusion in regard to him was that

his character, history, relationship to the world of mercenaries, stay in South Africa and frequent travelling to Europe amounted to “grounds for suspicion”.

#### Reference 32 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The ISU developed a reputation for abuses of power and the unaccountable behaviour of its members, which began to embarrass even senior police managers during the Peace Accord period. In a paradoxical twist of history, some township residents begin to call for troops, rather than the ISU, to patrol the townships.

#### Reference 33 - 0.01% Coverage

88 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985-1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by ‘people’s courts’ and it was not possible to establish whether the IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have played a factor.

#### Reference 34 - 0.01% Coverage

298 First, forms of vigilante activity in the KwaNdebele area predate the unrest of the mid-1980s by at least a decade. SS Skosana, elected the first president of the Imbokodo when it was officially constituted in 1986, has traced the organisation's roots to a “cultural society” formed in 1976 “when there were riots and schools were burned”. Throughout the intervening decade, a number of vigilante attacks were carried out against perceived political opponents of the KwaNdebele government and its various tribal authorities. In addition, numerous tactics, including roadblocks, were used to identify and “discipline” various “agitators” especially “outsiders” – generally perceived as politicised youth from the Rand – operating in the homeland. Vigilantism thus has a long, indigenous history in the area.

#### Reference 35 - 0.01% Coverage

299 Second, many of these activities were conducted with the blessing if not the active participation of the Ndzundza royal kraal. Despite their emergence as leading opponents of the Imbokodo in 1986, members of the royal family were involved in earlier forms of vigilante activity. In fact, individuals participating in early vigilante operations emphasised that they were “called by the king” when such activities were deemed necessary. With this history in mind, Imbokodo members have claimed that their organisation was constituted at the royal kraal and derived its authority from the king himself.

#### Reference 36 - 0.01% Coverage

308 However, on the recommendations of the 1975 select committee for Bantu Affairs, the government considered incorporating Moutse into the soon to be established Ndebele homeland.



Given Moutse's history and its ethnic composition, many analysts condemned the proposal as a violation of apartheid's ethnic ideal. Internal DCAD memoranda reveal that the department realised that their plans for Moutse represented a significant change of emphasis. Nevertheless, officials justified Moutse's incorporation based on a number of administrative, economic and developmental considerations. For its part, the 1975 select committee was motivated by a number of concerns. First, the incorporation of Moutse would have greatly expanded the area of the small KwaNdebele homeland. Second, the enlarged homeland would have remained a contiguous area, a goal frequently mentioned by apartheid planners but rarely achieved. Third, KwaNdebele's land area and population size would be boosted without the costs and negative publicity accompanying physical removals. Finally, given Moutse's combination of trust land and African freehold, the area's incorporation would boost KwaNdebele's size without the state having to purchase white farms or modify the amount of land occupied by Africans in terms of the limits set by the 1936 Land Act. In 1980, the central government excised Moutse from Lebowa, the first step towards acting on the select committee's recommendation.

#### Reference 37 - 0.01% Coverage

112 What is tragic is that so heroic a figure as Ms Madikizela-Mandela, with her own rich history of contribution to the struggle, became embroiled in a controversy that caused immeasurable damage to her reputation. There can be no doubt that she showed poor judgment in ignoring the advice of the community leaders and members of the MDM. The Commission has been unable to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to what went wrong, why Madikizela-Mandela was not accountable to the democratic structures inside the country, what influence the external liberation movement had over her, why she surrounded herself with persons of the calibre of Jerry Richardson and Xoliswa Falati, or why she became so isolated from democratic and community structures.

#### Reference 38 - 0.01% Coverage

139 Two important events in the homelands proved milestones in the larger history of this period as they resonated throughout South Africa and, in turn, helped to direct the course of events in the country. The incidents occurred in homelands whose leaders had proved reluctant to surrender juridical independence and reincorporate into South Africa. In addition, the governments in both homelands showed themselves willing to engage in political brinkmanship in order to assert their power, particularly in the face of the ANC's increasing centrality to the negotiations.

#### Reference 39 - 0.01% Coverage

149 In February 1991, in an ironic twist of history, Charles Sebe was shot dead by his former allies while on his way to the Bisho capital of Ciskei, apparently to overthrow Gqozo and fulfil his long-time dream of ruling Ciskei. Sebe was shot dead at a roadblock in an operation run by IR/CIS.

#### Reference 40 - 0.01% Coverage

175 Throughout its brief history, the ADM was involved in violent clashes with the ANC. After the Bisho massacre of September 1992, these clashes erupted into more overt warfare, with increasingly sophisticated weapons being used (see the Eastern Cape regional profile elsewhere in this report). The highest number of attacks appeared to have been carried out by the ANC-aligned groups.

#### Reference 41 - 0.01% Coverage

189 The Seven Day War in 1990 was one of the most significant events in the history of political violence in the province during the period. The Seven Day War is the collective name given to the events that occurred in the greater Edendale Valley in the greater Pietermaritzburg area in the seven days from Sunday 25 March 1990.

#### Reference 42 - 0.01% Coverage

239 In the run-up to the 1994 elections, Inkatha came into conflict with the central government and the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) concerning the issue of independence and sovereignty for KwaZulu. Inkatha adopted a publicly declared militant stance towards the rejection of its demands, culminating in a decision not to participate in the April 1994 elections. It was only on 19 April 1994, just six days before the elections, that Inkatha did an about-turn and announced that it would contest the elections. In the interim period, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. Approximately 3 000 gross violations of human rights were perpetrated by Inkatha in KwaZulu and Natal from July 1993 to May 1994. This constituted more than 55 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission's Durban office for this period.

#### Reference 43 - 0.01% Coverage

function. For many security force members, their existence undoubtedly confirmed that pronouncements of levelling the playing fields and normalising the political situation for free and fair elections represented the public face of NP policy, but at another, covert level, the war was to continue. In this regard, the Harms, Kahn and Goldstone Commissions and Steyn investigation were seen by many as public relations exercises rather than determined initiatives to root out 'dirty practices'. The long history of cover-ups and condonation of lying to such commissions merely reinforced this perception. Consequently, many operatives continued to conduct an all-out war against 'the enemy' and, as indicated earlier, elimination and the deadly use of force continued as a matter of routine.

#### Reference 44 - 0.01% Coverage

523 Of particular relevance in the 1990s is a previous history of encouraging divisions between Inkatha and the UDF. What is important to note is that this covert policy of encouraging and fomenting such divisions predates the outbreak of violent conflict in Natal and that, when the conflict assumed violent proportions, this was simply noted and no attempt was made to change the overall strategy. This indicates, at the very least, that this was regarded as acceptable, possibly even desirable. Operation Marion and the Caprivi training must thus be seen in the

context of this overall State Security Council policy. A similar strategy was reflected in Operation Katzen and support for vigilante groups. Covert support for anti-UDF/ ANC groupings was well established by the 1990 and was seen as legitimate and authorised. This support led to the development of links between individual security force operatives and conservative individuals at a local level, providing a basis for ongoing destabilisation on the ground. The connection between this strategy and the violence in the 1990s is obvious. Indeed, support for Inkatha continued into the 1990s. It is thus not surprising that security force members believed that it was legitimate to provide support, including arms, to Inkatha, or to seek to protect and foster IFP-linked forces when policing violence-torn communities.

#### Reference 45 - 0.01% Coverage

6 ‘State and allied groupings’ comprises reported violations associated with public order policing, detention and torture, covert actions of the security forces and contra-mobilisation. ‘Resistance and revolutionary groupings’ comprises, for the most part, violations perpetrated by such groupings, including attacks on ‘collaborators’, necklacings, armed actions and sabotage, inter-organisational conflict and so forth. Where the history of violations occurring in the mandate period of the Commission was not amenable to these categories (particularly in the 1990s – the years of political transition), a thematic approach has been used.

#### Reference 46 - 0.01% Coverage

38 The greatest number of instances of severe ill treatment are attributed to the SAP, followed by the IFP, with over 7 000 alleged violations each, followed by the ANC with over 2 000. Again, the pattern is different at different periods of history, and matches the pattern of alleged killings closely: ~

#### Reference 47 - 0.01% Coverage

Tribal clashes, which occur from time to time and which have occurred regularly throughout history, are presented as revolts against the system of Bantu Authorities. Even when the true facts are supplied to these newspapers, the paragraph giving the facts is carefully deleted.

#### Reference 48 - 0.01% Coverage

21 Statements were received from a broad cross-section of communities in the province, with the majority coming from the townships and rural KwaZulu (former ‘black areas’). While many people approached the Commission of their own accord with reports of violations, the Commission also deployed teams of statement takers across the province to gather a wide-ranging sample of evidence for a more complete view of the region’s history. Statement takers reported difficulties in gaining access to some areas, for example Inchanga, which had been the scene of political conflict during 1996–97, and other areas known to be strongholds of the IFP.

#### Reference 49 - 0.01% Coverage

35 The Durban strikes of 1973 marked a turning point in the history of political resistance in the province. With wages practically frozen for over a decade, the growing poverty in the cities – and therefore also in the rural areas where families depended on the wages of migrant breadwinners – led to strikes which affected 150 establishments and involved 60 000 workers during the first few months of 1973. The strikers were ultimately forced to back down, but they laid the foundations for a new labour union movement and for organised social resistance in other

#### Reference 50 - 0.01% Coverage

427 In the months leading up to the elections, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. The incidence of politically motivated human rights violations rose dramatically following the announcement of the election date.

#### Reference 51 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The constitution of the Eagles Youth Club was said to be based on 'Christian National Principles' and pursued its objectives by means of camps offering a variety of activities, including political education. Lectures in political education covered subjects as diverse as Christianity, Communism and the culture and history of the ANC and PAC. Eagles were encouraged to co-operate with state structures, particularly with the police and the SADF, who were described in the courses as 'your friends'. At the same time, members were encouraged to report 'terrorists' to the police and warned against 'people who are trying to tell you bad things about South Africa'. They were told that 'comrades' organisations in townships were part of the 'enemy' and should be neutralised. Eagles members became sources of information concerning the identity of 'comrades' in townships, and were used to monitor the strategies and plans of 'comrades' organisations, particularly around popular events such as the commemoration of 16 June (Soweto Day).

#### Reference 52 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The Northern Cape has a long history of land dispossession and forced removals. Africans were removed mainly to Bophuthatswana, often making way for South African Defence Force (SADF) military camps. Later in the 1980s, independent communal farming settlements such as Leliefontein, Steinkopf and Richtersveld in Namaqualand were privatised by the House of Representatives, leading to impoverishment and protest.

#### Reference 53 - 0.01% Coverage

124 On 26 October, the state of emergency was extended to the western Cape, which prohibited up to a hundred organisations from holding meetings and also restricted the media. Four hundred people were detained in the first two weeks of the emergency, and the death toll continued to rise. Under these harsh restrictions, political protest adopted more varied forms such as candlelight protests, hunger strikes and church services, many of which were violently disrupted by police. The Divisional Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape, Brigadier Chris Swart, said that the candlelight protests were not innocent, but "deliberate tactics aimed at stirring

people's emotions, which leads them to violent acts". THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE GOAL OF THE 'POLLSMOOR MARCH' WAS SYMBOLIC IN NATURE, NAMELY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO MR MANDELA AND DEMAND HIS RELEASE. MANY OF THE GROUPS OF MARCHERS WERE LED BY CLERICS, STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THE ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ON THE DAY OF THE POLLSMOOR MARCH AND THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS WERE THEREFORE UNWARRANTED AND USED EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT A MINIMUM OF TWENTY-EIGHT DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE HARSH REPRESSION OF THIS ACT OF PEACEFUL PROTEST PROPELLED THE REGION INTO THE MOST EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF PUBLIC UNREST IN ITS HISTORY, LASTING SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

Reference 54 - 0.01% Coverage

162 Police moved in and arrested numerous people, including three women. Twenty-six were accused of murder and tried in a high-profile political trial that dominated both Upington and South African judicial history.

Reference 55 - 0.01% Coverage

2 The massacre was a turning point in South African history. In its wake, the government declared South Africa's first state of emergency in terms of the Public Safety Act of 1953. In addition, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were 'banned' from operating as unlawful organisations.

Reference 56 - 0.01% Coverage

25 The march was organised and planned by the PAC. In its verbal submission to the Commission, the PAC outlined the history of the organisation's anti-pass campaign and emphasised the commitment of its organisers to peaceful protest. The March 1960 protest action against the pass laws built on the success of the PAC Status Campaign which focused on the idea of mental liberation. PAC representatives told the Commission that it was "an absolutely non-violent campaign".<sup>1</sup> PAC leader Robert Sobukwe, reportedly announced before the march that "we are ready to die for our cause but we are not ready to kill". Before the march, a letter was sent to the commissioner of police, Major General Rademeyer "explaining fully the peaceful nature of the campaign".

Reference 57 - 0.01% Coverage

107 In 1976, the Johannesburg area was the centre of the most sustained and violent protests the country had ever seen. 1976 has frequently been described as a turning point in South Africa's political history. The conflict sparked by the former state's attempt to impose Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on black school children lasted fifteen months and spread to 200 towns and cities across South Africa.<sup>18</sup>

#### Reference 58 - 0.01% Coverage

164 ‘Rooi Rus’ Swanepoel, who became known for his brutality in the course of the protest, already had a long history of involvement in gross human rights violations as chief interrogator of the Security Branch. He was, moreover, the founder of an anti-terrorist unit which later became Koevoet.

#### Reference 59 - 0.01% Coverage

245 In 1985, the charge of high treason was revived and fifty-five people were charged with high treason in seven separate trials. One of these, the Pietermaritzburg Trial, sought to demonstrate that the South African Allied Workers Union, the UDF and some of its affiliates – all lawful organisations carrying out legal activities – were operating as part of a revolutionary conspiracy. The Delmas trial, in which twenty-two activists were charged, lasted from June 1985 until December 1989 and is alleged to have been the longest trial in South African history.

#### Reference 60 - 0.01% Coverage

408 In Bophuthatswana, freedom of political expression and activity could hardly be said to exist. The ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party dominated parliament throughout the territory’s history, and various attempts to establish alternative parties and associations floundered as a result of severe repression.

#### Reference 61 - 0.01% Coverage

538 Conflict between hostel-dwellers and residents of adjacent townships and settlements was a major site of conflict in this period. Since the 1976 attack by Mzimhlope hostel residents on protesting students in Soweto in which seventy people died, there had been a history of animosity between the two communities. This was exacerbated during the 1980s as the urban-centred nature of township politics frequently marginalised hostel residents.

#### Reference 62 - 0.01% Coverage

564 In the attack which has become known as the Nangalembe Night Vigil Massacre in Sebokeng on 12 January 1991, forty-five people were killed at a night vigil for ANC Youth League (ANCYL) member, Mr Christopher Nangalembe [JB00317/03VT]. Mr Victor Khetisi Kheswa was allegedly responsible for Nangalembe’s death. According to Kheswa’s mother, the two boys had grown up together. Kheswa, however, had a long history of criminal involvement and, when youth in Sebokeng and Evaton launched an anti-crime campaign, Kheswa inevitably came into conflict with some of his former associates in the ANCYL. One of the allegations against Kheswa was that he had killed a young women by forcing her to drink acid. Christopher Nangalembe sat on the ‘panel’ of a ‘people’s court’ that accused Kheswa of this and other crimes. Kheswa was then shot, allegedly by members of the ‘people’s court’. Kheswa survived the attack.

#### Reference 63 - 0.01% Coverage

718 From 1989–91, there were at least seventeen extra-judicial executions in Khutsong, a small township outside Carletonville on the West Rand. The victims were all members of the Khutsong Youth Congress (KYC). The KYC split into two factions – the ‘Zim-Zims’ and the ‘Gaddaffis’, both active UDF/ANC supporters. The Commission received over sixty statements relating to this particular period in Khutsong’s history.

#### Reference 64 - 0.01% Coverage

743 The task team was set up and investigated over a hundred cases of torture and assault as well as seventeen cases of extra-judicial executions, two of which involved sixteen-year-old Mr Nixon Phiri [JB01068/03WR] and fifteen-year-old Mr Eugene Mbulawa [JB00462/03WR]. Both youths died after being detained by the SAP. The police claimed that Phiri died as a result of an epileptic fit. There was no history of him having this condition at the time of his detention. Two witnesses who were detained with him and who witnessed his assault died in ‘unrest incidents’ shortly after making statements to the Phiri family’s attorneys. THE COMMISSION FINDS THE SAP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH IN CUSTODY OF MR EUGENE MBULAWA AND MR NIXON PHIRI.

#### Reference 65 - 0.01% Coverage

16 The greatest number of instances of severe ill treatment are attributed to the SAP, followed by the ANC, with the Bophuthatswana security forces and IFP showing a similar number. As is the case for killings, the pattern changes at different periods of history, and closely matches the pattern of killings for the top three organisations: ~

#### Reference 66 - 0.01% Coverage

Indeed, the historical record does not support business claims of noncollaboration. A vast body of evidence points to a central role for business interests in the elaboration, adoption, implementation and modification of apartheid policies throughout its dismal history. The South African Police and Defence Force were armed and equipped by big business. Apartheid’s jails were constructed by big business, as were the buildings housing the vast apartheid bureaucracy. Apartheid’s labour laws, pass laws, forced removals and cheap labour system were all to the advantage of the business community.

#### Reference 67 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This history has been well documented<sup>7</sup> and was reflected in submissions by COSATU, the SACP and the ANC. The first-order involvement of the mining houses and the Chamber of Mines (COM) in shaping the migrant labour system is the clearest example of business working closely with the minority (white) government to create the conditions for capital accumulation based on cheap African labour. The evidence shows that, rather than relying simply on the forces of supply and demand, the mining industry harnessed the services of the state to shape labour supply conditions to their advantage. Thus, the mining industry bears a great deal of moral responsibility for the migrant labour system and its associated hardships.

#### Reference 68 - 0.01% Coverage

65 The image of gold mining magnates accumulating vast wealth at the expense of African mine workers, whose wages stagnated in real terms until the 1970s, is a stain on the mining industry and one it needs to recognise. For most of the twentieth century, the greatest point of contact between African workers and business occurred on the mines. The shameful history of subhuman compound conditions, brutal suppression of striking workers, racist practices and meagre wages is central to understanding the origins and nature of apartheid. The failure of the Chamber of Mines to address this squarely and to grapple with its moral implications is regrettable and not constructive.

#### Reference 69 - 0.01% Coverage

71 The COSATU submission also recalled the notorious Kinross mining disaster, the largest accident in the history of gold mining in South Africa. On 15 September 1986, 177 workers were killed as the result of a polyurethane fire. The submission records the shocking way in which the mine reacted to the disaster:

#### Reference 70 - 0.01% Coverage

109 As the repression of the 1980s escalated, some faith communities and organisations joined the liberation organisations in appealing to international partners to press for economic sanctions.<sup>52</sup> Many however opposed sanctions or were ambivalent on the question. Some, like the Church of the Province, confessed to its failure to support sanctions only as late as 1989.<sup>53</sup> The Catholic Bishops Conference, “fearing a great increase of poverty and unemployment”, supported sanctions with reservations. “History”, it said, “will be the judge”. The only English-speaking church to give unqualified support to sanctions from the outset was the United Congregational Church.<sup>54</sup>

#### Reference 71 - 0.01% Coverage

I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country is driven continuously to a conflict between his conscience on the one hand and the law on the other... The law as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is written by the Nationalist Government is a law which in our view is immoral, unjust and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we must oppose it and that we must attempt to alter it.

#### Reference 72 - 0.01% Coverage

46 The Commission finds that an appearance before the Commission in such special circumstances would have demonstrated accountability and would not have compromised the independence of the judiciary. History will judge the judiciary harshly. Its response to the hearing has again placed the questions of what accountability and independence mean in a constitutional democracy in the public domain for debate.



#### Reference 73 - 0.01% Coverage

It also appeared from interviews that, in teaching the subject, more attention was given to the history of nursing and etiquette than to ethics and professional conduct, and that students perceived the subject as a list of 'do's and don'ts'.

#### Reference 74 - 0.01% Coverage

22 While the Act establishing the Commission directed it to examine the years 1960 to 1994, many of the events under scrutiny by the Commission can only be understood adequately within the context of the history and events leading up to this period.

#### Reference 75 - 0.01% Coverage

40 As yet, relatively little is known about the human rights violations committed by health professionals in the military. The SAMS submission to the Commission focused on the history, functions and administrative structure of the service, rather than considering any possible involvement in gross human rights violations. Many questions were deferred because they related to supposedly 'classified' (secret) operations. For example, the SAMS submission referred to three special projects undertaken by the Psychology Directorate. The reference was followed by the

#### Reference 76 - 0.01% Coverage

54 There are some well-known examples of cases where doctors reported false causes of death. These include the numerous detainees who supposedly died from such causes as slipping on a bar of soap, dying of an epileptic seizure where no prior history of epilepsy existed, having a heart attack without a history of heart disease, choking on food or suffocating or committing suicide. In addition, doctors were known to give expert advice on the mental health of deceased prisoners, or to conclude that someone had committed suicide because of mental instability, without ever having met the person involved. This type of evidence was advanced at the inquest into the death of Neil Aggett.

#### Reference 77 - 0.01% Coverage

99 History has shown that the two most powerful bodies with which doctors were associated - the SAMDC and the MASA - failed to speak out or take a stand for most of the period under review.

#### Reference 78 - 0.01% Coverage

122 The South African Psychological Association (SAPA) was founded in 1948, with a membership of thirty-four. In 1962, following the admission of a black member, a new association, the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), was established exclusively for whites. The two organisations merged in 1983 to form the Psychological

Association of South Africa (PASA). Black professionals were permitted as members but, because of the racist history of PIRSA, many chose to join the Black Psychologists' Association instead.

#### Reference 79 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The Afrikaans press declined to make a submission to the Commission. Instead, it provided the Commission with a copy of Oor Grense Heen, the official history of Nasionale Pers (Naspers).

56 Rather oddly in the context, the book repeatedly confirms that the various newspapers in the group were always pro-NP government institutions. The opening paragraph states candidly that the NP victory in 1948 meant that the company became a pro-government institution. The history concedes that Die Burger, for instance, promoted Verwoerd's ideals of bantustans from an early stage and that, after Sharpsville, the same newspaper advised that all positive aspects be speeded up. Occasionally, doubts about apartheid do surface but, in the main, the book reflects a total lack of concern for the company's support of the racist system.

#### Reference 80 - 0.01% Coverage

59 They said that "many Afrikaans journalists were deaf and blind to the political aspirations and sufferings of black fellow South Africans" and did not inform their readers about the injustices of apartheid. When knowledge about gross human rights violations became public, the journalists felt they had too readily accepted the denials and disingenuous explanations of the NP. Those who made submissions also sought forgiveness for their lack of action and committed themselves to ensuring that history would not repeat itself.

#### Reference 81 - 0.01% Coverage

104 By not reporting honestly on the human rights abuses of the NP government, the Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor ones. (Their heirs, significantly, made a significant gesture towards reconciliation by making personal submissions of regret following the absence of their employers from the hearing.)

#### Reference 82 - 0.01% Coverage

c Biko's death and 'Black Thursday'. These were both milestones in media history and more attention should have been paid to them.

#### Reference 83 - 0.01% Coverage

7 MWASA embraced the Black Consciousness philosophy and excluded whites. The membership argued that news, current affairs and history was seen only through the eyes of

white writers. In later years, at a Cape Town conference in 1990, delegates moved for the opening up of the union to white membership, arguing that it was time the union became non-racial.

#### Reference 84 - 0.01% Coverage

What about those people in the existential vacuum from both sides that are now left with [the problem of] trying to figure out where to go? The change of government doesn't necessarily provide you with a job or resolve the problems you have as a result of a long history of alienation.

#### Reference 85 - 0.01% Coverage

Looking back on the sad history related above, there is nothing that I am and can be proud of. On the contrary, I am humbled by a deep sense of shame for the fact that it only slowly dawned upon me that I was participating in, and then virtually did nothing about, the system that I described.

#### Reference 86 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa's history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

#### Reference 87 - 0.01% Coverage

77 Exile is often experienced as a brutal rupture in an individual's personal history, resulting in a lack of continuity that frequently becomes a serious obstacle to the development of a meaningful and positive sense of identity. It has been argued that political repression and exile tend to distort normal socialisation in a child or young person. Some of the significant consequences of life in exile include a feeling of 'transitoriness', a profound sense of loss of security, feelings of guilt, and a range of more severe psychological problems and disorders.

#### Reference 88 - 0.01% Coverage

harnessed vast amounts of energy, courage and resilience during the apartheid era. For many young people, active engagement in political activity resulted in the acquisition of skills such as analysis, mobilisation and strategising, as well as the ability to draw strength from friends and comrades in times of hardship. Many of today's leaders come from a politically active history and have displayed a remarkable capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation.

#### Reference 89 - 0.01% Coverage

99 Psychological, social and economic stresses are compounded when children are faced with physical danger from and abuse by the authorities that are meant to protect them. Not only were child protection laws ignored, but the authorities systematically attacked children, resulting in grave emotional and physical harm. Mr Maxlesi described the persistent physical reminders of a violent history:

#### Reference 90 - 0.01% Coverage

After the unbanning of the ANC, they (the BMW members) were left to their own devices. As things simmered down, they found themselves naked and vulnerable, lost and exposed, without direction. These guys were literally born on the streets, born in the eye of the storm. They did not have a history before 1986. They had little schooling or skills, except in zipguns and petrol bombs. They were the shocktroops.<sup>7</sup>

#### Reference 91 - 0.01% Coverage

as individuals can and should be held accountable by history for our lack of necessary action in times of crisis ... in exercising apathy rather than commitment we allow(ed) others to sacrifice their lives for the sake of our freedom and an increase in our standard of living.

#### Reference 92 - 0.01% Coverage

10 South Africa's history of repression and exploitation severely affected the mental well-being of the majority of its citizens. South Africans have had to deal with a psychological stress which has arisen as a result of deprivation and dire socioeconomic conditions, coupled with the cumulative trauma arising from violent state repression and intra-community conflicts.

#### Reference 93 - 0.01% Coverage

139 The townships and residential areas constructed in this period were grossly underserved. Many were without basic services such as water, electricity, adequate housing, roads, schools and clinics. Lack of services and appalling living conditions generated tensions that laid the ground for much of the conflict that was generated in South Africa's contemporary history. From rural farming areas to homeland settlements to urban townships, living conditions and economic deprivation provided fertile ground for conflict. The battle for national liberation and civil and political rights cannot, therefore, be separated from countless localised battles rooted in socio-economic deprivation.

#### Reference 94 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The appearance before the Commission of former President FW de Klerk as spokesperson of the National Party (NP) perspective was a particular disappointment to the Commission. As one who had done so much to turn the tide of South African history, his evasiveness and unwillingness candidly to acknowledge the full burden of the NP's responsibility seemed to the Commission to be a missed opportunity to take the reconciliation process forward.

#### Reference 95 - 0.01% Coverage

105 Reference has already been made to the extensive destruction of documents by the former state (see Volume One). The following is a summary of the Commission's finding with regard to this issue: THE FORMER GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED STATE DOCUMENTATION OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THIS PROCESS BEGAN IN 1978, WHEN CLASSIFIED RECORDS WERE ROUTINELY DESTROYED, SUPPOSEDLY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD STATE SECURITY. BY THE 1990S THE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS HAD BECOME A CO-ORDINATED ENDEAVOUR, SANCTIONED BY THE CABINET, WITH THE AIM OF DENYING A NEW GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE AND SANITISING THE HISTORY OF THE APARTHEID ERA.

#### Reference 96 - 0.01% Coverage

150 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people's courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.

#### Reference 97 - 0.01% Coverage

162 The findings outlined above, to a greater or lesser extent, touch all the major role-players who were party to the conflict that enveloped South Africa during its mandate period. No major role-player emerges unscathed although, as already stated, a distinction must be made between those who fought for and those who fought against apartheid. There are many who will reject these findings and argue that they fail to understand the complexities and historical realities of the time, and of the motives and perspectives of those who perpetrated gross violations of human rights. In this regard it needs to be firmly stated that, while the Commission has attempted to convey some of these complexities and has grappled with the motives and perspectives of perpetrators in other sections of this report, it is not the Commission's task to write the history of this country. Rather, it is the Commission's function to expose the violations of all parties in an attempt to lay the basis for a culture in which human rights are respected and not violated.

#### Reference 98 - 0.01% Coverage

164 Finally, in the context of a society moving towards reconciliation, South Africans need to acknowledge this country's divided history and its regional burden; to understand the processes whereby all, citizens included, were drawn in and are implicated in the fabric of human rights abuse, both as victims and perpetrators – at times as both.

#### Reference 99 - 0.01% Coverage

2 Who were the perpetrators and what ‘made’ them, moved them or contributed to their behaviour? It is essential to examine perpetrators as multi-dimensional and rounded individuals rather than simply characterising them as purveyors of horrendous acts. Building on the factual history presented in earlier chapters, and utilising research developed in relation to the Holocaust and other situations of sustained oppression that gave rise to systematic acts of gross human rights violations, this chapter attempts to explain why and how these violations transpired, as a basis for informing the debate concerning reconciliation and recommendations to prevent violations in future. A diagnosis of persons and institutions responsible for gross human rights violations is of paramount importance in seeking to prevent future gross human rights violations.

Reference 100 - 0.01% Coverage

History has subsequently shown that, as far as the policy of apartheid was concerned, they were deeply mistaken.

Reference 101 - 0.01% Coverage

The way we approached this question is like a father, like parents would approach, let’s say, an aberrant child: that child is part of your family, these were people who were oppressed people, part of this history. Now if a child misbehaves and hopefully [the parent] disciplines that child

Reference 102 - 0.01% Coverage

and shouts at the child and does what is possible within the limits of the family ... alright, but they don’t disown these people. For us to disown these people would mean that we don’t understand the history of these people [who] tended to do these sort of things. So they were undisciplined in some instances. When they did that they were not acting within the UDF policy – but we own them, they are part of us, and they are part of our history and we accept them as part of our family.

Reference 103 - 0.01% Coverage

Thus ranged against one another, in intensifying conflict, were the oppressor and the oppressed, the owners of wealth of the country and the dispossessed, the rightless and the privileged. The ANC was a product of this history and this conflict, not their creator.

Reference 104 - 0.01% Coverage

Dr Treurnicht had called us up for the third freedom struggle, Mr Chairman, which in Afrikaner history means only one thing.

Reference 105 - 0.01% Coverage

infertile ground. More fertile soil presents itself in the form of special organisations. People join up or are recruited, and are then selectively drawn deeper into the organisational culture in

sequential steps of training, specialised allocation and ‘ideological acceleration’. South African history is littered with special groupings of a semi-secretive nature, designed to do either ideological work (the Broederbond) or repressive work, or sometimes both.

#### Reference 106 - 0.01% Coverage

- work actively to build bridges across the divisions of language, faith and history;

#### Reference 107 - 0.01% Coverage

5 History will judge whether or not this particular criticism is accurate. It is, nevertheless, worth making two points in this regard. The first is that, while truth may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation without truth. Certainly, lies, half-truths and denial are not a desirable foundation on which to build the new South Africa. Second, it is readily conceded that it is not possible for one commission, with a limited life-span and resources, on its own to achieve reconciliation against the background of decades of oppression, conflict and deep divisions.

#### Reference 108 - 0.01% Coverage

105 Measures must be implemented to prevent the destruction of records which form part of our history, however unpleasant. Particularly cynical is the deliberate destruction of records which may incriminate individuals or groups in power. To prevent such destruction, appropriate legal powers must be given to the state’s public archives service. The Archives Act provides the necessary legislative framework, but requires rigorous implementation.

#### Reference 109 - 0.01% Coverage

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES BE ENABLED TO FILL THE GAPS IN OFFICIAL MEMORY, THROUGH THE COLLECTION OF NON-PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE PROMOTION OF ORAL HISTORY PROJECTS (IN TERMS OF SECTION 3(D) OF THE ARCHIVES ACT).

#### Reference 110 - 0.01% Coverage

Central to most of these testimonies [by ex-conscripts] is the notion that the present has destroyed the foundations of ‘meaning’ these conscripts adopted to cope with their traumatic experiences. It is easier to cope with having killed someone you believe to be the sub-human agent of forces that wish to destroy everything you hold dear than it is to cope with having killed a normal man, woman or child that history happened to cast as ‘your enemy’. This crisis is greatly intensified when it is revealed to you that the person you have killed is a ‘hero’ or ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘innocent civilian’ – which the South African transformation correctly described him or her to have been. Most of these conscripts have, up until now, silently considered themselves victims (of neglect and manipulation) but are now publicly portrayed as perpetrators (of apartheid military objectives or even of gross human rights violations)... The Truth Commission has helped break the silence of past suffering, atrocities and abuses. In so

doing, it has both released some traumatised ex-conscripts from the prison of silence and trapped them in the role of perpetrators of apartheid. For some, the contradictions of their experience might prove intolerable; for others, the process of revealing the truth about the past might allow them to confront and deal with their experiences.

#### Reference 111 - 0.01% Coverage

I don't want to blame the [Commission] – the media is inclined to look at these atrocities. But the same names, the same police are repeatedly referred to, while there is no mention made of the majority of people who were in the police and the Defence Force who weren't involved in the atrocities. They provided a service for the country, because they loved the country. This is still the case at present and they would probably do it again. Commissioner Malan: Could I just interrupt you here, because I think we've got the message. I refer to the other part, you hear the same names and things but those are things that you didn't hear when you were in the army? That is my question. Mr Van Eeden: I can honestly say to you that these kinds of acts, no one can approve of. It makes you furious and angry because that is not what myself and thousands of young Afrikaner men got involved to do. Commissioner Malan: Can I take the question a bit further and the answer. I know is very difficult for people to understand who look at this whole history from a different perspective... How is it possible that you didn't know anything of it or did anything about it? Do you have a perspective on that? Mr Van Eeden: War as such is a crime against humanity; there are no victors. I had personal knowledge because I saw it, of certain of these actions that took place. I saw the result of bodies being burnt. I had knowledge of that. I didn't have knowledge of orchestrated efforts of forces that I served to incite such incidents... Commissioner Malan: You say that you saw bodies that were burnt. What did you think was the reason for that? Who burnt them? Mr Van Eeden: I didn't have to think of what the reason was; it was quite clear. I did my service in Vaal Triangle in the 1990s and it was black on black violence. That it could have been incited from another force, well we have evidence for that now. But I have personal knowledge of, well, let's refer to it as violence between ethnic groups, black ethnic groups in the Vaal Triangle, I saw that.

#### Reference 112 - 0.01% Coverage

55 A spokesperson for the Stellenbosch Presbytery of the Dutch Reformed Church made the following statement at the human rights violations hearing in Paarl: [We] are not doing this presentation on behalf of the Dutch Reformed Church – only the Synod has this right to do this. But what we are doing here this afternoon is the deepest conviction of the Presbytery of Stellenbosch ... In looking back, we realise that there have been times in the history of Stellenbosch when we as a Presbytery (and also as separate congregations) either failed wholesale or made only the most timid of efforts to fulfil the prophetic responsibility the Lord has given us. We think especially of the past forty years during which the official policy of apartheid radically impaired the human dignity of people all around us and resulted in gross violations of human rights. Within the borders of our Presbytery, there were those who actively developed and defended the ideological framework by which these violations and actions were justified. At times, standpoints and decisions taken within this Presbytery itself functioned within this ideological framework.



#### Reference 113 - 0.01% Coverage

70 Trust Feed is a rural community situated north-west of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZuluNatal. It is a freehold area with a hierarchical structure of landowners and tenants. The area has a long history of peaceful co-existence that changed in the mid1980s as a result of political tensions between the UDF and the IFP. Threatened by the activities of the UDF, the local police unit colluded with the IFP to wipe out UDF members. This led to a sequence of atrocities culminating in the Trust Feed massacre in December 1988.

#### Reference 114 - 0.01% Coverage

102 The following statements illustrate this vital need for broad participation, especially by those who have been unjustly privileged in the past, together with some of the obstacles to restitution. Dr Laurie Nathan, director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution and former Chairperson of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), said at a special hearing on compulsory military service in Cape Town: I want to end by addressing the question of how, in the light of this history, we should manage the past, and I want to address these comments in particular to the white community. The white community tends to take one of three positions in this regard.

#### Reference 115 - 0.01% Coverage

White racism is alive and kicking. It no longer takes the form of legislated supremacy, but it continues to manifest itself in crude and subtle ways. The most insidious is the assumption that white values are universal and by implication superior to those of other groups. The most offensive is the endless complaining about corruption, inefficiency and falling standards. This is one of the bad jokes of the new South Africa. The previous government set unsurpassed standards for corruption, incompetence and neglect. There is a fourth position which is seldom heard and which I believe is the appropriate response. The white community should confront its pervasive racism, and stare our ugly history and its long shelf life in the face. We should acknowledge collective responsibility for our efforts and our acquiescence in constructing and maintaining a wretched system of discrimination, exclusion and repression. To invoke theological terminology, we should confess and engage in meaningful acts of contrition.

#### Reference 116 - 0.01% Coverage

A longer-term reconciliation initiative would need to take the consultation process two steps further. It needs to engage with less developed community structures or networks that do not have a formal voice. Particularly in a community with a history of intense conflict, certain interest groups may not have organised and mobilised, because of fear and/or because of lack of resources. Unless there is assistance for the articulation of these interests, the process will not reach all sectors of the community.

#### Reference 117 - 0.01% Coverage

The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the

past and current community dynamics. Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories. One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history. Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth. Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is dependent on people's ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases. Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation. Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives

#### Reference 118 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The idea of such a register had been discussed informally among Commissioners and crystallised during a radio 'phone-in programme, when listeners expressed a need for some way in which to articulate the regret and contrition they felt for past wrongs. Announcing the Register, the Commission said: It has been established in response to a deep wish for reconciliation in the hearts of many South Africans; people who did not perhaps commit gross violations of human rights, but nevertheless wish to indicate their regret for failures in the past to do all they could have done to prevent such violations; people who want to demonstrate in some symbolic way their commitment to a new kind of future in which human rights abuses will not take place. We know that many South Africans are ready and eager to turn away from a past history of division and discrimination. Guilt for wrongdoing needs to be translated into positive commitment to building a better society – the healthiest and most productive form of atonement.

#### Reference 119 - 0.01% Coverage

134 Commissioners discussed the Register with many other organisations, in the hope that the idea would take root and not be regarded solely as a Commission project. They encouraged

churches and all religious denominations to offer a similar opportunity to their members, creating appropriate ceremonies. They also proposed that other ways of expanding the concept should be considered, possibly by municipalities where such a register might become a part of the history of the period of transformation in their region.

#### Reference 120 - 0.01% Coverage

138 The objectives of the IRC are: a To record the history of racial discrimination in the faculty; b To record the history of resistance to apartheid by members of the faculty; c To allow those who were discriminated against to tell their stories.

#### Reference 121 - 0.01% Coverage

1 We were seventeen individuals appointed by the President to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission). Although not representative of the South African society, we do come from different corners, so to speak, of our society. By definition, we had to have different understandings of our history and immediate past. We were differently exposed and therefore differently disposed. Even where we agreed on facts, their interpretation differed according to our various dispositions.

#### Reference 122 - 0.01% Coverage

4 I was born towards the end of the Second World War, while my father was interned, “in detention without trial”. I was born into the Afrikaner Volk and the National Party. I shared its history and its myths. Choice was not an option. During the interview by the panel that put forward the names of potential members to the President, I stated that I supported apartheid under Verwoerd as a moral option that I believed would lead away from domination and discrimination. It took me more than a decade to shed my (ideological) milk teeth, recognise inconsistencies in policy and cut my more permanent (political) teeth. I shifted from Volk to nation. Yet, when I entered politics, although my aim was nation, I entered the fold of the Volk. Only on looking back do I recognise elements of broader democratic choice. My politics expressed itself through the limited opportunities within the National Party. Only towards the mid-eighties, and then only through friends in struggle politics, did I begin to sense that a covert security ‘policy’ militated

#### Reference 123 - 0.01% Coverage

against my understanding of the political policy of reform, aiming at a democratic dispensation. This sense came about mainly as a result of multiple discretionary detentions without trial of my friends. In their experiences, I recognised some of Afrikaner history.

#### Reference 124 - 0.01% Coverage

23 Exaggeration is a natural consequence of human suffering. Often deponents were not present at the actual violations to which they testified and their stories were accounts of what they were told. They reflect oral history. They also reflect perspectives. Often deponents gave evidence in

terms of their own understanding of what happened. Evidence was not tested. It was not intended to be tested. Except for a few statements, they were not even attested to under oath. Most deponents giving oral evidence, when taking the oath, made it clear that they would speak the truth “as they see it”.

#### Reference 125 - 0.01% Coverage

27 Even though the report offers a good exposition of different concepts of truth, especially of factual truth and narrative truth and then of social or interactive truth, the distinction is not sustained. In arriving at findings, all is accepted as evidence, an ingredient of the factual truth. If we ignore the frame of our various dispositions through which evidence reaches us, we lose the context of the multiplicity of truth, both in dimension and in perspective. Truth, reconciliation and national unity can only be understood within the concept of multiple truths. Our perspectives decide our realities. Different elevations of an object give different pictures. It is only by sharing perspectives, by accepting them as real, that we can develop some form of understanding. To pour history into a mould is to recreate the potential for conflict which our Constitution and politics since 1990 have largely removed. A shared understanding of our history requires an understanding of different perspectives, not the building of a new national myth. Presenting ‘the truth’ as a one-dimensional finding is a continuation of the old frame. Nothing changes, sometimes not even content.

#### Reference 126 - 0.01% Coverage

31 National unity accepts different communities, accepts different cultures, accepts different value systems, accepts different religions, and even accepts different histories, provided there is some shared history. The work and activities of the Commission will certainly contribute to the further development of a shared history. However, such a history cannot be force-fed.

#### Reference 127 - 0.01% Coverage

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator – namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future – which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

#### Reference 128 - 0.01% Coverage

c The reactive phenomenon of Afrikaner Nationalism, which created its own myths and history of an Afrikaner people dating back to their founding with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652

(purely to facilitate trade), with a mission from God to evangelise Africa as His chosen people, seen as a parallel with Israel. Amnesty hearings of right-wing applicants showed ample evidence of remnants of this frame of mind, continuing right up to the end of the Commission's mandate period.

#### Reference 129 - 0.01% Coverage

85 Recommendations for the establishment of special units to follow up on the uncompleted work of the Investigation Unit, in particular to investigate gross human rights violations that resulted from the political conflicts on the past, should be resisted. Such action would militate against the spirit of understanding, the transcending of the divisions of the past, against bringing to close a chapter in our history. It would negate the spirit of the agreement that gave us our democracy. It is a very sensitive issue that requires great wisdom. It would be politically

#### Reference 130 - 0.01% Coverage

We are also deeply grateful to the thousands of South Africans who came to the Commission to tell us their stories. They have won our country the admiration of the world: wherever one goes, South Africa's peaceful transition to democracy, culminating in the Truth and Reconciliation process, is spoken of almost in reverent tones, as a phenomenon that is unique in the annals of history, one to be commended as a new way of living for humankind. Other countries have had truth commissions, and many more are following our example, but ours is regarded as the most ambitious, a kind of benchmark against which the rest are measured.

#### Reference 131 - 0.01% Coverage

30. All applications received were electronically registered on the Commission's database. In addition, all information initially contained in the application was electronically captured. As the process progressed, all relevant information pertaining to a specific application, including information on hearings, victims and decisions, was added. This process proved invaluable for the purposes of research and cross-referencing. The resultant database will form an integral part of the history concerning the past political conflict.

#### Reference 132 - 0.01% Coverage

26. As we have seen with other cases, the particular event Mrs Tenza reported to the Commission was little more than a punctuation mark in a life of ongoing difficulties. Both she and her family made political decisions at times influenced at least as much by attempts to survive violence and poverty as by ideological persuasions. The tone throughout is of a long struggle to eke out a meagre existence in a violent world. Mrs Tenza's life story paints a vivid picture of the convoluted political history of KwaZulu/Natal and the human consequences. The awful experience of seeing her nephew murdered in front of her is just one example of a broader tragedy.

#### Reference 133 - 0.01% Coverage

As the world draws closer together – the expression ‘global village’ did not come into currency for no just cause – it seems only natural to examine the sheet of relationships between converging communities. Where there has been inequity, especially of a singularly brutalizing kind, of a kind that robs one side of its most fundamental attribute – its humanity – it seems only appropriate that some form of atonement be made, in order to exorcise that past. Reparations, we repeat, serve as a cogent critique of history and thus a potent restraint on its repetition ... It is not possible to ignore the example of the Jews and the obsessed commitment of survivors of the Holocaust, and their descendants, to recover both their material patrimony, and the humanity of which they were brutally deprived.

#### Reference 134 - 0.01% Coverage

40. It was estimated in 1992 that about three million black households had no access to electricity – this after a history of electricity generation in South Africa of more than 85 years; equally some 19 000 schools and 4000 clinics serving black communities had not been linked to the national electrical grid.

#### Reference 135 - 0.01% Coverage

1. The issue of reparation and rehabilitation is real for every victim, though to varying degrees. As history takes the country further and further away from the historical moment of the negotiated settlement in South Africa, and as other challenges, especially that of HIV/AIDS, press ever more insistently on the national consciousness, it may become more and more tempting to deal dismissively with the issue of reparation and rehabilitation. There may be those who feel that there are things that cannot be repaired or rehabilitated. This too may discourage further consideration of the issue. Moreover, it may be argued that there is something very positive about a country that wishes to move forward.

#### Reference 136 - 0.01% Coverage

There were very many victims of apartheid and, certainly, those who came before the Commission are only a subset of a much larger group. This is why, when balancing individual and socially oriented reparations, the Commission sought to address the specific needs of those who came before it in order to contribute to the wider truth about the nation's history, whilst at the same time addressing the broader consequences of apartheid. It is almost impossible to design a reparation programme without leaving some gaps. Nevertheless, the fact that not all victims will receive individual financial grants cannot be allowed to prevent at least some clearly deserving victims from getting such awards.

#### Reference 137 - 0.01% Coverage

by groups of renegades or ‘bad apples’. The placing and promotion of personnel suggests that those in charge of the Security Branch were well aware of the existence and effectiveness of covert operations. Officers such as General Gerrit Erasmus, Brigadier Nicolaas van Rensburg and Major Hermanus du Plessis, all of whom had a long history of committing abuses, were not only promoted but, by the end of the 1980s, were based at Security Branch Headquarters. Thus,

not only were their activities endorsed, but they were placed in a position where they were able significantly to influence and direct security policy from national headquarters.

Reference 138 - 0.01% Coverage

45. During this period the ANC's Special Operations Unit launched several high profile armed attacks on economic and energy installations, infrastructure and police stations, as well as an attack on the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria, in which nineteen people died. In terms of casualties, this was the largest attack in MK history. Other high-profile attacks included the 1980 SASOL attacks, the 1982 attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte SADF base, attacks on police stations and the 1982 sabotage attack on the Koeberg nuclear power station.

Reference 139 - 0.01% Coverage

120. In their applications, they sketched the turbulent political history of the township since 1985, including serious clashes with security forces. They testified that local farmers served as police reservists and had played a role in other forms of political repression. As a consequence, groups of up to forty youths, including the applicants, had embarked on raids and robberies on white farmers. In most instances, the motive was to acquire weapons and ammunition. In some of the attacks, farmers or farm workers were shot and injured. Amnesty was granted for four of the attacks and refused for one.

Reference 140 - 0.01% Coverage

The question is – and I am looking at each one, every single one of you now, directly across this table – I want to know from each one of you and your leaders, to explain to us why this was done, if there was any logical reason for what you have done, to launch a senseless terrorist attack on a pub with young, cheerful, innocent students at a time in South Africa's history when we were already on the road to democracy after you had all accepted and taken part in the accepting of an interim constitution on the 3rd of December? Is there any reason, sensible reason, why you had to still continue with something like that? Could you not think for yourself? (Cape Town hearing, 27 October 1997.)

Reference 141 - 0.01% Coverage

So that was an inevitable part of the history of this country. Now it's very important that our Parliament, a democratic elected Parliament, recognised this by making the cut-off date the 10th of May 1997. It recognised, the law makers recognised, that we were engaged in a racial struggle up to that point. And the 14th of February falls within that cut-off date.

Reference 142 - 0.01% Coverage

We have the highest respect for your Truth and Reconciliation Commission and process. We recognise that, if this process had not been a pre-negotiated condition, your democratic free elections could not possibly have occurred. Therefore, and believing as Amy did in the absolute importance of those democratic elections occurring, we unabashedly support the process

which we recognise to be unprecedented in contemporary human history. At the same time we say to you, it's your process, not ours. We cannot, therefore, oppose amnesty if it is granted on the merits. In the truest sense it is for the community of South Africa to forgive its own and this has its basis in traditions of ubuntu and other principles of human dignity. Amnesty is not clearly for Linda and Peter Biehl to grant. You face a challenging and extraordinarily difficult decision. How do you value a committed life? What value do you place on Amy and her legacy in South Africa? How do you exercise responsibility to the community in granting forgiveness, in the granting of amnesty? How are we preparing prisoners, such as these young men before us, to re-enter the community as a benefit to the community, acknowledging that the vast majority of South Africa's prisoners are under 30 years of age – acknowledging as we do that there's massive unemployment in the marginalised community; acknowledging that the recidivism rate is roughly 95 per cent? So how do we, as friends, link arms and do something? There are clear needs for prisoner rehabilitation in our country as well as here. There are clear needs for literacy training and education, and there are clear needs for the development of targeted job skill training. We, as the Amy Biehl Foundation, are willing to do our part as catalysts for social progress. All anyone need do is ask. Are you, the community of South Africa, prepared to do your part? (Cape Town hearing, 9 July 1997.)

#### Reference 143 - 0.01% Coverage

[T]he attack on white civilians is not a new thing, when you look back at the history of PAC – the formation of Poqo on the 11th of September 1961. If you remember the attacks at Mbashe, Paarl and Komane, those comrades of those days were members of the PAC which was converted into APLA. They were attacking white civilians during those days; even history confirms that. Therefore I find it difficult for me when one of the panel members says we're shifting as to our targets. Instead of attacking security forces, we were attacking white civilians which I refer to as 'soft targets' ... That's the reason why I say I am confused when they say we have shifted in constituting targets because this started long ago. (Pietmaritzburg hearing, 11 February 1998.)

#### Reference 144 - 0.01% Coverage

88. Terre'Blanche and his followers, all members of the AWB, decided that Professor van Jaarsveld had abused his influential position in an attempt to further leftist political objectives, and saw this as an attack on the ultimate freedom of the Afrikaner volk. They regarded the new direction given by Van Jaarsveld to Afrikaner history as contrary to the then South African Constitution, which recognised God as the highest authority. It was for this reason that the AWB took a decision to 'tar and feather' 241

#### Reference 145 - 0.01% Coverage

90. Terre'Blanche testified that, after the tarring and feathering, history books written by the professor were withdrawn from schools and that the AWB had therefore partially succeeded in its political objective since Professor van Jaarsveld could no longer influence the minds of the youth, the voters of the future.



Reference 146 - 0.01% Coverage

93. Mr van Jaarsveld confirmed that one of the consequences of the incident was that Afrikaans publishers like Perskor turned their backs on Professor van Jaarsveld and removed 'his popular and well-known history textbooks from the market'. He was ignored by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to which he had regularly contributed to radio programmes. He was investigated by the security police and threatened with anonymous telephone calls and hate mail. Shortly after Terre'blanche and others had been found guilty, an attempt was made on the professor's life and he was shot at with a crossbow. Other members of the family were threatened and a stone-throwing incident took place at the family home.

Reference 147 - 0.01% Coverage

94. In response to Mr van Jaarsveld's statement, Terre'Blanche told the Committee: Mr Chairman, all these things did not happen because the professor was tarred and feathered; these things happened because of the incorrect version of the Covenant and the fact that history was twisted, which can be the worst that can happen to a nation if you abuse your power to rewrite history so that you all of a sudden can become acceptable to other nations. If we sit here at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is scaring to think that the Van Jaarsveld's family admit in front of this body seeking reconciliation and truth, that his father treated the truth in this way to the extent that his books were no longer published as textbooks because what he said was not acceptable to students and pupils. (Klerksdorp hearing, 10 May 1999.)

Reference 148 - 0.01% Coverage

332. Applications for amnesty from conservative Afrikaners and right-wingers frequently made reference to a romantic image of the Boer nation, derived from the history of seventeenth century freeburgers, Trekkers and ultimately the Anglo-Boer War. A common theme in this history was the desire of conservative Afrikaner groupings to be in control of their own destiny and the wish to achieve self-determination through the creation of a volkstaat or Boer state.

Reference 149 - 0.01% Coverage

often followed is to open a grave first, and conduct the rest of the investigation afterwards'. The investigation and exhumation process should, in their view, be broken into three phases, each of which is intimately connected to the others: a Prior to the exhumation taking place, there should be an investigation of the oral and written sources, which allows for the construction of the case history and a working hypothesis.

Reference 150 - 0.01% Coverage

17. Inkatha's relationship with apartheid security force agencies had a long history. In April 1986, the State Security Council approved guidelines for a strategy for a counter-revolutionary war, which, amongst other things, emphasised the fact that the forces of revolution

should not be combated by the security forces alone, but also by 'anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha ... or the ZCC38 as well as the ethnic factor in South African society'.

#### Reference 151 - 0.01% Coverage

96. One of the most important statements made in modern history is that made by the prosecution in its summation at Nuremberg in the High Command case:

#### Reference 152 - 0.01% Coverage

36. David Simelane and Obed Masina, for example, were granted amnesty for the killing of Sergeant Orphan Hlubi Chapi outside his Soweto home in June 1978. It was, however, the formation of the ANC Special Operations Unit in 1979 that led to the launch of several high-profile attacks on police stations, state infrastructure and a major attack on SADF personnel, namely the Church Street bombing. Here a car bomb placed outside the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria led to the deaths of nineteen people. In terms of the numbers of casualties, this was the most devastating attack by MK in its entire history. The Commission received amnesty applications for a total of seventy-nine incidents carried out by this unit during this period.<sup>63</sup>

#### Reference 153 - 0.01% Coverage

85. The document envisaged that, although MK members would play a role in the establishment of SDUs, it was imperative that they be controlled from within communities because of the past history of informally established units. It was also envisaged that the units would receive political instruction of some sort. Local MK members were granted permission to participate in these structures. MK involvement took the form of recruiting and training of SDU members and supplying weapons. In some instances, individual members of MK participated in the clashes and skirmishes that took place.

#### Reference 154 - 0.01% Coverage

example of such an attack. His children testified in the amnesty hearing that this attack had contributed to the humiliation of their father and his loss of standing in his community. While the expressed motive for the attack was that they regarded the new direction that Van Jaarsveld had given to Afrikaner history as contrary to the then South African Constitution, which recognised God as the highest authority, it became quite clear during the hearing that the real motivation for the attack was his willingness to accommodate change.

#### Reference 155 - 0.01% Coverage

in Sharing joy and sharing sorrow. In Being proud and at the same time being humbled to have the honour and privilege to serve our country and to contribute towards understanding our past history and make present history.

#### Reference 156 - 0.01% Coverage

35. Finally tribute is paid to all the staff members, interpreters, transcribers, technicians, lawyers and all those who came into touch with the Commission and who, through their commitment and dedication, and notwithstanding the huge demands that were made on their personal and family lives, played an integral part in bringing this process to a conclusion and contributing to the history of South Africa.

#### Reference 157 - 0.01% Coverage

There were other reasons why many people did not come forward to tell their stories. Some were afraid; some chose not to participate because they did not support the process, particularly the concept of granting amnesty. The choice not to make a statement had to be respected by the Commission and as a consequence, many cases that may be expected to appear here do not, including those of a number of well-known victims. Despite their exclusion from these summaries, we recognise that their stories too form part of this period of the history of South Africa.

## History Child Node References

The following section contains history references from the South Africa report organized by the child nodes outlined in History Coding for the South Africa Report. Some references appear under several subheadings since they contained discussions of multiple themes.

### *Apartheid*

References or discussions of apartheid - policies, leadership, etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 19 references coded [0.05% Coverage]

#### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This means that we cannot hope properly to understand the history of the period under review unless we give apartheid and racism their rightful place as the defining features of that period. People would be surprised if anyone wanting to describe or understand the post World War II period were to ignore Soviet Communism or not give it a central, indeed pivotal, place in the geopolitics of that period. We know that nations defined themselves in terms of their relationship to Communism. That is what determined the politics, economics and foreign policies of the different protagonists at the time. It is what determined the nature of the Cold War period. The attitude towards Communism defined who one's allies and enemies were, what sort of defence budget was necessary and which surrogate states to support. The threat was seen as so serious that the world's greatest Western democracy saw nothing wrong with supporting some of the world's worst dictatorships - for example, Pinochet's Chile, other Latin American military dictatorships and

#### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

64 I want to suggest that apartheid and racism played a similar defining role in the history of the period under review. The vast majority, if not all, of the gross violations of human rights that were perpetrated in this period happened at the hands either of those who sought to defend the unjust apartheid and racist dispensation or those who sought to resist and ultimately overthrow that system.

#### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and a majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights became a major casualty of this conflict ... the legitimacy of the law itself was deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged in the face of this tragic conflict ...

#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

105 A pertinent question is the extent to which individual South Africans can be regarded as responsible for the premises and presuppositions which gave rise to apartheid. The kindest answer consists of a reminder that history suggests that most citizens are inclined to lemming-like behaviour - thoughtless submission rather than thoughtful accountability. This is a tendency that needs to be addressed in ensuring that the future is different from the past and serves as a reminder that the most penetrating enquiry into the past involves more than a witch-hunt. It involves, rather, laying a foundation against which the present and all future governments will be judged.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

■ INTRODUCTION 1 The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation's memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory – much of it contained in countless documentary records. The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. As this chapter will demonstrate, the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

28 The history of resistance in South Africa was frequently associated with shifts in the patterns and forms of gross violations of human rights, as well as in the changing identities of perpetrator groups. In response to the events of 1960 and the liberation movements' adoption of the armed struggle, the former state invoked the full force of its security legislation to curb resistance. Detention of political activists became the primary means of intensifying repression. Torture of detainees and other abuses associated with detention were the main forms of violation reported to the Commission for this early period. The most frequently reported perpetrator grouping was the security police.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

308 However, on the recommendations of the 1975 select committee for Bantu Affairs, the government considered incorporating Moutse into the soon to be established Ndebele homeland. Given Moutse's history and its ethnic composition, many analysts condemned the proposal as a violation of apartheid's ethnic ideal. Internal DCAD memoranda reveal that the department realised that their plans for Moutse represented a significant change of emphasis. Nevertheless, officials justified Moutse's incorporation based on a number of administrative, economic and developmental considerations. For its part, the 1975 select committee was motivated by a number of concerns. First, the incorporation of Moutse would have greatly expanded the area of the small KwaNdebele homeland. Second, the enlarged homeland would have remained a contiguous area, a goal frequently mentioned by apartheid planners but rarely achieved. Third,

KwaNdebele's land area and population size would be boosted without the costs and negative publicity accompanying physical removals. Finally, given Moutse's combination of trust land and African freehold, the area's incorporation would boost KwaNdebele's size without the state having to purchase white farms or modify the amount of land occupied by Africans in terms of the limits set by the 1936 Land Act. In 1980, the central government excised Moutse from Lebowa, the first step towards acting on the select committee's recommendation.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

Indeed, the historical record does not support business claims of noncollaboration. A vast body of evidence points to a central role for business interests in the elaboration, adoption, implementation and modification of apartheid policies throughout its dismal history. The South African Police and Defence Force were armed and equipped by big business. Apartheid's jails were constructed by big business, as were the buildings housing the vast apartheid bureaucracy. Apartheid's labour laws, pass laws, forced removals and cheap labour system were all to the advantage of the business community.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

65 The image of gold mining magnates accumulating vast wealth at the expense of African mine workers, whose wages stagnated in real terms until the 1970s, is a stain on the mining industry and one it needs to recognise. For most of the twentieth century, the greatest point of contact between African workers and business occurred on the mines. The shameful history of subhuman compound conditions, brutal suppression of striking workers, racist practices and meagre wages is central to understanding the origins and nature of apartheid. The failure of the Chamber of Mines to address this squarely and to grapple with its moral implications is regrettable and not constructive.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The Afrikaans press declined to make a submission to the Commission. Instead, it provided the Commission with a copy of Oor Grense Heen, the official history of Nasionale Pers (Naspers).

56 Rather oddly in the context, the book repeatedly confirms that the various newspapers in the group were always pro-NP government institutions. The opening paragraph states candidly that the NP victory in 1948 meant that the company became a pro-government institution. The history concedes that Die Burger, for instance, promoted Verwoerd's ideals of bantustans from an early stage and that, after Sharpsville, the same newspaper advised that all positive aspects be speeded up. Occasionally, doubts about apartheid do surface but, in the main, the book reflects a total lack of concern for the company's support of the racist system.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

104 By not reporting honestly on the human rights abuses of the NP government, the Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who

rejected the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor ones. (Their heirs, significantly, made a significant gesture towards reconciliation by making personal submissions of regret following the absence of their employers from the hearing.)

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa's history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

105 Reference has already been made to the extensive destruction of documents by the former state (see Volume One). The following is a summary of the Commission's finding with regard to this issue: THE FORMER GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED STATE DOCUMENTATION OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THIS PROCESS BEGAN IN 1978, WHEN CLASSIFIED RECORDS WERE ROUTINELY DESTROYED, SUPPOSEDLY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD STATE SECURITY. BY THE 1990S THE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS HAD BECOME A CO-ORDINATED ENDEAVOUR, SANCTIONED BY THE CABINET, WITH THE AIM OF DENYING A NEW GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE AND SANITISING THE HISTORY OF THE APARTHEID ERA.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

162 The findings outlined above, to a greater or lesser extent, touch all the major role-players who were party to the conflict that enveloped South Africa during its mandate period. No major role-player emerges unscathed although, as already stated, a distinction must be made between those who fought for and those who fought against apartheid. There are many who will reject these findings and argue that they fail to understand the complexities and historical realities of the time, and of the motives and perspectives of those who perpetrated gross violations of human rights. In this regard it needs to be firmly stated that, while the Commission has attempted to convey some of these complexities and has grappled with the motives and perspectives of perpetrators in other sections of this report, it is not the Commission's task to write the history of this country. Rather, it is the Commission's function to expose the violations of all parties in an attempt to lay the basis for a culture in which human rights are respected and not violated.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

History has subsequently shown that, as far as the policy of apartheid was concerned, they were deeply mistaken.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

Central to most of these testimonies [by ex-conscripts] is the notion that the present has destroyed the foundations of 'meaning' these conscripts adopted to cope with their traumatic experiences. It is easier to cope with having killed someone you believe to be the sub-human agent of forces that wish to destroy everything you hold dear than it is to cope with having killed a normal man, woman or child that history happened to cast as 'your enemy'. This crisis is greatly intensified when it is revealed to you that the person you have killed is a 'hero' or 'freedom fighter' or 'innocent civilian' – which the South African transformation correctly described him or her to have been. Most of these conscripts have, up until now, silently considered themselves victims (of neglect and manipulation) but are now publicly portrayed as perpetrators (of apartheid military objectives or even of gross human rights violations)... The Truth Commission has helped break the silence of past suffering, atrocities and abuses. In so doing, it has both released some traumatised ex-conscripts from the prison of silence and trapped them in the role of perpetrators of apartheid. For some, the contradictions of their experience might prove intolerable; for others, the process of revealing the truth about the past might allow them to confront and deal with their experiences.

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

4 I was born towards the end of the Second World War, while my father was interned, "in detention without trial". I was born into the Afrikaner Volk and the National Party. I shared its history and its myths. Choice was not an option. During the interview by the panel that put forward the names of potential members to the President, I stated that I supported apartheid under Verwoerd as a moral option that I believed would lead away from domination and discrimination. It took me more than a decade to shed my (ideological) milk teeth, recognise inconsistencies in policy and cut my more permanent (political) teeth. I shifted from Volk to nation. Yet, when I entered politics, although my aim was nation, I entered the fold of the Volk. Only on looking back do I recognise elements of broader democratic choice. My politics expressed itself through the limited opportunities within the National Party. Only towards the mid-eighties, and then only through friends in struggle politics, did I begin to sense that a covert security 'policy' militated

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

There were very many victims of apartheid and, certainly, those who came before the Commission are only a subset of a much larger group. This is why, when balancing individual and socially oriented reparations, the Commission sought to address the specific needs of those who came before it in order to contribute to the wider truth about the nation's history, whilst at the same time addressing the broader consequences of apartheid. It is almost impossible to design a reparation programme without leaving some gaps. Nevertheless, the fact that not all victims will receive individual financial grants cannot be allowed to prevent at least some clearly deserving victims from getting such awards.



#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

17. I n k a t h a 's relationship with apartheid security force agencies had a long history. In April 1986, the State Security Council approved guidelines for a strategy for a c o u n t e r-revolutionary war, which, amongst other things, emphasised the fact that the forces of revolution should not be combated by the security forc e s alone, but also by 'anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha ... or the ZCC3 8 well as the ethnic factor in South African society'.

## *Archives*

References or discussions of archives

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 6 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof...Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.<sup>14</sup>

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

105 Measures must be implemented to prevent the destruction of records which form part of our history, however unpleasant. Particularly cynical is the deliberate destruction of records which may incriminate individuals or groups in power. To prevent such destruction, appropriate legal powers must be given to the state's public archives service. The Archives Act provides the necessary legislative framework, but requires rigorous implementation.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES BE ENABLED TO FILL THE GAPS IN OFFICIAL MEMORY, THROUGH THE COLLECTION OF NON-PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE PROMOTION OF ORAL HISTORY PROJECTS (IN TERMS OF SECTION 3(D) OF THE ARCHIVES ACT).

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

134 Commissioners discussed the Register with many other organisations, in the hope that the idea would take root and not be regarded solely as a Commission project. They encouraged churches and all religious denominations to offer a similar opportunity to their members, creating appropriate ceremonies. They also proposed that other ways of expanding the concept should be considered, possibly by municipalities where such a register might become a part of the history of the period of transformation in their region.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

138 The objectives of the IRC are: a To record the history of racial discrimination in the faculty; b To record the history of resistance to apartheid by members of the faculty; c To allow those who were discriminated against to tell their stories.

### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

30. All applications received were electronically registered on the Commission's database. In addition, all information initially contained in the application was electronically captured. As the process progressed, all relevant information pertaining to a specific application, including information on hearings, victims and decisions, was added. This process proved invaluable for the purposes of research and cross-referencing. The resultant database will form an integral part of the history concerning the past political conflict.

## *Commemorate*

References or discussions of commemoration, remembrance, heritage etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 2 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

52 This means that one must guard against such simplistic platitudes as ‘to forgive is to forget’. It is also crucial not to fall into the error of equating forgiveness with reconciliation. The road to reconciliation requires more than forgiveness and respectful remembrance. It is, in this respect, worth remembering the difficult history of reconciliation between Afrikaners and white English-speaking South Africans after the devastating Anglo-Boer/South African War (1899-1902). Despite coexistence and participation with English-speaking South Africans in the political system that followed the war, it took many decades to rebuild relationships and redistribute resources - a process that was additionally complicated by a range of urban/rural, class, and linguistic and other barriers. Reconciliation requires not only individual justice, but also social justice.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The constitution of the Eagles Youth Club was said to be based on ‘Christian National Principles’ and pursued its objectives by means of camps offering a variety of activities, including political education. Lectures in political education covered subjects as diverse as Christianity, Communism and the culture and history of the ANC and PAC. Eagles were encouraged to co-operate with state structures, particularly with the police and the SADF, who were described in the courses as ‘your friends’. At the same time, members were encouraged to report ‘terrorists’ to the police and warned against ‘people who are trying to tell you bad things about South Africa’. They were told that ‘comrades’ organisations in townships were part of the ‘enemy’ and should be neutralised. Eagles members became sources of information concerning the identity of ‘comrades’ in townships, and were used to monitor the strategies and plans of ‘comrades’ organisations, particularly around popular events such as the commemoration of 16 June (Soweto Day).

## *Economy*

References or discussions of the economy

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 15 references coded [0.03% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

11 Indeed, one of most ambitious and far-reaching attempts at social engineering in twentieth century South African history was introduced by the first post-unification South African Party government in the form of the 1913 Land Act. No other piece of legislation in South African history more dramatically and drastically re-shaped the social map of this country. Not only did it lay the basis for the territorial separation of whites and Africans; it destroyed, at a stroke, a thriving African landowning and peasant agricultural sector. It did so by prohibiting African land ownership outside of the initial 7 per cent of land allocated to the so-called traditional reserves and ending sharecropping and non-tenancy arrangements on white-owned farms. The Land Act set in motion a massive forced removal of African people that led, amongst other things, to the deaths of many hundreds of people who found themselves suddenly landless.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

312 In January 1987, Rouget left the Comores and moved to South Africa where he worked as a representative of the Europe-Africa Export company. This position required him to visit Europe frequently. Ms Forkel accepted that Rouget was not one of the killers as his looks did not correspond with the description of the two killers, but her conclusion in regard to him was that his character, history, relationship to the world of mercenaries, stay in South Africa and frequent travelling to Europe amounted to “grounds for suspicion”.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

308 However, on the recommendations of the 1975 select committee for Bantu Affairs, the government considered incorporating Moutse into the soon to be established Ndebele homeland. Given Moutse’s history and its ethnic composition, many analysts condemned the proposal as a violation of apartheid’s ethnic ideal. Internal DCAD memoranda reveal that the department realised that their plans for Moutse represented a significant change of emphasis. Nevertheless, officials justified Moutse’s incorporation based on a number of administrative, economic and developmental considerations. For its part, the 1975 select committee was motivated by a number of concerns. First, the incorporation of Moutse would have greatly expanded the area of the small KwaNdebele homeland. Second, the enlarged homeland would have remained a contiguous area, a goal frequently mentioned by apartheid planners but rarely achieved. Third, KwaNdebele’s land area and population size would be boosted without the costs and negative publicity accompanying physical removals. Finally, given Moutse’s combination of trust land and African freehold, the area’s incorporation would boost KwaNdebele’s size without the state having to purchase white farms or modify the amount of land occupied by Africans in terms of the limits set by the 1936 Land Act. In 1980, the central government excised Moutse from Lebowa, the first step towards acting on the select committee’s recommendation.

#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

35 The Durban strikes of 1973 marked a turning point in the history of political resistance in the province. With wages practically frozen for over a decade, the growing poverty in the cities – and therefore also in the rural areas where families depended on the wages of migrant breadwinners – led to strikes which affected 150 establishments and involved 60 000 workers during the first few months of 1973. The strikers were ultimately forced to back down, but they laid the foundations for a new labour union movement and for organised social resistance in other

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

Indeed, the historical record does not support business claims of noncollaboration. A vast body of evidence points to a central role for business interests in the elaboration, adoption, implementation and modification of apartheid policies throughout its dismal history. The South African Police and Defence Force were armed and equipped by big business. Apartheid's jails were constructed by big business, as were the buildings housing the vast apartheid bureaucracy. Apartheid's labour laws, pass laws, forced removals and cheap labour system were all to the advantage of the business community.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This history has been well documented<sup>7</sup> and was reflected in submissions by COSATU, the SACP and the ANC. The first-order involvement of the mining houses and the Chamber of Mines (COM) in shaping the migrant labour system is the clearest example of business working closely with the minority (white) government to create the conditions for capital accumulation based on cheap African labour. The evidence shows that, rather than relying simply on the forces of supply and demand, the mining industry harnessed the services of the state to shape labour supply conditions to their advantage. Thus, the mining industry bears a great deal of moral responsibility for the migrant labour system and its associated hardships.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

65 The image of gold mining magnates accumulating vast wealth at the expense of African mine workers, whose wages stagnated in real terms until the 1970s, is a stain on the mining industry and one it needs to recognise. For most of the twentieth century, the greatest point of contact between African workers and business occurred on the mines. The shameful history of subhuman compound conditions, brutal suppression of striking workers, racist practices and meagre wages is central to understanding the origins and nature of apartheid. The failure of the Chamber of Mines to address this squarely and to grapple with its moral implications is regrettable and not constructive.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

71 The COSATU submission also recalled the notorious Kinross mining disaster, the largest accident in the history of gold mining in South Africa. On 15 September 1986, 177 workers were killed as the result of a polyurethane fire. The submission records the shocking way in which the mine reacted to the disaster:

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

109 As the repression of the 1980s escalated, some faith communities and organisations joined the liberation organisations in appealing to international partners to press for economic sanctions.<sup>52</sup> Many however opposed sanctions or were ambivalent on the question. Some, like the Church of the Province, confessed to its failure to support sanctions only as late as 1989.<sup>53</sup> The Catholic Bishops Conference, “fearing a great increase of poverty and unemployment”, supported sanctions with reservations. “History”, it said, “will be the judge”. The only English-speaking church to give unqualified support to sanctions from the outset was the United Congregational Church.<sup>54</sup>

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

7 MWASA embraced the Black Consciousness philosophy and excluded whites. The membership argued that news, current affairs and history was seen only through the eyes of white writers. In later years, at a Cape Town conference in 1990, delegates moved for the opening up of the union to white membership, arguing that it was time the union became non-racial.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

What about those people in the existential vacuum from both sides that are now left with [the problem of] trying to figure out where to go? The change of government doesn’t necessarily provide you with a job or resolve the problems you have as a result of a long history of alienation.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

10 South Africa’s history of repression and exploitation severely affected the mental well-being of the majority of its citizens. South Africans have had to deal with a psychological stress which has arisen as a result of deprivation and dire socioeconomic conditions, coupled with the cumulative trauma arising from violent state repression and intra-community conflicts.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

139 The townships and residential areas constructed in this period were grossly underserved. Many were without basic services such as water, electricity, adequate housing, roads, schools and clinics. Lack of services and appalling living conditions generated tensions that laid the ground for much of the conflict that was generated in South Africa’s contemporary history. From rural farming areas to homeland settlements to urban townships, living conditions and economic deprivation provided fertile ground for conflict. The battle for national liberation and civil and

political rights cannot, therefore, be separated from countless localised battles rooted in socio-economic deprivation.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

Thus ranged against one another, in intensifying conflict, were the oppressor and the oppressed, the owners of wealth of the country and the dispossessed, the rightless and the privileged. The ANC was a product of this history and this conflict, not their creator.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

45. During this period the ANC's Special Operations Unit launched several high profile armed attacks on economic and energy installations, infrastructure and police stations, as well as an attack on the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria, in which nineteen people died. In terms of casualties, this was the largest attack in MK history. Other high-profile attacks included the 1980 SASOL attacks, the 1982 attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte SADF base, attacks on police stations and the 1982 sabotage attack on the Koeberg nuclear power station.



## *Ethnicity*

References or discussions of ethnicity, ethnic lines, ethnic division etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 14 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

13 From the late 1960s and 1970s, the Black Consciousness Movement campaigned for the use of the word black to describe all those defined as other than white. However, this was by no means universally accepted and many members of the so-called black group still prefer to be described as coloured, Indian and so on. Another debate arises around the term African. Does this or can this refer only to black Africans? The debate is not really capable of being resolved. Generally in this report, black Africans are referred to as Africans. Coloured people, people of Indian or Asian origin and white people are referred to as such. No disrespect is intended to any group or political perspective. It is simply impossible to write a history of South Africa without erring on one side or another of the argument.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

308 However, on the recommendations of the 1975 select committee for Bantu Affairs, the government considered incorporating Moutse into the soon to be established Ndebele homeland. Given Moutse's history and its ethnic composition, many analysts condemned the proposal as a violation of apartheid's ethnic ideal. Internal DCAD memoranda reveal that the department realised that their plans for Moutse represented a significant change of emphasis. Nevertheless, officials justified Moutse's incorporation based on a number of administrative, economic and developmental considerations. For its part, the 1975 select committee was motivated by a number of concerns. First, the incorporation of Moutse would have greatly expanded the area of the small KwaNdebele homeland. Second, the enlarged homeland would have remained a contiguous area, a goal frequently mentioned by apartheid planners but rarely achieved. Third, KwaNdebele's land area and population size would be boosted without the costs and negative publicity accompanying physical removals. Finally, given Moutse's combination of trust land and African freehold, the area's incorporation would boost KwaNdebele's size without the state having to purchase white farms or modify the amount of land occupied by Africans in terms of the limits set by the 1936 Land Act. In 1980, the central government excised Moutse from Lebowa, the first step towards acting on the select committee's recommendation.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

523 Of particular relevance in the 1990s is a previous history of encouraging divisions between Inkatha and the UDF. What is important to note is that this covert policy of encouraging and fomenting such divisions predates the outbreak of violent conflict in Natal and that, when the conflict assumed violent proportions, this was simply noted and no attempt was made to change the overall strategy. This indicates, at the very least, that this was regarded as acceptable, possibly even desirable. Operation Marion and the Caprivi training must thus be seen in the context of this overall State Security Council policy. A similar strategy was reflected in

Operation Katzen and support for vigilante groups. Covert support for anti-UDF/ ANC groupings was well established by the 1990 and was seen as legitimate and authorised. This support led to the development of links between individual security force operatives and conservative individuals at a local level, providing a basis for ongoing destabilisation on the ground. The connection between this strategy and the violence in the 1990s is obvious. Indeed, support for Inkatha continued into the 1990s. It is thus not surprising that security force members believed that it was legitimate to provide support, including arms, to Inkatha, or to seek to protect and foster IFP-linked forces when policing violence-torn communities.

#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

Tribal clashes, which occur from time to time and which have occurred regularly throughout history, are presented as revolts against the system of Bantu Authorities. Even when the true facts are supplied to these newspapers, the paragraph giving the facts is carefully deleted.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

21 Statements were received from a broad cross-section of communities in the province, with the majority coming from the townships and rural KwaZulu (former 'black areas'). While many people approached the Commission of their own accord with reports of violations, the Commission also deployed teams of statement takers across the province to gather a wide-ranging sample of evidence for a more complete view of the region's history. Statement takers reported difficulties in gaining access to some areas, for example Inchanga, which had been the scene of political conflict during 1996–97, and other areas known to be strongholds of the IFP.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This history has been well documented<sup>7</sup> and was reflected in submissions by COSATU, the SACP and the ANC. The first-order involvement of the mining houses and the Chamber of Mines (COM) in shaping the migrant labour system is the clearest example of business working closely with the minority (white) government to create the conditions for capital accumulation based on cheap African labour. The evidence shows that, rather than relying simply on the forces of supply and demand, the mining industry harnessed the services of the state to shape labour supply conditions to their advantage. Thus, the mining industry bears a great deal of moral responsibility for the migrant labour system and its associated hardships.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

122 The South African Psychological Association (SAPA) was founded in 1948, with a membership of thirty-four. In 1962, following the admission of a black member, a new association, the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), was established exclusively for whites. The two organisations merged in 1983 to form the Psychological Association of South Africa (PASA). Black professionals were permitted as members but, because of the racist history of PIRSA, many chose to join the Black Psychologists' Association instead.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

7 MWASA embraced the Black Consciousness philosophy and excluded whites. The membership argued that news, current affairs and history was seen only through the eyes of white writers. In later years, at a Cape Town conference in 1990, delegates moved for the opening up of the union to white membership, arguing that it was time the union became non-racial.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

I don't want to blame the [Commission] – the media is inclined to look at these atrocities. But the same names, the same police are repeatedly referred to, while there is no mention made of the majority of people who were in the police and the Defence Force who weren't involved in the atrocities. They provided a service for the country, because they loved the country. This is still the case at present and they would probably do it again. Commissioner Malan: Could I just interrupt you here, because I think we've got the message. I refer to the other part, you hear the same names and things but those are things that you didn't hear when you were in the army? That is my question. Mr Van Eeden: I can honestly say to you that these kinds of acts, no one can approve of. It makes you furious and angry because that is not what myself and thousands of young Afrikaner men got involved to do. Commissioner Malan: Can I take the question a bit further and the answer. I know is very difficult for people to understand who look at this whole history from a different perspective... How is it possible that you didn't know anything of it or did anything about it? Do you have a perspective on that? Mr Van Eeden: War as such is a crime against humanity; there are no victors. I had personal knowledge because I saw it, of certain of these actions that took place. I saw the result of bodies being burnt. I had knowledge of that. I didn't have knowledge of orchestrated efforts of forces that I served to incite such incidents... Commissioner Malan: You say that you saw bodies that were burnt. What did you think was the reason for that? Who burnt them? Mr Van Eeden: I didn't have to think of what the reason was; it was quite clear. I did my service in Vaal Triangle in the 1990s and it was black on black violence. That it could have been incited from another force, well we have evidence for that now. But I have personal knowledge of, well, let's refer to it as violence between ethnic groups, black ethnic groups in the Vaal Triangle, I saw that.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

102 The following statements illustrate this vital need for broad participation, especially by those who have been unjustly privileged in the past, together with some of the obstacles to restitution. Dr Laurie Nathan, director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution and former Chairperson of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), said at a special hearing on compulsory military service in Cape Town: I want to end by addressing the question of how, in the light of this history, we should manage the past, and I want to address these comments in particular to the white community. The white community tends to take one of three positions in this regard.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

White racism is alive and kicking. It no longer takes the form of legislated supremacy, but it continues to manifest itself in crude and subtle ways. The most insidious is the assumption that white values are universal and by implication superior to those of other groups. The most offensive is the endless complaining about corruption, inefficiency and falling standards. This is one of the bad jokes of the new South Africa. The previous government set unsurpassed standards for corruption, incompetence and neglect. There is a fourth position which is seldom heard and which I believe is the appropriate response. The white community should confront its pervasive racism, and stare our ugly history and its long shelf life in the face. We should acknowledge collective responsibility for our efforts and our acquiescence in constructing and maintaining a wretched system of discrimination, exclusion and repression. To invoke theological terminology, we should confess and engage in meaningful acts of contrition.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

c The reactive phenomenon of Afrikaner Nationalism, which created its own myths and history of an Afrikaner people dating back to their founding with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 (purely to facilitate trade), with a mission from God to evangelise Africa as His chosen people, seen as a parallel with Israel. Amnesty hearings of right-wing applicants showed ample evidence of remnants of this frame of mind, continuing right up to the end of the Commission's mandate period.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

[T]he attack on white civilians is not a new thing, when you look back at the history of PAC – the formation of Poqo on the 11th of September 1961. If you remember the attacks at Mbashe, Paarl and Komane, those comrades of those days were members of the PAC which was converted into APLA. They were attacking white civilians during those days; even history confirms that. There fore I find it difficult for me when one of the panel members says we're shifting as to our targets. Instead of attacking security forces, we were attacking white civilians which I refer to as 'soft targets' ... That's the reason why I say I am confused when they say we have shifted in constituting targets because this started long ago. (Pietmaritzburg hearing, 11 February 1998.)

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

332. Applications for amnesty from conservative Afrikaners and right-wingers frequently made reference to a romantic image of the Boer nation, derived from the history of seventeenth century freeburghers, Trekkers and ultimately the Anglo-Boer War. A common theme in this history was the desire of conservative Afrikaner groupings to be in control of their own destiny and the wish to achieve self-determination through the creation of a volkstaat or Boer state.

## *Forgive*

References or discussions of forgiveness or forgiving

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 5 references coded [0.02% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

52 This means that one must guard against such simplistic platitudes as ‘to forgive is to forget’. It is also crucial not to fall into the error of equating forgiveness with reconciliation. The road to reconciliation requires more than forgiveness and respectful remembrance. It is, in this respect, worth remembering the difficult history of reconciliation between Afrikaners and white English-speaking South Africans after the devastating Anglo-Boer/South African War (1899-1902). Despite coexistence and participation with English-speaking South Africans in the political system that followed the war, it took many decades to rebuild relationships and redistribute resources - a process that was additionally complicated by a range of urban/rural, class, and linguistic and other barriers. Reconciliation requires not only individual justice, but also social justice.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

59 They said that “many Afrikaans journalists were deaf and blind to the political aspirations and sufferings of black fellow South Africans” and did not inform their readers about the injustices of apartheid. When knowledge about gross human rights violations became public, the journalists felt they had too readily accepted the denials and disingenuous explanations of the NP. Those who made submissions also sought forgiveness for their lack of action and committed themselves to ensuring that history would not repeat itself.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

harnessed vast amounts of energy, courage and resilience during the apartheid era. For many young people, active engagement in political activity resulted in the acquisition of skills such as analysis, mobilisation and strategising, as well as the ability to draw strength from friends and comrades in times of hardship. Many of today’s leaders come from a politically active history and have displayed a remarkable capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the past and current community dynamics. Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories. One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad

terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history.

Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth. Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is dependent on people's ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases. Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation. Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

We have the highest respect for your Truth and Reconciliation Commission and process. We recognise that, if this process had not been a pre-negotiated condition, your democratic free elections could not possibly have occurred. Therefore, and believing as Amy did in the absolute importance of those democratic elections occurring, we unabashedly support the process which we recognise to be unprecedented in contemporary human history. At the same time we say to you, it's your process, not ours. We cannot, therefore, oppose amnesty if it is granted on the merits. In the truest sense it is for the community of South Africa to forgive its own and this has its basis in traditions of ubuntu and other principles of human dignity. Amnesty is not clearly for Linda and Peter Biehl to grant. You face a challenging and extraordinarily difficult decision. How do you value a committed life? What value do you place on Amy and her legacy in South Africa? How do you exercise responsibility to the community in granting forgiveness, in the granting of amnesty? How are we preparing prisoners, such as these young men before us, to re-enter the community as a benefit to the community, acknowledging that the vast majority of South Africa's prisoners are under 30 years of age – acknowledging as we do that there's massive unemployment in the marginalised community; acknowledging that the recidivism rate is roughly 95 per cent? So how do we, as friends, link arms and do something? There are clear needs for prisoner rehabilitation in our country as well as here. There are clear needs for literacy training and education, and there are clear needs for the development of targeted job skill training. We, as the Amy Biehl Foundation, are willing to do our part as catalysts for social progress. All anyone need do is ask. Are you, the community of South Africa, prepared to do your part? (Cape Town hearing, 9 July 1997.)

## *Human Rights*

References or discussions of human rights, human rights violations, and human rights codes

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 28 references coded [0.06% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

20 We could not make the journey from a past marked by conflict, injustice, oppression, and exploitation to a new and democratic dispensation characterised by a culture of respect for human rights without coming face to face with our recent history. No one has disputed that. The differences of opinion have been about how we should deal with that past; how we should go about coming to terms with it.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

64 I want to suggest that apartheid and racism played a similar defining role in the history of the period under review. The vast majority, if not all, of the gross violations of human rights that were perpetrated in this period happened at the hands either of those who sought to defend the unjust apartheid and racist dispensation or those who sought to resist and ultimately overthrow that system.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and a majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights became a major casualty of this conflict ... the legitimacy of the law itself was deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged in the face of this tragic conflict ...

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

3 Before starting on the long journey through these volumes, two major points or themes need to be developed in order to place their context in fuller political and historical perspective. The first of these relates to the fact that this report covers only a small fraction of time - although possibly the worst and certainly, in regard to the wider region, the bloodiest in the long and violent history of human rights abuse in this subcontinent. The second point to be made is that the report tells only a small part of a much larger story of human rights abuse in South and southern Africa.  
4 In developing these two themes in this chapter, special attention will be given to the role and contribution of two phenomena or factors in the shaping of this country's history, namely violence and the law, and the relationship between them.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

7 Soon afterwards, Asmal's call became a firm proposal of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, following an investigation of accusations that the ANC in-exile had perpetrated human rights violations in some of its camps. In response to the allegations, the ANC set up its own internal commissions of enquiry, the Stuart, Skweyiya and Motsuenyane commissions. The reports of these commissions confirmed that gross human rights violations had taken place in the camps. The National Executive Committee accepted the criticisms levelled at the organisation. It expressed the view, however, that the violations committed by the ANC should be seen against the background of the human rights violations that had taken place in South Africa over a much longer period. It proposed the appointment of a truth commission as a way of achieving this. This was perhaps the first time in history that a liberation movement or government-in-waiting had called for an independent investigation of this kind, aimed at enquiring into allegations of violations of human rights not only by the previous regime, but also by its own members.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

19 However, the data gathered from the human rights violations statements do permit the kinds of analyses to which they are subjected in the various chapters of this report. It is important to note that the Commission's data were based on corroborated findings. This means that, at a minimum, these violations (if not many more) definitely happened in these places at these times. Furthermore, none of the conclusions in the Commission report are based on quantitative data alone; in each case, the quantitative data is linked to the accounts of contemporary journalists, histories of the various regions, and analyses of reported situations by NGO human rights groups.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

33 Staff went to a lot of trouble to identify different types of cases for the human rights violation hearings so that both high and low profile cases were heard, witnesses from across the political spectrum were given a voice, and both individual and group cases were heard. Occasionally alleged perpetrators were able to give their side of the story at the same hearings as their accusers. The hearing at Lusikisiki, for example, became a landmark in uncovering the history of rural rebellions from the early 1960s.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The Commission attempted to resolve these difficulties by identifying patterns and trends in the gross violations reported, as well as patterns of behaviour in groups and parties responsible for their perpetration. In so doing, it aimed to achieve a broader and more accurate picture of the history of human rights violations during the mandate period, 1960–94.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

28 The history of resistance in South Africa was frequently associated with shifts in the patterns and forms of gross violations of human rights, as well as in the changing identities of perpetrator groups. In response to the events of 1960 and the liberation movements' adoption of the armed struggle, the former state invoked the full force of its security legislation to curb resistance.



Detention of political activists became the primary means of intensifying repression. Torture of detainees and other abuses associated with detention were the main forms of violation reported to the Commission for this early period. The most frequently reported perpetrator grouping was the security police.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

239 In the run-up to the 1994 elections, Inkatha came into conflict with the central government and the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) concerning the issue of independence and sovereignty for KwaZulu. Inkatha adopted a publicly declared militant stance towards the rejection of its demands, culminating in a decision not to participate in the April 1994 elections. It was only on 19 April 1994, just six days before the elections, that Inkatha did an about-turn and announced that it would contest the elections. In the interim period, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. Approximately 3 000 gross violations of human rights were perpetrated by Inkatha in KwaZulu and Natal from July 1993 to May 1994. This constituted more than 55 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission's Durban office for this period.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

6 'State and allied groupings' comprises reported violations associated with public order policing, detention and torture, covert actions of the security forces and contra-mobilisation. 'Resistance and revolutionary groupings' comprises, for the most part, violations perpetrated by such groupings, including attacks on 'collaborators', necklacings, armed actions and sabotage, inter-organisational conflict and so forth. Where the history of violations occurring in the mandate period of the Commission was not amenable to these categories (particularly in the 1990s – the years of political transition), a thematic approach has been used.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

38 The greatest number of instances of severe ill treatment are attributed to the SAP, followed by the IFP, with over 7 000 alleged violations each, followed by the ANC with over 2 000. Again, the pattern is different at different periods of history, and matches the pattern of alleged killings closely: ~

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

21 Statements were received from a broad cross-section of communities in the province, with the majority coming from the townships and rural KwaZulu (former 'black areas'). While many people approached the Commission of their own accord with reports of violations, the Commission also deployed teams of statement takers across the province to gather a wide-ranging sample of evidence for a more complete view of the region's history. Statement takers reported difficulties in gaining access to some areas, for example Inchanga, which had been the scene of political conflict during 1996–97, and other areas known to be strongholds of the IFP.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

427 In the months leading up to the elections, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. The incidence of politically motivated human rights violations rose dramatically following the announcement of the election date.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

164 'Rooi Rus' Swanepoel, who became known for his brutality in the course of the protest, already had a long history of involvement in gross human rights violations as chief interrogator of the Security Branch. He was, moreover, the founder of an anti-terrorist unit which later became Koevoet.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

40 As yet, relatively little is known about the human rights violations committed by health professionals in the military. The SAMS submission to the Commission focused on the history, functions and administrative structure of the service, rather than considering any possible involvement in gross human rights violations. Many questions were deferred because they related to supposedly 'classified' (secret) operations. For example, the SAMS submission referred to three special projects undertaken by the Psychology Directorate. The reference was followed by the

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

59 They said that "many Afrikaans journalists were deaf and blind to the political aspirations and sufferings of black fellow South Africans" and did not inform their readers about the injustices of apartheid. When knowledge about gross human rights violations became public, the journalists felt they had too readily accepted the denials and disingenuous explanations of the NP. Those who made submissions also sought forgiveness for their lack of action and committed themselves to ensuring that history would not repeat itself.

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

104 By not reporting honestly on the human rights abuses of the NP government, the Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor ones. (Their heirs, significantly, made a significant gesture towards reconciliation by making personal submissions of regret following the absence of their employers from the hearing.)

#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of

the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa's history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

#### Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

162 The findings outlined above, to a greater or lesser extent, touch all the major role-players who were party to the conflict that enveloped South Africa during its mandate period. No major role-player emerges unscathed although, as already stated, a distinction must be made between those who fought for and those who fought against apartheid. There are many who will reject these findings and argue that they fail to understand the complexities and historical realities of the time, and of the motives and perspectives of those who perpetrated gross violations of human rights. In this regard it needs to be firmly stated that, while the Commission has attempted to convey some of these complexities and has grappled with the motives and perspectives of perpetrators in other sections of this report, it is not the Commission's task to write the history of this country. Rather, it is the Commission's function to expose the violations of all parties in an attempt to lay the basis for a culture in which human rights are respected and not violated.

#### Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

164 Finally, in the context of a society moving towards reconciliation, South Africans need to acknowledge this country's divided history and its regional burden; to understand the processes whereby all, citizens included, were drawn in and are implicated in the fabric of human rights abuse, both as victims and perpetrators – at times as both.

#### Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

2 Who were the perpetrators and what 'made' them, moved them or contributed to their behaviour? It is essential to examine perpetrators as multi-dimensional and rounded individuals rather than simply characterising them as purveyors of horrendous acts. Building on the factual history presented in earlier chapters, and utilising research developed in relation to the Holocaust and other situations of sustained oppression that gave rise to systematic acts of gross human rights violations, this chapter attempts to explain why and how these violations transpired, as a basis for informing the debate concerning reconciliation and recommendations to prevent violations in future. A diagnosis of persons and institutions responsible for gross human rights violations is of paramount importance in seeking to prevent future gross human rights violations.

#### Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

Central to most of these testimonies [by ex-conscripts] is the notion that the present has destroyed the foundations of 'meaning' these conscripts adopted to cope with their traumatic experiences. It is easier to cope with having killed someone you believe to be the sub-human agent of forces that wish to destroy everything you hold dear than it is to cope with having killed

a normal man, woman or child that history happened to cast as ‘your enemy’. This crisis is greatly intensified when it is revealed to you that the person you have killed is a ‘hero’ or ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘innocent civilian’ – which the South African transformation correctly described him or her to have been. Most of these conscripts have, up until now, silently considered themselves victims (of neglect and manipulation) but are now publicly portrayed as perpetrators (of apartheid military objectives or even of gross human rights violations)... The Truth Commission has helped break the silence of past suffering, atrocities and abuses. In so doing, it has both released some traumatised ex-conscripts from the prison of silence and trapped them in the role of perpetrators of apartheid. For some, the contradictions of their experience might prove intolerable; for others, the process of revealing the truth about the past might allow them to confront and deal with their experiences.

#### Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

55 A spokesperson for the Stellenbosch Presbytery of the Dutch Reformed Church made the following statement at the human rights violations hearing in Paarl: [We] are not doing this presentation on behalf of the Dutch Reformed Church – only the Synod has this right to do this. But what we are doing here this afternoon is the deepest conviction of the Presbytery of Stellenbosch ... In looking back, we realise that there have been times in the history of Stellenbosch when we as a Presbytery (and also as separate congregations) either failed wholesale or made only the most timid of efforts to fulfil the prophetic responsibility the Lord has given us. We think especially of the past forty years during which the official policy of apartheid radically impaired the human dignity of people all around us and resulted in gross violations of human rights. Within the borders of our Presbytery, there were those who actively developed and defended the ideological framework by which these violations and actions were justified. At times, standpoints and decisions taken within this Presbytery itself functioned within this ideological framework.

#### Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The idea of such a register had been discussed informally among Commissioners and crystallised during a radio ‘phone-in’ programme, when listeners expressed a need for some way in which to articulate the regret and contrition they felt for past wrongs. Announcing the Register, the Commission said: It has been established in response to a deep wish for reconciliation in the hearts of many South Africans; people who did not perhaps commit gross violations of human rights, but nevertheless wish to indicate their regret for failures in the past to do all they could have done to prevent such violations; people who want to demonstrate in some symbolic way their commitment to a new kind of future in which human rights abuses will not take place. We know that many South Africans are ready and eager to turn away from a past history of division and discrimination. Guilt for wrongdoing needs to be translated into positive commitment to building a better society – the healthiest and most productive form of atonement.

#### Reference 26 - 0.01% Coverage

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights

violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator – namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future – which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

#### Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

85 Recommendations for the establishment of special units to follow up on the uncompleted work of the Investigation Unit, in particular to investigate gross human rights violations that resulted from the political conflicts on the past, should be resisted. Such action would militate against the spirit of understanding, the transcending of the divisions of the past, against bringing to close a chapter in our history. It would negate the spirit of the agreement that gave us our democracy. It is a very sensitive issue that requires great wisdom. It would be politically

#### Reference 28 - 0.01% Coverage

by groups of renegades or ‘bad apples’. The placing and promotion of personnel suggests that those in charge of the Security Branch were well aware of the existence and effectiveness of covert operations. Officers such as General Gerrit Erasmus, Brigadier Nicolaas van Rensburg and Major Hermanus du Plessis, all of whom had a long history of committing abuses, were not only promoted but, by the end of the 1980s, were based at Security Branch Headquarters. Thus, not only were their activities endorsed, but they were placed in a position where they were able significantly to influence and direct security policy from national headquarters.

## *Invoking Others*

References or discussions of other countries and their history, politics, international relations etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 7 references coded [0.02% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This means that we cannot hope properly to understand the history of the period under review unless we give apartheid and racism their rightful place as the defining features of that period. People would be surprised if anyone wanting to describe or understand the post World War II period were to ignore Soviet Communism or not give it a central, indeed pivotal, place in the geopolitics of that period. We know that nations defined themselves in terms of their relationship to Communism. That is what determined the politics, economics and foreign policies of the different protagonists at the time. It is what determined the nature of the Cold War period. The attitude towards Communism defined who one's allies and enemies were, what sort of defence budget was necessary and which surrogate states to support. The threat was seen as so serious that the world's greatest Western democracy saw nothing wrong with supporting some of the world's worst dictatorships - for example, Pinochet's Chile, other Latin American military dictatorships and

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

13 See Michael Marrus, 'History and the Holocaust in the Courtroom', paper delivered at a conference, Searching for Memory and Justice: the Holocaust and Apartheid, Yale University, 8-10 February 1998. He identifies a range of factors inherent to the due process of law, concluding that criminal trials are "far less effective vehicles than many people think for registering a historical account" of past atrocities. He contends that: "Knowing what happened in the past demands an alternative method of enquiry".

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

109 As the repression of the 1980s escalated, some faith communities and organisations joined the liberation organisations in appealing to international partners to press for economic sanctions.<sup>52</sup> Many however opposed sanctions or were ambivalent on the question. Some, like the Church of the Province, confessed to its failure to support sanctions only as late as 1989.<sup>53</sup> The Catholic Bishops Conference, "fearing a great increase of poverty and unemployment", supported sanctions with reservations. "History", it said, "will be the judge". The only English-speaking church to give unqualified support to sanctions from the outset was the United Congregational Church.<sup>54</sup>

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

2 Who were the perpetrators and what 'made' them, moved them or contributed to their behaviour? It is essential to examine perpetrators as multi-dimensional and rounded individuals rather than simply characterising them as purveyors of horrendous acts. Building on the factual

history presented in earlier chapters, and utilising research developed in relation to the Holocaust and other situations of sustained oppression that gave rise to systematic acts of gross human rights violations, this chapter attempts to explain why and how these violations transpired, as a basis for informing the debate concerning reconciliation and recommendations to prevent violations in future. A diagnosis of persons and institutions responsible for gross human rights violations is of paramount importance in seeking to prevent future gross human rights violations.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

We are also deeply grateful to the thousands of South Africans who came to the Commission to tell us their stories. They have won our country the admiration of the world: wherever one goes, South Africa's peaceful transition to democracy, culminating in the Truth and Reconciliation process, is spoken of almost in reverent tones, as a phenomenon that is unique in the annals of history, one to be commended as a new way of living for humankind. Other countries have had truth commissions, and many more are following our example, but ours is regarded as the most ambitious, a kind of benchmark against which the rest are measured.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

As the world draws closer together – the expression 'global village' did not come into currency for no just cause – it seems only natural to examine the sheet of relationships between converging communities. Where there has been inequity, especially of a singularly brutalizing kind, of a kind that robs one side of its most fundamental attribute – its humanity – it seems only appropriate that some form of atonement be made, in order to exorcise that past. Reparations, we repeat, serve as a cogent critique of history and thus a potent restraint on its repetition ... It is not possible to ignore the example of the Jews and the obsessed commitment of survivors of the Holocaust, and their descendants, to recover both their material patrimony, and the humanity of which they were brutally deprived.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

96. One of the most important statements made in modern history is that made by the prosecution in its summation at Nuremberg in the High Command case:

## *Land*

References or discussions of land, land Acts or legislation, land owners etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 5 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

11 Indeed, one of most ambitious and far-reaching attempts at social engineering in twentieth century South African history was introduced by the first post-unification South African Party government in the form of the 1913 Land Act. No other piece of legislation in South African history more dramatically and drastically re-shaped the social map of this country. Not only did it lay the basis for the territorial separation of whites and Africans; it destroyed, at a stroke, a thriving African landowning and peasant agricultural sector. It did so by prohibiting African land ownership outside of the initial 7 per cent of land allocated to the so-called traditional reserves and ending sharecropping and non-tenancy arrangements on white-owned farms. The Land Act set in motion a massive forced removal of African people that led, amongst other things, to the deaths of many hundreds of people who found themselves suddenly landless.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

308 However, on the recommendations of the 1975 select committee for Bantu Affairs, the government considered incorporating Moutse into the soon to be established Ndebele homeland. Given Moutse's history and its ethnic composition, many analysts condemned the proposal as a violation of apartheid's ethnic ideal. Internal DCAD memoranda reveal that the department realised that their plans for Moutse represented a significant change of emphasis. Nevertheless, officials justified Moutse's incorporation based on a number of administrative, economic and developmental considerations. For its part, the 1975 select committee was motivated by a number of concerns. First, the incorporation of Moutse would have greatly expanded the area of the small KwaNdebele homeland. Second, the enlarged homeland would have remained a contiguous area, a goal frequently mentioned by apartheid planners but rarely achieved. Third, KwaNdebele's land area and population size would be boosted without the costs and negative publicity accompanying physical removals. Finally, given Moutse's combination of trust land and African freehold, the area's incorporation would boost KwaNdebele's size without the state having to purchase white farms or modify the amount of land occupied by Africans in terms of the limits set by the 1936 Land Act. In 1980, the central government excised Moutse from Lebowa, the first step towards acting on the select committee's recommendation.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The Northern Cape has a long history of land dispossession and forced removals. Africans were removed mainly to Bophuthatswana, often making way for South African Defence Force (SADF) military camps. Later in the 1980s, independent communal farming settlements such as Leliefontein, Steinkopf and Richtersveld in Namaqualand were privatised by the House of Representatives, leading to impoverishment and protest.



#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

538 Conflict between hostel-dwellers and residents of adjacent townships and settlements was a major site of conflict in this period. Since the 1976 attack by Mzimbhlope hostel residents on protesting students in Soweto in which seventy people died, there had been a history of animosity between the two communities. This was exacerbated during the 1980s as the urban-centred nature of township politics frequently marginalised hostel residents.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

70 Trust Feed is a rural community situated north-west of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZuluNatal. It is a freehold area with a hierarchical structure of landowners and tenants. The area has a long history of peaceful co-existence that changed in the mid1980s as a result of political tensions between the UDF and the IFP. Threatened by the activities of the UDF, the local police unit colluded with the IFP to wipe out UDF members. This led to a sequence of atrocities culminating in the Trust Feed massacre in December 1988.

## *Legacy*

References or discussions of the legacy of colonialism and apartheid

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 16 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

1 All South Africans know that our recent history is littered with some horrendous occurrences - the Sharpsville and Langa killings, the Soweto uprising, the Church Street bombing, Magoo's Bar, the Amanzimtoti Wimpy Bar bombing, the St James' Church killings, Boipatong and Sebokeng. We also knew about the deaths in detention of people such as Steve Biko, Neil Aggett, and others; necklacings, and the so-called 'black on black' violence on the East Rand and in KwaZulu Natal which arose from the rivalries between IFP and first the UDF and later the ANC. Our country is soaked in the blood of her children of all races and of all political persuasions.

2 It is this contemporary history - which began in 1960 when the Sharpsville disaster took place and ended with the wonderful inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically-elected President of the Republic of South Africa - it is this history with which we have had to come to terms. We could not pretend it did not happen. Everyone agrees that South Africans must deal with that history and its legacy. It is how we do this that is in question - a bone of contention throughout the life of the Commission, right up to the time when this report was being written. And I imagine we can assume that this particular point will remain controversial for a long time to come.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

will fill many shelves in the National Archives. This material will be of great value to scholars, journalists and others researching our history for generations to come. From a research point of view, this may be the Commission's greatest legacy.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and a majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights became a major casualty of this conflict ... the legitimacy of the law itself was deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged in the face of this tragic conflict ...

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

11 Indeed, one of most ambitious and far-reaching attempts at social engineering in twentieth century South African history was introduced by the first post-unification South African Party government in the form of the 1913 Land Act. No other piece of legislation in South African history more dramatically and drastically re-shaped the social map of this country. Not only did it lay the basis for the territorial separation of whites and Africans; it destroyed, at a stroke, a

thriving African landowning and peasant agricultural sector. It did so by prohibiting African land ownership outside of the initial 7 per cent of land allocated to the so-called traditional reserves and ending sharecropping and non-tenancy arrangements on white-owned farms. The Land Act set in motion a massive forced removal of African people that led, amongst other things, to the deaths of many hundreds of people who found themselves suddenly landless.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

146 These norms governing the use of legitimate state power are particularly difficult to apply to the period of South African history prescribed by the Commission's mandate. The large majority of people inside and outside the country increasingly rejected the legitimacy of the state, and activists fighting against apartheid were defined as criminals through the enforcement of harsh, unjust and discriminatory laws.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared, sometimes mysteriously, and most of them no longer survive to tell their tales. Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

■ INTRODUCTION 1 The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation's memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory – much of it contained in countless documentary records. The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. As this chapter will demonstrate, the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

112 What is tragic is that so heroic a figure as Ms Madikizela-Mandela, with her own rich history of contribution to the struggle, became embroiled in a controversy that caused immeasurable damage to her reputation. There can be no doubt that she showed poor judgment in ignoring the advice of the community leaders and members of the MDM. The Commission has been unable to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to what went wrong, why Madikizela-

Mandela was not accountable to the democratic structures inside the country, what influence the external liberation movement had over her, why she surrounded herself with persons of the calibre of Jerry Richardson and Xoliswa Falati, or why she became so isolated from democratic and community structures.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

What about those people in the existential vacuum from both sides that are now left with [the problem of] trying to figure out where to go? The change of government doesn't necessarily provide you with a job or resolve the problems you have as a result of a long history of alienation.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

10 South Africa's history of repression and exploitation severely affected the mental well-being of the majority of its citizens. South Africans have had to deal with a psychological stress which has arisen as a result of deprivation and dire socioeconomic conditions, coupled with the cumulative trauma arising from violent state repression and intra-community conflicts.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

139 The townships and residential areas constructed in this period were grossly underserved. Many were without basic services such as water, electricity, adequate housing, roads, schools and clinics. Lack of services and appalling living conditions generated tensions that laid the ground for much of the conflict that was generated in South Africa's contemporary history. From rural farming areas to homeland settlements to urban townships, living conditions and economic deprivation provided fertile ground for conflict. The battle for national liberation and civil and political rights cannot, therefore, be separated from countless localised battles rooted in socio-economic deprivation.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

White racism is alive and kicking. It no longer takes the form of legislated supremacy, but it continues to manifest itself in crude and subtle ways. The most insidious is the assumption that white values are universal and by implication superior to those of other groups. The most offensive is the endless complaining about corruption, inefficiency and falling standards. This is one of the bad jokes of the new South Africa. The previous government set unsurpassed standards for corruption, incompetence and neglect. There is a fourth position which is seldom heard and which I believe is the appropriate response. The white community should confront its pervasive racism, and stare our ugly history and its long shelf life in the face. We should acknowledge collective responsibility for our efforts and our acquiescence in constructing and maintaining a wretched system of discrimination, exclusion and repression. To invoke theological terminology, we should confess and engage in meaningful acts of contrition.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

26. As we have seen with other cases, the particular event Mrs Tenza reported to the Commission was little more than a punctuation mark in a life of ongoing difficulties. Both she and her family made political decisions at times influenced at least as much by attempts to survive violence and poverty as by ideological persuasions. The tone throughout is of a long struggle to eke out a meagre existence in a violent world. Mrs Te n z a 's life story paints a vivid picture of the convoluted political history of KwaZulu/Natal and the human consequences. The awful experience of seeing her nephew murdered in front of her is just one example of a broader tragedy.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

40. It was estimated in 1992 that about three million black households had no access to electricity – this after a history of electricity generation in South Africa of more than 85 years; equally some 19 000 schools and 4000 clinics serving black communities had not been linked to the national electrical grid.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

T h e r e were very many victims of apartheid and, certainly, those who came b e f o r e the Commission are only a subset of a much larger group. This is why, when balancing individual and socially oriented reparations, the Commission sought to address the specific needs of those who came before it in order to contribute to the wider truth about the nation's history, whilst at the same time a d d r e s s i n g the broader consequences of apartheid. It is almost impossible to design a reparation programme without leaving some gaps. Nevertheless, the fact that not all victims will receive individual financial grants cannot be allowed to prevent at least some clearly deserving victims from getting such award s .

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

We have the highest respect for your Truth and Reconciliation Commission and process. We recognise that, if this process had not been a pre-negotiated condition, your democratic free elections could not possibly have occurred. There f o r e, and believing as Amy did in the absolute importance of those democratic elections occurring, we unabashedly support the process which we recognise to be u n p r e c e d e n t e d in contemporary human history. At the same time we say to you, it's your process, not ours. We cannot, theref o r e, oppose amnesty if it is granted on the merits. In the truest sense it is for the community of South Africa to forgive its own and this has its basis in traditions of ubuntu and other principles of human dignity. Amnesty is not clearly for Linda and Peter Biehl to grant. You face a challenging and extraordinarily difficult decision. How do you value a committed life? What value do you place on Amy and her legacy in South Africa? How do you exercise responsibility to the community in granting forgiveness, in the granting of amnesty? How are we preparing prisoners, such as these young men before us, to re-enter the community as a benefit to the community, acknowledging that the vast majority of South Africa's prisoners are under 30 years of age – acknowledging as we do that there 's massive unemployment in the marginalised community; acknowledging that the recidivism rate is roughly 95 per cent? So how do we, as friends, link arms and do something? There are clear needs for prisoner rehabilitation in our country as well as here. There are clear needs for literacy

training and education, and there are clear needs for the development of targeted job skill training. We, as the Amy Biehl Foundation, are willing to do our part as catalysts for social progress. All anyone need do is ask. Are you, the community of South Africa, prepared to do your part? (Cape Town hearing, 9 July 1997.)

## *Medical Community*

References or discussions of the medical community, doctors, etc.

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### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

It also appeared from interviews that, in teaching the subject, more attention was given to the history of nursing and etiquette than to ethics and professional conduct, and that students perceived the subject as a list of 'do's and don'ts'.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

40 As yet, relatively little is known about the human rights violations committed by health professionals in the military. The SAMS submission to the Commission focused on the history, functions and administrative structure of the service, rather than considering any possible involvement in gross human rights violations. Many questions were deferred because they related to supposedly 'classified' (secret) operations. For example, the SAMS submission referred to three special projects undertaken by the Psychology Directorate. The reference was followed by the

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

54 There are some well-known examples of cases where doctors reported false causes of death. These include the numerous detainees who supposedly died from such causes as slipping on a bar of soap, dying of an epileptic seizure where no prior history of epilepsy existed, having a heart attack without a history of heart disease, choking on food or suffocating or committing suicide. In addition, doctors were known to give expert advice on the mental health of deceased prisoners, or to conclude that someone had committed suicide because of mental instability, without ever having met the person involved. This type of evidence was advanced at the inquest into the death of Neil Aggett.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

99 History has shown that the two most powerful bodies with which doctors were associated - the SAMDC and the MASA - failed to speak out or take a stand for most of the period under review.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

122 The South African Psychological Association (SAPA) was founded in 1948, with a membership of thirty-four. In 1962, following the admission of a black member, a new association, the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), was established exclusively for whites. The two organisations merged in 1983 to form the Psychological Association of South Africa (PASA). Black professionals were permitted as members but,

because of the racist history of PIRSA, many chose to join the Black Psychologists' Association instead.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

93. Mr van Jaarsveld confirmed that one of the consequences of the incident was that Afrikaans publishers like Perskor turned their backs on Professor van Jaarsveld and removed 'his popular and well-known history textbooks from the market'. He was ignored by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to which he had regularly contributed to radio programmes. He was investigated by the security police and threatened with anonymous telephone calls and hate mail. Shortly after Te r re'blanche and others had been found guilty, an attempt was made on the pro f e s s o r 's life and he was shot at with a cro s s b o w. Other members of the family were threatened and a stone-throwing incident took place at the family home.



## *Nation*

References or discussions of the nation, nationalism and national identity

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 13 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

This report has been constrained by a number of factors - not least by the extent of the Commission's mandate and a number of legal provisions contained in the Act. It was, at the same time, driven by a dual responsibility. It had to provide the space within which victims could share the story of their trauma with the nation; and it had to recognise the importance of the due process of law that ensures the rights of alleged perpetrators. Several court rulings emphasised the importance of the latter. Obviously, the Commission respected these judgements. They did, however, sometimes make our efforts to obtain information about the past more difficult. This, in its turn, caused us to err on the side of caution in making our findings. Despite these difficulties, however, we can still claim, without fear of being contradicted, that we have contributed more to uncovering the truth about the past than all the court cases in the history of apartheid.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This means that we cannot hope properly to understand the history of the period under review unless we give apartheid and racism their rightful place as the defining features of that period. People would be surprised if anyone wanting to describe or understand the post World War II period were to ignore Soviet Communism or not give it a central, indeed pivotal, place in the geopolitics of that period. We know that nations defined themselves in terms of their relationship to Communism. That is what determined the politics, economics and foreign policies of the different protagonists at the time. It is what determined the nature of the Cold War period. The attitude towards Communism defined who one's allies and enemies were, what sort of defence budget was necessary and which surrogate states to support. The threat was seen as so serious that the world's greatest Western democracy saw nothing wrong with supporting some of the world's worst dictatorships - for example, Pinochet's Chile, other Latin American military dictatorships and

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

7 Soon afterwards, Asmal's call became a firm proposal of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, following an investigation of accusations that the ANC in-exile had perpetrated human rights violations in some of its camps. In response to the allegations, the ANC set up its own internal commissions of enquiry, the Stuart, Skweyiya and Motsuenyane commissions. The reports of these commissions confirmed that gross human rights violations had taken place in the camps. The National Executive Committee accepted the criticisms levelled at the organisation. It expressed the view, however, that the violations committed by the ANC should be seen against the background of the human rights violations that had taken place in South Africa over a much longer period. It proposed the appointment of a truth commission as a way of achieving this. This was perhaps the first time in history that a liberation movement or government-in-waiting had

called for an independent investigation of this kind, aimed at enquiring into allegations of violations of human rights not only by the previous regime, but also by its own members.

#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

■ INTRODUCTION 1 The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation's memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory – much of it contained in countless documentary records. The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. As this chapter will demonstrate, the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

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#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the past and current community dynamics. Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories. One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history. Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth. Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process

unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is dependent on people's ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases. Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation. Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

4 I was born towards the end of the Second World War, while my father was interned, "in detention without trial". I was born into the Afrikaner Volk and the National Party. I shared its history and its myths. Choice was not an option. During the interview by the panel that put forward the names of potential members to the President, I stated that I supported apartheid under Verwoerd as a moral option that I believed would lead away from domination and discrimination. It took me more than a decade to shed my (ideological) milk teeth, recognise inconsistencies in policy and cut my more permanent (political) teeth. I shifted from Volk to nation. Yet, when I entered politics, although my aim was nation, I entered the fold of the Volk. Only on looking back do I recognise elements of broader democratic choice. My politics expressed itself through the limited opportunities within the National Party. Only towards the mid-eighties, and then only through friends in struggle politics, did I begin to sense that a covert security 'policy' militated

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

27 Even though the report offers a good exposition of different concepts of truth, especially of factual truth and narrative truth and then of social or interactive truth, the distinction is not sustained. In arriving at findings, all is accepted as evidence, an ingredient of the factual truth. If we ignore the frame of our various dispositions through which evidence reaches us, we lose the context of the multiplicity of truth, both in dimension and in perspective. Truth, reconciliation and national unity can only be understood within the concept of multiple truths. Our perspectives decide our realities. Different elevations of an object give different pictures. It is only by sharing perspectives, by accepting them as real, that we can develop some form of understanding. To pour history into a mould is to recreate the potential for conflict which our Constitution and politics since 1990 have largely removed. A shared understanding of our history requires an understanding of different perspectives, not the building of a new national myth. Presenting 'the truth' as a one-dimensional finding is a continuation of the old frame. Nothing changes, sometimes not even content.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

31 National unity accepts different communities, accepts different cultures, accepts different value systems, accepts different religions, and even accepts different histories, provided there is some shared history. The work and activities of the Commission will certainly contribute to the further development of a shared history. However, such a history cannot be force-fed.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator – namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future – which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

c The reactive phenomenon of Afrikaner Nationalism, which created its own myths and history of an Afrikaner people dating back to their founding with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 (purely to facilitate trade), with a mission from God to evangelise Africa as His chosen people, seen as a parallel with Israel. Amnesty hearings of right-wing applicants showed ample evidence of remnants of this frame of mind, continuing right up to the end of the Commission's mandate period.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

94. In response to Mr van Jaarsveld's statement, Te r re'Blanche told the Committee: Mr Chairman, all these things did not happen because the professor was tarred and feathered; these things happened because of the incorrect version of the Covenant and the fact that history was twisted, which can be the worst that can happen to a nation if you abuse your power to rewrite history so that you all of a sudden can become acceptable to other nations. If we sit here at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is scaring to think that the Van Jaarsveld's family admit in front of this body seeking reconciliation and truth, that his father treated the truth in this way to the extent that his books were no longer published as textbooks because what he said was not acceptable to students and pupils. (Klerksdorp hearing, 10 May 1999.)

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

332. Applications for amnesty from conservative Afrikaners and right-wingers frequently made reference to a romantic image of the Boer nation, derived from the history of seventeenth century freeburgers, Trekkers and ultimately the Anglo-Boer War. A common theme in this

history was the desire of conservative Afrikaner groupings to be in control of their own destiny and the wish to achieve self-determination through the creation of a volkstaat or Boerestate.

## *Police*

References or discussions of the police, police officers, etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 17 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

47 In 1961, responsibility for the police was added to Justice Minister Vorster's portfolio. In 1962, he appointed Lieutenant General JM Kevvy as commissioner of police and, in 1963, Hendrik van den Bergh as head of the Security Branch. According to the official history of the SAP, the three were a formidable triumvirate whose major objective was "to safeguard and protect the country."<sup>2</sup> They obtained significant increases in the police budget, a large proportion of which was absorbed by the Security Branch, which grew substantially in the 1960s.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The ISU developed a reputation for abuses of power and the unaccountable behaviour of its members, which began to embarrass even senior police managers during the Peace Accord period. In a paradoxical twist of history, some township residents begin to call for troops, rather than the ISU, to patrol the townships.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

function. For many security force members, their existence undoubtedly confirmed that pronouncements of levelling the playing fields and normalising the political situation for free and fair elections represented the public face of NP policy, but at another, covert level, the war was to continue. In this regard, the Harms, Kahn and Goldstone Commissions and Steyn investigation were seen by many as public relations exercises rather than determined initiatives to root out 'dirty practices'. The long history of cover-ups and condonation of lying to such commissions merely reinforced this perception. Consequently, many operatives continued to conduct an all-out war against 'the enemy' and, as indicated earlier, elimination and the deadly use of force continued as a matter of routine.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

6 'State and allied groupings' comprises reported violations associated with public order policing, detention and torture, covert actions of the security forces and contra-mobilisation. 'Resistance and revolutionary groupings' comprises, for the most part, violations perpetrated by such groupings, including attacks on 'collaborators', necklacings, armed actions and sabotage, inter-organisational conflict and so forth. Where the history of violations occurring in the mandate period of the Commission was not amenable to these categories (particularly in the 1990s – the years of political transition), a thematic approach has been used.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

427 In the months leading up to the elections, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. The incidence of politically motivated human rights violations rose dramatically following the announcement of the election date.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

124 On 26 October, the state of emergency was extended to the western Cape, which prohibited up to a hundred organisations from holding meetings and also restricted the media. Four hundred people were detained in the first two weeks of the emergency, and the death toll continued to rise. Under these harsh restrictions, political protest adopted more varied forms such as candlelight protests, hunger strikes and church services, many of which were violently disrupted by police. The Divisional Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape, Brigadier Chris Swart, said that the candlelight protests were not innocent, but "deliberate tactics aimed at stirring people's emotions, which leads them to violent acts". THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE GOAL OF THE 'POLLSMOOR MARCH' WAS SYMBOLIC IN NATURE, NAMELY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO MR MANDELA AND DEMAND HIS RELEASE. MANY OF THE GROUPS OF MARCHERS WERE LED BY CLERICS, STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THE ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ON THE DAY OF THE POLLSMOOR MARCH AND THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS WERE THEREFORE UNWARRANTED AND USED EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT A MINIMUM OF TWENTY-EIGHT DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE HARSH REPRESSION OF THIS ACT OF PEACEFUL PROTEST PROPELLED THE REGION INTO THE MOST EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF PUBLIC UNREST IN ITS HISTORY, LASTING SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

162 Police moved in and arrested numerous people, including three women. Twenty-six were accused of murder and tried in a high-profile political trial that dominated both Upington and South African judicial history.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

2 The massacre was a turning point in South African history. In its wake, the government declared South Africa's first state of emergency in terms of the Public Safety Act of 1953. In addition, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were 'banned' from operating as unlawful organisations.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

164 'Rooi Rus' Swanepoel, who became known for his brutality in the course of the protest, already had a long history of involvement in gross human rights violations as chief interrogator of the Security Branch. He was, moreover, the founder of an anti-terrorist unit which later became Koevoet.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

743 The task team was set up and investigated over a hundred cases of torture and assault as well as seventeen cases of extra-judicial executions, two of which involved sixteen-year-old Mr Nixon Phiri [JB01068/03WR] and fifteen-year-old Mr Eugene Mbulawa [JB00462/03WR]. Both youths died after being detained by the SAP. The police claimed that Phiri died as a result of an epileptic fit. There was no history of him having this condition at the time of his detention. Two witnesses who were detained with him and who witnessed his assault died in ‘unrest incidents’ shortly after making statements to the Phiri family’s attorneys. THE COMMISSION FINDS THE SAP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH IN CUSTODY OF MR EUGENE MBULAWA AND MR NIXON PHIRI.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

16 The greatest number of instances of severe ill treatment are attributed to the SAP, followed by the ANC, with the Bophuthatswana security forces and IFP showing a similar number. As is the case for killings, the pattern changes at different periods of history, and closely matches the pattern of killings for the top three organisations: ~

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

Indeed, the historical record does not support business claims of noncollaboration. A vast body of evidence points to a central role for business interests in the elaboration, adoption, implementation and modification of apartheid policies throughout its dismal history. The South African Police and Defence Force were armed and equipped by big business. Apartheid’s jails were constructed by big business, as were the buildings housing the vast apartheid bureaucracy. Apartheid’s labour laws, pass laws, forced removals and cheap labour system were all to the advantage of the business community.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

150 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people’s courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

I don’t want to blame the [Commission] – the media is inclined to look at these atrocities. But the same names, the same police are repeatedly referred to, while there is no mention made of the majority of people who were in the police and the Defence Force who weren’t involved in the atrocities. They provided a service for the country, because they loved the country. This is still the case at present and they would probably do it again. Commissioner Malan: Could I just



interrupt you here, because I think we've got the message. I refer to the other part, you hear the same names and things but those are things that you didn't hear when you were in the army? That is my question. Mr Van Eeden: I can honestly say to you that these kinds of acts, no one can approve of. It makes you furious and angry because that is not what myself and thousands of young Afrikaner men got involved to do. Commissioner Malan: Can I take the question a bit further and the answer. I know is very difficult for people to understand who look at this whole history from a different perspective... How is it possible that you didn't know anything of it or did anything about it? Do you have a perspective on that? Mr Van Eeden: War as such is a crime against humanity; there are no victors. I had personal knowledge because I saw it, of certain of these actions that took place. I saw the result of bodies being burnt. I had knowledge of that. I didn't have knowledge of orchestrated efforts of forces that I served to incite such incidents... Commissioner Malan: You say that you saw bodies that were burnt. What did you think was the reason for that? Who burnt them? Mr Van Eeden: I didn't have to think of what the reason was; it was quite clear. I did my service in Vaal Triangle in the 1990s and it was black on black violence. That it could have been incited from another force, well we have evidence for that now. But I have personal knowledge of, well, let's refer to it as violence between ethnic groups, black ethnic groups in the Vaal Triangle, I saw that.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

120. In their applications, they sketched the turbulent political history of the township since 1985, including serious clashes with security forces. They testified that local farmers served as police reservists and had played a role in other forms of political repression. As a consequence, groups of up to forty youths, including the applicants, had embarked on raids and robberies on white farmers. In most instances, the motive was to acquire weapons and ammunition. In some of the attacks, farmers or farm workers were shot and injured. Amnesty was granted for four of the attacks and refused for one.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

93. Mr van Jaarsveld confirmed that one of the consequences of the incident was that Afrikaans publishers like Perskor turned their backs on Professor van Jaarsveld and removed 'his popular and well-known history textbooks from the market'. He was ignored by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to which he had regularly contributed to radio programmes. He was investigated by the security police and threatened with anonymous telephone calls and hate mail. Shortly after Terre'blanche and others had been found guilty, an attempt was made on the professor's life and he was shot at with a crossbow. Other members of the family were threatened and a stone-throwing incident took place at the family home.

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

17. Inkatha's relationship with apartheid security force agencies had a long history. In April 1986, the State Security Council approved guidelines for a strategy for a counter-revolutionary war, which, amongst other things, emphasised the fact that the forces of revolution should not be combated by the security forces alone, but also by 'anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha ... or the ZCC38 as well as the ethnic factor in South African society'.

## *Politics*

References or discussions of politics, politicians, or political parties

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 58 references coded [0.13% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

1 All South Africans know that our recent history is littered with some horrendous occurrences - the Sharpsville and Langa killings, the Soweto uprising, the Church Street bombing, Magoo's Bar, the Amanzimtoti Wimpy Bar bombing, the St James' Church killings, Boipatong and Sebokeng. We also knew about the deaths in detention of people such as Steve Biko, Neil Aggett, and others; necklacings, and the so-called 'black on black' violence on the East Rand and in KwaZulu Natal which arose from the rivalries between IFP and first the UDF and later the ANC. Our country is soaked in the blood of her children of all races and of all political persuasions.

2 It is this contemporary history - which began in 1960 when the Sharpsville disaster took place and ended with the wonderful inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically-elected President of the Republic of South Africa - it is this history with which we have had to come to terms. We could not pretend it did not happen. Everyone agrees that South Africans must deal with that history and its legacy. It is how we do this that is in question - a bone of contention throughout the life of the Commission, right up to the time when this report was being written. And I imagine we can assume that this particular point will remain controversial for a long time to come.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

will fill many shelves in the National Archives. This material will be of great value to scholars, journalists and others researching our history for generations to come. From a research point of view, this may be the Commission's greatest legacy.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This means that we cannot hope properly to understand the history of the period under review unless we give apartheid and racism their rightful place as the defining features of that period. People would be surprised if anyone wanting to describe or understand the post World War II period were to ignore Soviet Communism or not give it a central, indeed pivotal, place in the geopolitics of that period. We know that nations defined themselves in terms of their relationship to Communism. That is what determined the politics, economics and foreign policies of the different protagonists at the time. It is what determined the nature of the Cold War period. The attitude towards Communism defined who one's allies and enemies were, what sort of defence budget was necessary and which surrogate states to support. The threat was seen as so serious that the world's greatest Western democracy saw nothing wrong with supporting some of the

world's worst dictatorships - for example, Pinochet's Chile, other Latin American military dictatorships and

#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and a majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights became a major casualty of this conflict ... the legitimacy of the law itself was deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged in the face of this tragic conflict ...

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

8 It is also important to remember that the 1960 Sharpville massacre (with which the mandate of the Commission begins) was simply the latest in a long line of similar killings of civilian protesters in South African history. It was, for example, not a National Party administration but the South African Party government, made up primarily of English-speaking South Africans, that in July 1913 crushed a series of miners' strikes on the Reef - sending in the army and killing just over one hundred strikers and onlookers. Thrice in 1921 and 1922, this same governing party let loose its troops and planes: first, against a protesting religious sect, the Israelites at Bulhoek, killing 183 people; second, against striking white mineworkers on the Reef in 1922, resulting in the deaths of 214 people<sup>3</sup>; and third, when the Bondelswarts people, a landless hunting group of Nama origin in South West Africa, in rebellion against a punitive dog tax in 1922, were machine-gunned from the air. One hundred civilians, mostly women, were killed.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

11 Indeed, one of most ambitious and far-reaching attempts at social engineering in twentieth century South African history was introduced by the first post-unification South African Party government in the form of the 1913 Land Act. No other piece of legislation in South African history more dramatically and drastically re-shaped the social map of this country. Not only did it lay the basis for the territorial separation of whites and Africans; it destroyed, at a stroke, a thriving African landowning and peasant agricultural sector. It did so by prohibiting African land ownership outside of the initial 7 per cent of land allocated to the so-called traditional reserves and ending sharecropping and non-tenancy arrangements on white-owned farms. The Land Act set in motion a massive forced removal of African people that led, amongst other things, to the deaths of many hundreds of people who found themselves suddenly landless.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

7 Soon afterwards, Asmal's call became a firm proposal of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, following an investigation of accusations that the ANC in-exile had perpetrated human rights violations in some of its camps. In response to the allegations, the ANC set up its own internal commissions of enquiry, the Stuart, Skweyiya and Motsuenyane commissions. The reports of these commissions confirmed that gross human rights violations had taken place in the camps. The National Executive Committee accepted the criticisms levelled at the organisation. It

expressed the view, however, that the violations committed by the ANC should be seen against the background of the human rights violations that had taken place in South Africa over a much longer period. It proposed the appointment of a truth commission as a way of achieving this. This was perhaps the first time in history that a liberation movement or government-in-waiting had called for an independent investigation of this kind, aimed at enquiring into allegations of violations of human rights not only by the previous regime, but also by its own members.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

146 These norms governing the use of legitimate state power are particularly difficult to apply to the period of South African history prescribed by the Commission's mandate. The large majority of people inside and outside the country increasingly rejected the legitimacy of the state, and activists fighting against apartheid were defined as criminals through the enforcement of harsh, unjust and discriminatory laws.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

52 This means that one must guard against such simplistic platitudes as 'to forgive is to forget'. It is also crucial not to fall into the error of equating forgiveness with reconciliation. The road to reconciliation requires more than forgiveness and respectful remembrance. It is, in this respect, worth remembering the difficult history of reconciliation between Afrikaners and white English-speaking South Africans after the devastating Anglo-Boer/South African War (1899-1902). Despite coexistence and participation with English-speaking South Africans in the political system that followed the war, it took many decades to rebuild relationships and redistribute resources - a process that was additionally complicated by a range of urban/rural, class, and linguistic and other barriers. Reconciliation requires not only individual justice, but also social justice.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

■ INTRODUCTION 1 The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation's memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory – much of it contained in countless documentary records. The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. As this chapter will demonstrate, the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

surgery. In that instance, the investigating officer was killed, and other detectives were afraid to pursue their investigations. Ms Mary de Haas of the University of Natal gave a background

submission on the political history of the area, and the failure of the SAP and KZP to investigate properly and deal with the situation.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

33 Staff went to a lot of trouble to identify different types of cases for the human rights violation hearings so that both high and low profile cases were heard, witnesses from across the political spectrum were given a voice, and both individual and group cases were heard. Occasionally alleged perpetrators were able to give their side of the story at the same hearings as their accusers. The hearing at Lusikisiki, for example, became a landmark in uncovering the history of rural rebellions from the early 1960s.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

The history of security legislation in South Africa is very convoluted. Only those laws mentioned in the Race Relations Surveys (RRS and SRR) and John Dugard's Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) are listed. In particular, those laws relating to the tightening up of detention legislation are included. Only a brief description of the various state of emergency regulations is given.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

88 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985-1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by 'people's courts' and it was not possible to establish whether the IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have played a factor.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

298 First, forms of vigilante activity in the KwaNdebele area predate the unrest of the mid-1980s by at least a decade. SS Skosana, elected the first president of the Imbokodo when it was officially constituted in 1986, has traced the organisation's roots to a "cultural society" formed in 1976 "when there were riots and schools were burned". Throughout the intervening decade, a number of vigilante attacks were carried out against perceived political opponents of the KwaNdebele government and its various tribal authorities. In addition, numerous tactics, including roadblocks, were used to identify and "discipline" various "agitators" especially "outsiders" – generally perceived as politicised youth from the Rand – operating in the homeland. Vigilantism thus has a long, indigenous history in the area.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

299 Second, many of these activities were conducted with the blessing if not the active participation of the Ndzundza royal kraal. Despite their emergence as leading opponents of the

Imbokodo in 1986, members of the royal family were involved in earlier forms of vigilante activity. In fact, individuals participating in early vigilante operations emphasised that they were “called by the king” when such activities were deemed necessary. With this history in mind, Imbokodo members have claimed that their organisation was constituted at the royal kraal and derived its authority from the king himself.

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

112 What is tragic is that so heroic a figure as Ms Madikizela-Mandela, with her own rich history of contribution to the struggle, became embroiled in a controversy that caused immeasurable damage to her reputation. There can be no doubt that she showed poor judgment in ignoring the advice of the community leaders and members of the MDM. The Commission has been unable to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to what went wrong, why Madikizela-Mandela was not accountable to the democratic structures inside the country, what influence the external liberation movement had over her, why she surrounded herself with persons of the calibre of Jerry Richardson and Xoliswa Falati, or why she became so isolated from democratic and community structures.

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

139 Two important events in the homelands proved milestones in the larger history of this period as they resonated throughout South Africa and, in turn, helped to direct the course of events in the country. The incidents occurred in homelands whose leaders had proved reluctant to surrender juridical independence and reincorporate into South Africa. In addition, the governments in both homelands showed themselves willing to engage in political brinkmanship in order to assert their power, particularly in the face of the ANC’s increasing centrality to the negotiations.

#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

175 Throughout its brief history, the ADM was involved in violent clashes with the ANC. After the Bisho massacre of September 1992, these clashes erupted into more overt warfare, with increasingly sophisticated weapons being used (see the Eastern Cape regional profile elsewhere in this report). The highest number of attacks appeared to have been carried out by the ANC-aligned groups.

#### Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

189 The Seven Day War in 1990 was one of the most significant events in the history of political violence in the province during the period. The Seven Day War is the collective name given to the events that occurred in the greater Edendale Valley in the greater Pietermaritzburg area in the seven days from Sunday 25 March 1990.

#### Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

239 In the run-up to the 1994 elections, Inkatha came into conflict with the central government and the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) concerning the issue of independence and sovereignty for KwaZulu. Inkatha adopted a publicly declared militant stance towards the rejection of its demands, culminating in a decision not to participate in the April 1994 elections. It was only on 19 April 1994, just six days before the elections, that Inkatha did an about-turn and announced that it would contest the elections. In the interim period, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. Approximately 3 000 gross violations of human rights were perpetrated by Inkatha in KwaZulu and Natal from July 1993 to May 1994. This constituted more than 55 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission's Durban office for this period.

#### Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

523 Of particular relevance in the 1990s is a previous history of encouraging divisions between Inkatha and the UDF. What is important to note is that this covert policy of encouraging and fomenting such divisions predates the outbreak of violent conflict in Natal and that, when the conflict assumed violent proportions, this was simply noted and no attempt was made to change the overall strategy. This indicates, at the very least, that this was regarded as acceptable, possibly even desirable. Operation Marion and the Caprivi training must thus be seen in the context of this overall State Security Council policy. A similar strategy was reflected in Operation Katzen and support for vigilante groups. Covert support for anti-UDF/ ANC groupings was well established by the 1990 and was seen as legitimate and authorised. This support led to the development of links between individual security force operatives and conservative individuals at a local level, providing a basis for ongoing destabilisation on the ground. The connection between this strategy and the violence in the 1990s is obvious. Indeed, support for Inkatha continued into the 1990s. It is thus not surprising that security force members believed that it was legitimate to provide support, including arms, to Inkatha, or to seek to protect and foster IFP-linked forces when policing violence-torn communities.

#### Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

6 'State and allied groupings' comprises reported violations associated with public order policing, detention and torture, covert actions of the security forces and contra-mobilisation. 'Resistance and revolutionary groupings' comprises, for the most part, violations perpetrated by such groupings, including attacks on 'collaborators', necklacings, armed actions and sabotage, inter-organisational conflict and so forth. Where the history of violations occurring in the mandate period of the Commission was not amenable to these categories (particularly in the 1990s – the years of political transition), a thematic approach has been used.

#### Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

Tribal clashes, which occur from time to time and which have occurred regularly throughout history, are presented as revolts against the system of Bantu Authorities. Even when the true facts are supplied to these newspapers, the paragraph giving the facts is carefully deleted.

#### Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

21 Statements were received from a broad cross-section of communities in the province, with the majority coming from the townships and rural KwaZulu (former 'black areas'). While many people approached the Commission of their own accord with reports of violations, the Commission also deployed teams of statement takers across the province to gather a wide-ranging sample of evidence for a more complete view of the region's history. Statement takers reported difficulties in gaining access to some areas, for example Inchanga, which had been the scene of political conflict during 1996–97, and other areas known to be strongholds of the IFP.

#### Reference 26 - 0.01% Coverage

35 The Durban strikes of 1973 marked a turning point in the history of political resistance in the province. With wages practically frozen for over a decade, the growing poverty in the cities – and therefore also in the rural areas where families depended on the wages of migrant breadwinners – led to strikes which affected 150 establishments and involved 60 000 workers during the first few months of 1973. The strikers were ultimately forced to back down, but they laid the foundations for a new labour union movement and for organised social resistance in other

#### Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The constitution of the Eagles Youth Club was said to be based on 'Christian National Principles' and pursued its objectives by means of camps offering a variety of activities, including political education. Lectures in political education covered subjects as diverse as Christianity, Communism and the culture and history of the ANC and PAC. Eagles were encouraged to co-operate with state structures, particularly with the police and the SADF, who were described in the courses as 'your friends'. At the same time, members were encouraged to report 'terrorists' to the police and warned against 'people who are trying to tell you bad things about South Africa'. They were told that 'comrades' organisations in townships were part of the 'enemy' and should be neutralised. Eagles members became sources of information concerning the identity of 'comrades' in townships, and were used to monitor the strategies and plans of 'comrades' organisations, particularly around popular events such as the commemoration of 16 June (Soweto Day).

#### Reference 28 - 0.01% Coverage

124 On 26 October, the state of emergency was extended to the western Cape, which prohibited up to a hundred organisations from holding meetings and also restricted the media. Four hundred people were detained in the first two weeks of the emergency, and the death toll continued to rise. Under these harsh restrictions, political protest adopted more varied forms such as candlelight protests, hunger strikes and church services, many of which were violently disrupted by police. The Divisional Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape, Brigadier Chris Swart, said that the candlelight protests were not innocent, but "deliberate tactics aimed at stirring people's emotions, which leads them to violent acts". THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE GOAL OF THE 'POLLSMOOR MARCH' WAS SYMBOLIC IN NATURE, NAMELY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO MR MANDELA AND DEMAND HIS RELEASE. MANY OF



THE GROUPS OF MARCHERS WERE LED BY CLERICS, STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THE ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ON THE DAY OF THE POLLSMOOR MARCH AND THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS WERE THEREFORE UNWARRANTED AND USED EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT A MINIMUM OF TWENTY-EIGHT DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE HARSH REPRESSION OF THIS ACT OF PEACEFUL PROTEST PROPELLED THE REGION INTO THE MOST EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF PUBLIC UNREST IN ITS HISTORY, LASTING SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

Reference 29 - 0.01% Coverage

25 The march was organised and planned by the PAC. In its verbal submission to the Commission, the PAC outlined the history of the organisation's anti-pass campaign and emphasised the commitment of its organisers to peaceful protest. The March 1960 protest action against the pass laws built on the success of the PAC Status Campaign which focused on the idea of mental liberation. PAC representatives told the Commission that it was "an absolutely non-violent campaign".<sup>1</sup> PAC leader Robert Sobukwe, reportedly announced before the march that "we are ready to die for our cause but we are not ready to kill". Before the march, a letter was sent to the commissioner of police, Major General Rademeyer "explaining fully the peaceful nature of the campaign".

Reference 30 - 0.01% Coverage

107 In 1976, the Johannesburg area was the centre of the most sustained and violent protests the country had ever seen. 1976 has frequently been described as a turning point in South Africa's political history. The conflict sparked by the former state's attempt to impose Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on black school children lasted fifteen months and spread to 200 towns and cities across South Africa.<sup>18</sup>

Reference 31 - 0.01% Coverage

245 In 1985, the charge of high treason was revived and fifty-five people were charged with high treason in seven separate trials. One of these, the Pietermaritzburg Trial, sought to demonstrate that the South African Allied Workers Union, the UDF and some of its affiliates – all lawful organisations carrying out legal activities – were operating as part of a revolutionary conspiracy. The Delmas trial, in which twenty-two activists were charged, lasted from June 1985 until December 1989 and is alleged to have been the longest trial in South African history.

Reference 32 - 0.01% Coverage

408 In Bophuthatswana, freedom of political expression and activity could hardly be said to exist. The ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party dominated parliament throughout the territory's history, and various attempts to establish alternative parties and associations floundered as a result of severe repression.

#### Reference 33 - 0.01% Coverage

718 From 1989–91, there were at least seventeen extra-judicial executions in Khutsong, a small township outside Carletonville on the West Rand. The victims were all members of the Khutsong Youth Congress (KYC). The KYC split into two factions – the ‘Zim-Zims’ and the ‘Gaddaffis’, both active UDF/ANC supporters. The Commission received over sixty statements relating to this particular period in Khutsong’s history.

#### Reference 34 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This history has been well documented<sup>7</sup> and was reflected in submissions by COSATU, the SACP and the ANC. The first-order involvement of the mining houses and the Chamber of Mines (COM) in shaping the migrant labour system is the clearest example of business working closely with the minority (white) government to create the conditions for capital accumulation based on cheap African labour. The evidence shows that, rather than relying simply on the forces of supply and demand, the mining industry harnessed the services of the state to shape labour supply conditions to their advantage. Thus, the mining industry bears a great deal of moral responsibility for the migrant labour system and its associated hardships.

#### Reference 35 - 0.01% Coverage

109 As the repression of the 1980s escalated, some faith communities and organisations joined the liberation organisations in appealing to international partners to press for economic sanctions.<sup>52</sup> Many however opposed sanctions or were ambivalent on the question. Some, like the Church of the Province, confessed to its failure to support sanctions only as late as 1989.<sup>53</sup> The Catholic Bishops Conference, “fearing a great increase of poverty and unemployment”, supported sanctions with reservations. “History”, it said, “will be the judge”. The only English-speaking church to give unqualified support to sanctions from the outset was the United Congregational Church.<sup>54</sup>

#### Reference 36 - 0.01% Coverage

I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country is driven continuously to a conflict between his conscience on the one hand and the law on the other... The law as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is written by the Nationalist Government is a law which in our view is immoral, unjust and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we must oppose it and that we must attempt to alter it.

#### Reference 37 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The Afrikaans press declined to make a submission to the Commission. Instead, it provided the Commission with a copy of Oor Grense Heen, the official history of Nasionale Pers (Naspers).

56 Rather oddly in the context, the book repeatedly confirms that the various newspapers in the group were always pro-NP government institutions. The opening paragraph states candidly that

the NP victory in 1948 meant that the company became a pro-government institution. The history concedes that Die Burger, for instance, promoted Verwoerd's ideals of bantustans from an early stage and that, after Sharpville, the same newspaper advised that all positive aspects be speeded up. Occasionally, doubts about apartheid do surface but, in the main, the book reflects a total lack of concern for the company's support of the racist system.

#### Reference 38 - 0.01% Coverage

59 They said that "many Afrikaans journalists were deaf and blind to the political aspirations and sufferings of black fellow South Africans" and did not inform their readers about the injustices of apartheid. When knowledge about gross human rights violations became public, the journalists felt they had too readily accepted the denials and disingenuous explanations of the NP. Those who made submissions also sought forgiveness for their lack of action and committed themselves to ensuring that history would not repeat itself.

#### Reference 39 - 0.01% Coverage

What about those people in the existential vacuum from both sides that are now left with [the problem of] trying to figure out where to go? The change of government doesn't necessarily provide you with a job or resolve the problems you have as a result of a long history of alienation.

#### Reference 40 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa's history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

#### Reference 41 - 0.01% Coverage

harnessed vast amounts of energy, courage and resilience during the apartheid era. For many young people, active engagement in political activity resulted in the acquisition of skills such as analysis, mobilisation and strategising, as well as the ability to draw strength from friends and comrades in times of hardship. Many of today's leaders come from a politically active history and have displayed a remarkable capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation.

#### Reference 42 - 0.01% Coverage

139 The townships and residential areas constructed in this period were grossly underserved. Many were without basic services such as water, electricity, adequate housing, roads, schools and clinics. Lack of services and appalling living conditions generated tensions that laid the

ground for much of the conflict that was generated in South Africa's contemporary history. From rural farming areas to homeland settlements to urban townships, living conditions and economic deprivation provided fertile ground for conflict. The battle for national liberation and civil and political rights cannot, therefore, be separated from countless localised battles rooted in socio-economic deprivation.

#### Reference 43 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The appearance before the Commission of former President FW de Klerk as spokesperson of the National Party (NP) perspective was a particular disappointment to the Commission. As one who had done so much to turn the tide of South African history, his evasiveness and unwillingness candidly to acknowledge the full burden of the NP's responsibility seemed to the Commission to be a missed opportunity to take the reconciliation process forward.

#### Reference 44 - 0.01% Coverage

150 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people's courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.

#### Reference 45 - 0.01% Coverage

infertile ground. More fertile soil presents itself in the form of special organisations. People join up or are recruited, and are then selectively drawn deeper into the organisational culture in sequential steps of training, specialised allocation and 'ideological acceleration'. South African history is littered with special groupings of a semi-secretive nature, designed to do either ideological work (the Broederbond) or repressive work, or sometimes both.

#### Reference 46 - 0.01% Coverage

70 Trust Feed is a rural community situated north-west of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZuluNatal. It is a freehold area with a hierarchical structure of landowners and tenants. The area has a long history of peaceful co-existence that changed in the mid 1980s as a result of political tensions between the UDF and the IFP. Threatened by the activities of the UDF, the local police unit colluded with the IFP to wipe out UDF members. This led to a sequence of atrocities culminating in the Trust Feed massacre in December 1988.

#### Reference 47 - 0.01% Coverage

4 I was born towards the end of the Second World War, while my father was interned, "in detention without trial". I was born into the Afrikaner Volk and the National Party. I shared its history and its myths. Choice was not an option. During the interview by the panel that put

forward the names of potential members to the President, I stated that I supported apartheid under Verwoerd as a moral option that I believed would lead away from domination and discrimination. It took me more than a decade to shed my (ideological) milk teeth, recognise inconsistencies in policy and cut my more permanent (political) teeth. I shifted from Volk to nation. Yet, when I entered politics, although my aim was nation, I entered the fold of the Volk. Only on looking back do I recognise elements of broader democratic choice. My politics expressed itself through the limited opportunities within the National Party. Only towards the mid-eighties, and then only through friends in struggle politics, did I begin to sense that a covert security 'policy' militated

#### Reference 48 - 0.01% Coverage

against my understanding of the political policy of reform, aiming at a democratic dispensation. This sense came about mainly as a result of multiple discretionary detentions without trial of my friends. In their experiences, I recognised some of Afrikaner history.

#### Reference 49 - 0.01% Coverage

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator – namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future – which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

#### Reference 50 - 0.01% Coverage

85 Recommendations for the establishment of special units to follow up on the uncompleted work of the Investigation Unit, in particular to investigate gross human rights violations that resulted from the political conflicts on the past, should be resisted. Such action would militate against the spirit of understanding, the transcending of the divisions of the past, against bringing to close a chapter in our history. It would negate the spirit of the agreement that gave us our democracy. It is a very sensitive issue that requires great wisdom. It would be politically

#### Reference 51 - 0.01% Coverage

26. As we have seen with other cases, the particular event Mrs Tenza reported to the Commission was little more than a punctuation mark in a life of ongoing difficulties. Both she and her family made political decisions at times influenced at least as much by attempts to survive violence and poverty as by ideological persuasions. The tone throughout is of a long struggle to eke out a meagre existence in a violent world. Mrs Te n z a 's life story paints a vivid

picture of the convoluted political history of KwaZulu/Natal and the human consequences. The awful experience of seeing her nephew murdered in front of her is just one example of a broader tragedy.

#### Reference 52 - 0.01% Coverage

45. During this period the ANC's Special Operations Unit launched several high profile armed attacks on economic and energy installations, infrastructure and police stations, as well as an attack on the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria, in which nineteen people died. In terms of casualties, this was the largest attack in MK history. Other high-profile attacks included the 1980 SASOL attacks, the 1982 attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte SADF base, attacks on police stations and the 1982 sabotage attack on the Koeberg nuclear power station.

#### Reference 53 - 0.01% Coverage

120. In their applications, they sketched the turbulent political history of the township since 1985, including serious clashes with security forces. They testified that local farmers served as police reservists and had played a role in other forms of political repression. As a consequence, groups of up to forty youths, including the applicants, had embarked on raids and robberies on white farmers. In most instances, the motive was to acquire weapons and ammunition. In some of the attacks, farmers or farm workers were shot and injured. Amnesty was granted for four of the attacks and refused for one.

#### Reference 54 - 0.01% Coverage

So that was an inevitable part of the history of this country. Now it's very important that our Parliament, a democratic elected Parliament, recognised this by making the cut-off date the 10th of May 1997. It recognised, the law makers recognised, that we were engaged in a racial struggle up to that point. And the 14th of February falls within that cut-off date.

#### Reference 55 - 0.01% Coverage

[T]he attack on white civilians is not a new thing, when you look back at the history of PAC – the formation of Poqo on the 11th of September 1961. If you remember the attacks at Mbashe, Paarl and Komane, those comrades of those days were members of the PAC which was converted into APLA. They were attacking white civilians during those days; even history confirms that. Therefore I find it difficult for me when one of the panel members says we're shifting as to our targets. Instead of attacking security forces, we were attacking white civilians which I refer to as 'soft targets' ... That's the reason why I say I am confused when they say we have shifted in constituting targets because this started long ago. (Pietemmaritzburg hearing, 11 February 1998.)

#### Reference 56 - 0.01% Coverage

90. Terre'Blanche testified that, after the tarring and feathering, history books written by the professor were withdrawn from schools and that the AWB had therefore partially succeeded in

its political objective since Professor van Jaarsveld could no longer influence the minds of the youth, the voters of the future .

#### Reference 57 - 0.01% Coverage

36. David Simelane and Obed Masina, for example, were granted amnesty for the killing of Sergeant Orphan Hlubi Chapi outside his Soweto home in June 1978. It was, however, the formation of the ANC Special Operations Unit in 1979 that led to the launch of several high-profile attacks on police stations, state infrastructure and a major attack on SADF personnel, namely the Church Street bombing. Here a car bomb placed outside the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria led to the deaths of nineteen people. In terms of the numbers of casualties, this was the most devastating attack by MK in its entire history. The Commission received amnesty applications for a total of seventy-nine incidents carried out by this unit during this period.<sup>63</sup>

#### Reference 58 - 0.01% Coverage

85. The document envisaged that, although MK members would play a role in the establishment of SDUs, it was imperative that they be controlled from within communities because of the past history of informally established units. It was also envisaged that the units would receive political instruction of some sort. Local MK members were granted permission to participate in these structures. MK involvement took the form of recruiting and training of SDU members and supplying weapons. In some instances, individual members of MK participated in the clashes and skirmishes that took place.

## *Press*

References or discussions of the press, media, journalists, etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 5 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The Afrikaans press declined to make a submission to the Commission. Instead, it provided the Commission with a copy of Oor Grense Heen, the official history of Nasionale Pers (Naspers).

56 Rather oddly in the context, the book repeatedly confirms that the various newspapers in the group were always pro-NP government institutions. The opening paragraph states candidly that the NP victory in 1948 meant that the company became a pro-government institution. The history concedes that Die Burger, for instance, promoted Verwoerd's ideals of bantustans from an early stage and that, after Sharpsville, the same newspaper advised that all positive aspects be speeded up. Occasionally, doubts about apartheid do surface but, in the main, the book reflects a total lack of concern for the company's support of the racist system.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

59 They said that "many Afrikaans journalists were deaf and blind to the political aspirations and sufferings of black fellow South Africans" and did not inform their readers about the injustices of apartheid. When knowledge about gross human rights violations became public, the journalists felt they had too readily accepted the denials and disingenuous explanations of the NP. Those who made submissions also sought forgiveness for their lack of action and committed themselves to ensuring that history would not repeat itself.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

104 By not reporting honestly on the human rights abuses of the NP government, the Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor ones. (Their heirs, significantly, made a significant gesture towards reconciliation by making personal submissions of regret following the absence of their employers from the hearing.)

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

c Biko's death and 'Black Thursday'. These were both milestones in media history and more attention should have been paid to them.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage



I don't want to blame the [Commission] – the media is inclined to look at these atrocities. But the same names, the same police are repeatedly referred to, while there is no mention made of the majority of people who were in the police and the Defence Force who weren't involved in the atrocities. They provided a service for the country, because they loved the country. This is still the case at present and they would probably do it again. Commissioner Malan: Could I just interrupt you here, because I think we've got the message. I refer to the other part, you hear the same names and things but those are things that you didn't hear when you were in the army? That is my question. Mr Van Eeden: I can honestly say to you that these kinds of acts, no one can approve of. It makes you furious and angry because that is not what myself and thousands of young Afrikaner men got involved to do. Commissioner Malan: Can I take the question a bit further and the answer. I know is very difficult for people to understand who look at this whole history from a different perspective... How is it possible that you didn't know anything of it or did anything about it? Do you have a perspective on that? Mr Van Eeden: War as such is a crime against humanity; there are no victors. I had personal knowledge because I saw it, of certain of these actions that took place. I saw the result of bodies being burnt. I had knowledge of that. I didn't have knowledge of orchestrated efforts of forces that I served to incite such incidents... Commissioner Malan: You say that you saw bodies that were burnt. What did you think was the reason for that? Who burnt them? Mr Van Eeden: I didn't have to think of what the reason was; it was quite clear. I did my service in Vaal Triangle in the 1990s and it was black on black violence. That it could have been incited from another force, well we have evidence for that now. But I have personal knowledge of, well, let's refer to it as violence between ethnic groups, black ethnic groups in the Vaal Triangle, I saw that.

## *Racism*

References or discussions of racism, discrimination etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 7 references coded [0.02% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This means that we cannot hope properly to understand the history of the period under review unless we give apartheid and racism their rightful place as the defining features of that period. People would be surprised if anyone wanting to describe or understand the post World War II period were to ignore Soviet Communism or not give it a central, indeed pivotal, place in the geopolitics of that period. We know that nations defined themselves in terms of their relationship to Communism. That is what determined the politics, economics and foreign policies of the different protagonists at the time. It is what determined the nature of the Cold War period. The attitude towards Communism defined who one's allies and enemies were, what sort of defence budget was necessary and which surrogate states to support. The threat was seen as so serious that the world's greatest Western democracy saw nothing wrong with supporting some of the world's worst dictatorships - for example, Pinochet's Chile, other Latin American military dictatorships and

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

64 I want to suggest that apartheid and racism played a similar defining role in the history of the period under review. The vast majority, if not all, of the gross violations of human rights that were perpetrated in this period happened at the hands either of those who sought to defend the unjust apartheid and racist dispensation or those who sought to resist and ultimately overthrow that system.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

65 The image of gold mining magnates accumulating vast wealth at the expense of African mine workers, whose wages stagnated in real terms until the 1970s, is a stain on the mining industry and one it needs to recognise. For most of the twentieth century, the greatest point of contact between African workers and business occurred on the mines. The shameful history of subhuman compound conditions, brutal suppression of striking workers, racist practices and meagre wages is central to understanding the origins and nature of apartheid. The failure of the Chamber of Mines to address this squarely and to grapple with its moral implications is regrettable and not constructive.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

122 The South African Psychological Association (SAPA) was founded in 1948, with a membership of thirty-four. In 1962, following the admission of a black member, a new association, the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), was established exclusively for whites. The two organisations merged in 1983 to form the Psychological

Association of South Africa (PASA). Black professionals were permitted as members but, because of the racist history of PIRSA, many chose to join the Black Psychologists' Association instead.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

55 The Afrikaans press declined to make a submission to the Commission. Instead, it provided the Commission with a copy of Oor Grense Heen, the official history of Nasionale Pers (Naspers).

56 Rather oddly in the context, the book repeatedly confirms that the various newspapers in the group were always pro-NP government institutions. The opening paragraph states candidly that the NP victory in 1948 meant that the company became a pro-government institution. The history concedes that Die Burger, for instance, promoted Verwoerd's ideals of bantustans from an early stage and that, after Sharpville, the same newspaper advised that all positive aspects be speeded up. Occasionally, doubts about apartheid do surface but, in the main, the book reflects a total lack of concern for the company's support of the racist system.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

104 By not reporting honestly on the human rights abuses of the NP government, the Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor ones. (Their heirs, significantly, made a significant gesture towards reconciliation by making personal submissions of regret following the absence of their employers from the hearing.)

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

White racism is alive and kicking. It no longer takes the form of legislated supremacy, but it continues to manifest itself in crude and subtle ways. The most insidious is the assumption that white values are universal and by implication superior to those of other groups. The most offensive is the endless complaining about corruption, inefficiency and falling standards. This is one of the bad jokes of the new South Africa. The previous government set unsurpassed standards for corruption, incompetence and neglect. There is a fourth position which is seldom heard and which I believe is the appropriate response. The white community should confront its pervasive racism, and stare our ugly history and its long shelf life in the face. We should acknowledge collective responsibility for our efforts and our acquiescence in constructing and maintaining a wretched system of discrimination, exclusion and repression. To invoke theological terminology, we should confess and engage in meaningful acts of contrition.

## *Reconciliation*

References or discussions of reconciliation

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 14 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

52 This means that one must guard against such simplistic platitudes as ‘to forgive is to forget’. It is also crucial not to fall into the error of equating forgiveness with reconciliation. The road to reconciliation requires more than forgiveness and respectful remembrance. It is, in this respect, worth remembering the difficult history of reconciliation between Afrikaners and white English-speaking South Africans after the devastating Anglo-Boer/South African War (1899-1902). Despite coexistence and participation with English-speaking South Africans in the political system that followed the war, it took many decades to rebuild relationships and redistribute resources - a process that was additionally complicated by a range of urban/rural, class, and linguistic and other barriers. Reconciliation requires not only individual justice, but also social justice.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

harnessed vast amounts of energy, courage and resilience during the apartheid era. For many young people, active engagement in political activity resulted in the acquisition of skills such as analysis, mobilisation and strategising, as well as the ability to draw strength from friends and comrades in times of hardship. Many of today’s leaders come from a politically active history and have displayed a remarkable capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The appearance before the Commission of former President FW de Klerk as spokesperson of the National Party (NP) perspective was a particular disappointment to the Commission. As one who had done so much to turn the tide of South African history, his evasiveness and unwillingness candidly to acknowledge the full burden of the NP’s responsibility seemed to the Commission to be a missed opportunity to take the reconciliation process forward.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

164 Finally, in the context of a society moving towards reconciliation, South Africans need to acknowledge this country’s divided history and its regional burden; to understand the processes whereby all, citizens included, were drawn in and are implicated in the fabric of human rights abuse, both as victims and perpetrators – at times as both.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

The way we approached this question is like a father, like parents would approach, let's say, an aberrant child: that child is part of your family, these were people who were oppressed people, part of this history. Now if a child misbehaves and hopefully [the parent] disciplines that child

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

and shouts at the child and does what is possible within the limits of the family ... alright, but they don't disown these people. For us to disown these people would mean that we don't understand the history of these people [who] tended to do these sort of things.

So they were undisciplined in some instances. When they did that they were not acting within the UDF policy – but we own them, they are part of us, and they are part of our history and we accept them as part of our family.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

- work actively to build bridges across the divisions of language, faith and history;

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

A longer-term reconciliation initiative would need to take the consultation process two steps further. It needs to engage with less developed community structures or networks that do not have a formal voice. Particularly in a community with a history of intense conflict, certain interest groups may not have organised and mobilised, because of fear and/or because of lack of resources. Unless there is assistance for the articulation of these interests, the process will not reach all sectors of the community.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the past and current community dynamics. Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories. One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history.

Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth. Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is

dependent on people's ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases. Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation. Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The idea of such a register had been discussed informally among Commissioners and crystallised during a radio 'phone-in programme, when listeners expressed a need for some way in which to articulate the regret and contrition they felt for past wrongs. Announcing the Register, the Commission said: It has been established in response to a deep wish for reconciliation in the hearts of many South Africans; people who did not perhaps commit gross violations of human rights, but nevertheless wish to indicate their regret for failures in the past to do all they could have done to prevent such violations; people who want to demonstrate in some symbolic way their commitment to a new kind of future in which human rights abuses will not take place. We know that many South Africans are ready and eager to turn away from a past history of division and discrimination. Guilt for wrongdoing needs to be translated into positive commitment to building a better society – the healthiest and most productive form of atonement.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

27 Even though the report offers a good exposition of different concepts of truth, especially of factual truth and narrative truth and then of social or interactive truth, the distinction is not sustained. In arriving at findings, all is accepted as evidence, an ingredient of the factual truth. If we ignore the frame of our various dispositions through which evidence reaches us, we lose the context of the multiplicity of truth, both in dimension and in perspective. Truth, reconciliation and national unity can only be understood within the concept of multiple truths. Our perspectives decide our realities. Different elevations of an object give different pictures. It is only by sharing perspectives, by accepting them as real, that we can develop some form of understanding. To pour history into a mould is to recreate the potential for conflict which our Constitution and politics since 1990 have largely removed. A shared understanding of our history requires an understanding of different perspectives, not the building of a new national myth. Presenting 'the truth' as a one-dimensional finding is a continuation of the old frame. Nothing changes, sometimes not even content.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights

violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator – namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future – which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

As the world draws closer together – the expression ‘global village’ did not come into currency for no just cause – it seems only natural to examine the sheet of relationships between converging communities. Where there has been inequity, especially of a singularly brutalizing kind, of a kind that robs one side of its most fundamental attribute – its humanity – it seems only appropriate that some form of atonement be made, in order to exorcise that past. Reparations, we repeat, serve as a cogent critique of history and thus a potent restraint on its repetition ... It is not possible to ignore the example of the Jews and the obsessed commitment of survivors of the Holocaust, and their descendants, to recover both their material patrimony, and the humanity of which they were brutally deprived.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

1. The issue of reparation and rehabilitation is real for every victim, though to varying degrees. As history takes the country further and further away from the historical moment of the negotiated settlement in South Africa, and as other challenges, especially that of HIV/AIDS, press ever more insistently on the national consciousness, it may become more and more tempting to deal dismissively with the issue of reparation and rehabilitation. There may be those who feel that there are things that cannot be repaired or rehabilitated. This too may discourage further consideration of the issue. Moreover, it may be argued that there is something very positive about a country that wishes to move forward.

## *Responsibility*

References or discussions of responsibility or accountability

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 19 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

105 A pertinent question is the extent to which individual South Africans can be regarded as responsible for the premises and presuppositions which gave rise to apartheid. The kindest answer consists of a reminder that history suggests that most citizens are inclined to lemming-like behaviour - thoughtless submission rather than thoughtful accountability. This is a tendency that needs to be addressed in ensuring that the future is different from the past and serves as a reminder that the most penetrating enquiry into the past involves more than a witch-hunt. It involves, rather, laying a foundation against which the present and all future governments will be judged.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

112 What is tragic is that so heroic a figure as Ms Madikizela-Mandela, with her own rich history of contribution to the struggle, became embroiled in a controversy that caused immeasurable damage to her reputation. There can be no doubt that she showed poor judgment in ignoring the advice of the community leaders and members of the MDM. The Commission has been unable to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to what went wrong, why Madikizela-Mandela was not accountable to the democratic structures inside the country, what influence the external liberation movement had over her, why she surrounded herself with persons of the calibre of Jerry Richardson and Xoliswa Falati, or why she became so isolated from democratic and community structures.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

124 On 26 October, the state of emergency was extended to the western Cape, which prohibited up to a hundred organisations from holding meetings and also restricted the media. Four hundred people were detained in the first two weeks of the emergency, and the death toll continued to rise. Under these harsh restrictions, political protest adopted more varied forms such as candlelight protests, hunger strikes and church services, many of which were violently disrupted by police. The Divisional Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape, Brigadier Chris Swart, said that the candlelight protests were not innocent, but “deliberate tactics aimed at stirring people’s emotions, which leads them to violent acts”. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE GOAL OF THE ‘POLLSMOOR MARCH’ WAS SYMBOLIC IN NATURE, NAMELY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO MR MANDELA AND DEMAND HIS RELEASE. MANY OF THE GROUPS OF MARCHERS WERE LED BY CLERICS, STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THE ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ON THE DAY OF THE POLLSMOOR MARCH AND THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS WERE THEREFORE UNWARRANTED AND USED EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT A MINIMUM OF TWENTY-EIGHT DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT WERE THE



RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE HARSH REPRESSION OF THIS ACT OF PEACEFUL PROTEST PROPELLED THE REGION INTO THE MOST EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF PUBLIC UNREST IN ITS HISTORY, LASTING SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

743 The task team was set up and investigated over a hundred cases of torture and assault as well as seventeen cases of extra-judicial executions, two of which involved sixteen-year-old Mr Nixon Phiri [JB01068/03WR] and fifteen-year-old Mr Eugene Mbulawa [JB00462/03WR]. Both youths died after being detained by the SAP. The police claimed that Phiri died as a result of an epileptic fit. There was no history of him having this condition at the time of his detention. Two witnesses who were detained with him and who witnessed his assault died in ‘unrest incidents’ shortly after making statements to the Phiri family’s attorneys. THE COMMISSION FINDS THE SAP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH IN CUSTODY OF MR EUGENE MBULAWA AND MR NIXON PHIRI.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

16 The greatest number of instances of severe ill treatment are attributed to the SAP, followed by the ANC, with the Bophuthatswana security forces and IFP showing a similar number. As is the case for killings, the pattern changes at different periods of history, and closely matches the pattern of killings for the top three organisations: ~

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

63 This history has been well documented<sup>7</sup> and was reflected in submissions by COSATU, the SACP and the ANC. The first-order involvement of the mining houses and the Chamber of Mines (COM) in shaping the migrant labour system is the clearest example of business working closely with the minority (white) government to create the conditions for capital accumulation based on cheap African labour. The evidence shows that, rather than relying simply on the forces of supply and demand, the mining industry harnessed the services of the state to shape labour supply conditions to their advantage. Thus, the mining industry bears a great deal of moral responsibility for the migrant labour system and its associated hardships.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

46 The Commission finds that an appearance before the Commission in such special circumstances would have demonstrated accountability and would not have compromised the independence of the judiciary. History will judge the judiciary harshly. Its response to the hearing has again placed the questions of what accountability and independence mean in a constitutional democracy in the public domain for debate.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

104 By not reporting honestly on the human rights abuses of the NP government, the Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor ones. (Their heirs, significantly, made a significant gesture towards reconciliation by making personal submissions of regret following the absence of their employers from the hearing.)

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

Looking back on the sad history related above, there is nothing that I am and can be proud of. On the contrary, I am humbled by a deep sense of shame for the fact that it only slowly dawned upon me that I was participating in, and then virtually did nothing about, the system that I described.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

as individuals can and should be held accountable by history for our lack of necessary action in times of crisis ... in exercising apathy rather than commitment we allow(ed) others to sacrifice their lives for the sake of our freedom and an increase in our standard of living.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

8 The appearance before the Commission of former President FW de Klerk as spokesperson of the National Party (NP) perspective was a particular disappointment to the Commission. As one who had done so much to turn the tide of South African history, his evasiveness and unwillingness candidly to acknowledge the full burden of the NP's responsibility seemed to the Commission to be a missed opportunity to take the reconciliation process forward.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

105 Reference has already been made to the extensive destruction of documents by the former state (see Volume One). The following is a summary of the Commission's finding with regard to this issue: THE FORMER GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED STATE DOCUMENTATION OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THIS PROCESS BEGAN IN 1978, WHEN CLASSIFIED RECORDS WERE ROUTINELY DESTROYED, SUPPOSEDLY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD STATE SECURITY. BY THE 1990S THE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS HAD BECOME A CO-ORDINATED ENDEAVOUR, SANCTIONED BY THE CABINET, WITH THE AIM OF DENYING A NEW GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE AND SANITISING THE HISTORY OF THE APARTHEID ERA.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

150 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the

incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people's courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

164 Finally, in the context of a society moving towards reconciliation, South Africans need to acknowledge this country's divided history and its regional burden; to understand the processes whereby all, citizens included, were drawn in and are implicated in the fabric of human rights abuse, both as victims and perpetrators – at times as both.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

5 History will judge whether or not this particular criticism is accurate. It is, nevertheless, worth making two points in this regard. The first is that, while truth may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation without truth. Certainly, lies, half-truths and denial are not a desirable foundation on which to build the new South Africa. Second, it is readily conceded that it is not possible for one commission, with a limited life-span and resources, on its own to achieve reconciliation against the background of decades of oppression, conflict and deep divisions.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

55 A spokesperson for the Stellenbosch Presbytery of the Dutch Reformed Church made the following statement at the human rights violations hearing in Paarl: [We] are not doing this presentation on behalf of the Dutch Reformed Church – only the Synod has this right to do this. But what we are doing here this afternoon is the deepest conviction of the Presbytery of Stellenbosch ... In looking back, we realise that there have been times in the history of Stellenbosch when we as a Presbytery (and also as separate congregations) either failed wholesale or made only the most timid of efforts to fulfil the prophetic responsibility the Lord has given us. We think especially of the past forty years during which the official policy of apartheid radically impaired the human dignity of people all around us and resulted in gross violations of human rights. Within the borders of our Presbytery, there were those who actively developed and defended the ideological framework by which these violations and actions were justified. At times, standpoints and decisions taken within this Presbytery itself functioned within this ideological framework.

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

White racism is alive and kicking. It no longer takes the form of legislated supremacy, but it continues to manifest itself in crude and subtle ways. The most insidious is the assumption that white values are universal and by implication superior to those of other groups. The most offensive is the endless complaining about corruption, inefficiency and falling standards. This is one of the bad jokes of the new South Africa. The previous government set unsurpassed

standards for corruption, incompetence and neglect. There is a fourth position which is seldom heard and which I believe is the appropriate response. The white community should confront its pervasive racism, and stare our ugly history and its long shelf life in the face. We should acknowledge collective responsibility for our efforts and our acquiescence in constructing and maintaining a wretched system of discrimination, exclusion and repression. To invoke theological terminology, we should confess and engage in meaningful acts of contrition.

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

132 The idea of such a register had been discussed informally among Commissioners and crystallised during a radio 'phone-in programme, when listeners expressed a need for some way in which to articulate the regret and contrition they felt for past wrongs. Announcing the Register, the Commission said: It has been established in response to a deep wish for reconciliation in the hearts of many South Africans; people who did not perhaps commit gross violations of human rights, but nevertheless wish to indicate their regret for failures in the past to do all they could have done to prevent such violations; people who want to demonstrate in some symbolic way their commitment to a new kind of future in which human rights abuses will not take place. We know that many South Africans are ready and eager to turn away from a past history of division and discrimination. Guilt for wrongdoing needs to be translated into positive commitment to building a better society – the healthiest and most productive form of atonement.

#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

The question is – and I am looking at each one, every single one of you now, directly across this table – I want to know from each one of you and your leaders, to explain to us why this was done, if there was any logical reason for what you have done, to launch a senseless terrorist attack on a pub with young, cheerful, innocent students at a time in South Africa's history when we were already on the road to democracy after you had all accepted and taken part in the accepting of an interim constitution on the 3rd of December? Is there any reason, sensible reason, why you had to still continue with something like that? Could you not think for yourself? (Cape Town hearing, 27 October 1997.)

## *True or Accurate*

References or discussions of true, genuine, accurate, forgotten or lesser known history

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 11 references coded [0.02% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

This report has been constrained by a number of factors - not least by the extent of the Commission's mandate and a number of legal provisions contained in the Act. It was, at the same time, driven by a dual responsibility. It had to provide the space within which victims could share the story of their trauma with the nation; and it had to recognise the importance of the due process of law that ensures the rights of alleged perpetrators. Several court rulings emphasised the importance of the latter. Obviously, the Commission respected these judgements. They did, however, sometimes make our efforts to obtain information about the past more difficult. This, in its turn, caused us to err on the side of caution in making our findings. Despite these difficulties, however, we can still claim, without fear of being contradicted, that we have contributed more to uncovering the truth about the past than all the court cases in the history of apartheid.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Krog, a South African writer and poet, "the road of... restoring memory and humanity".<sup>7</sup> It is what Oxford University historian, Timothy Garton Ash, sees as "the most promising" way – a way that offers "history lessons" as an alternative to political trials, uncovering what happened and identifying lessons for the future.<sup>8</sup> As such, the Commission sought to recover parts of the national memory that had hitherto been officially ignored.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof...Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.<sup>14</sup>

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

<sup>21</sup> The Commission's database represents an unequalled collection of data on a set of events that took place during a unique period of South Africa's history. It may only have scratched the surface, but that surface has been scratched in unprecedented detail.

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared, sometimes mysteriously, and most of them no longer survive to tell their tales. Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

33 Staff went to a lot of trouble to identify different types of cases for the human rights violation hearings so that both high and low profile cases were heard, witnesses from across the political spectrum were given a voice, and both individual and group cases were heard. Occasionally alleged perpetrators were able to give their side of the story at the same hearings as their accusers. The hearing at Lusikisiki, for example, became a landmark in uncovering the history of rural rebellions from the early 1960s.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

1 Lusikisiki (24 - 26 March 1997). The hearing took place in a deep rural area and was hampered by logistic problems, such as the lack of electricity. However, it was successful in giving insights into lesser-known South African history, like the 1960 Pondoland revolt.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

5 History will judge whether or not this particular criticism is accurate. It is, nevertheless, worth making two points in this regard. The first is that, while truth may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation without truth. Certainly, lies, half-truths and denial are not a desirable foundation on which to build the new South Africa. Second, it is readily conceded that it is not possible for one commission, with a limited life-span and resources, on its own to achieve reconciliation against the background of decades of oppression, conflict and deep divisions.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

23 Exaggeration is a natural consequence of human suffering. Often deponents were not present at the actual violations to which they testified and their stories were accounts of what they were told. They reflect oral history. They also reflect perspectives. Often deponents gave evidence in terms of their own understanding of what happened. Evidence was not tested. It was not intended to be tested. Except for a few statements, they were not even attested to under oath. Most deponents giving oral evidence, when taking the oath, made it clear that they would speak the truth "as they see it".

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

27 Even though the report offers a good exposition of different concepts of truth, especially of factual truth and narrative truth and then of social or interactive truth, the distinction is not sustained. In arriving at findings, all is accepted as evidence, an ingredient of the factual truth. If we ignore the frame of our various dispositions through which evidence reaches us, we lose the context of the multiplicity of truth, both in dimension and in perspective. Truth, reconciliation and national unity can only be understood within the concept of multiple truths. Our perspectives decide our realities. Different elevations of an object give different pictures. It is only by sharing perspectives, by accepting them as real, that we can develop some form of understanding. To pour history into a mould is to recreate the potential for conflict which our Constitution and politics since 1990 have largely removed. A shared understanding of our history requires an understanding of different perspectives, not the building of a new national myth. Presenting 'the truth' as a one-dimensional finding is a continuation of the old frame. Nothing changes, sometimes not even content.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

94. In response to Mr van Jaarsveld's statement, Te r re'Blanche told the Committee: Mr Chairman, all these things did not happen because the professor was tarred and feathered; these things happened because of the incorrect version of the Covenant and the fact that history was twisted, which can be the worst that can happen to a nation if you abuse your power to rewrite history so that you all of a sudden can become acceptable to other nations. If we sit here at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is scaring to think that the Van Jaarsveld's family admit in front of this body seeking reconciliation and truth, that his father treated the truth in this way to the extent that his books were no longer published as textbooks because what he said was not acceptable to students and pupils. (Klerksdorp hearing, 10 May 1999.)

## *Victims*

References or discussions of victims - their experiences or actions against them

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 25 references coded [0.07% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

This report has been constrained by a number of factors - not least by the extent of the Commission's mandate and a number of legal provisions contained in the Act. It was, at the same time, driven by a dual responsibility. It had to provide the space within which victims could share the story of their trauma with the nation; and it had to recognise the importance of the due process of law that ensures the rights of alleged perpetrators. Several court rulings emphasised the importance of the latter. Obviously, the Commission respected these judgements. They did, however, sometimes make our efforts to obtain information about the past more difficult. This, in its turn, caused us to err on the side of caution in making our findings. Despite these difficulties, however, we can still claim, without fear of being contradicted, that we have contributed more to uncovering the truth about the past than all the court cases in the history of apartheid.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

8 It is also important to remember that the 1960 Sharpsville massacre (with which the mandate of the Commission begins) was simply the latest in a long line of similar killings of civilian protesters in South African history. It was, for example, not a National Party administration but the South African Party government, made up primarily of English-speaking South Africans, that in July 1913 crushed a series of miners' strikes on the Reef - sending in the army and killing just over one hundred strikers and onlookers. Thrice in 1921 and 1922, this same governing party let loose its troops and planes: first, against a protesting religious sect, the Israelites at Bulhoek, killing 183 people; second, against striking white mineworkers on the Reef in 1922, resulting in the deaths of 214 people<sup>3</sup>; and third, when the Bondelswarts people, a landless hunting group of Nama origin in South West Africa, in rebellion against a punitive dog tax in 1922, were machine-gunned from the air. One hundred civilians, mostly women, were killed.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof...Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.<sup>14</sup>

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage



Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared, sometimes mysteriously, and most of them no longer survive to tell their tales. Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

28 The history of resistance in South Africa was frequently associated with shifts in the patterns and forms of gross violations of human rights, as well as in the changing identities of perpetrator groups. In response to the events of 1960 and the liberation movements' adoption of the armed struggle, the former state invoked the full force of its security legislation to curb resistance. Detention of political activists became the primary means of intensifying repression. Torture of detainees and other abuses associated with detention were the main forms of violation reported to the Commission for this early period. The most frequently reported perpetrator grouping was the security police.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

88 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985-1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by 'people's courts' and it was not possible to establish whether the IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have played a factor.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

149 In February 1991, in an ironic twist of history, Charles Sebe was shot dead by his former allies while on his way to the Bisho capital of Ciskei, apparently to overthrow Gqozo and fulfil his long-time dream of ruling Ciskei. Sebe was shot dead at a roadblock in an operation run by IR/CIS.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

564 In the attack which has become known as the Nangalembe Night Vigil Massacre in Sebokeng on 12 January 1991, forty-five people were killed at a night vigil for ANC Youth League (ANCYL) member, Mr Christopher Nangalembe [JB00317/03VT]. Mr Victor Khetisi Kheswa was allegedly responsible for Nangalembe's death. According to Kheswa's mother, the two boys had grown up together. Kheswa, however, had a long history of criminal involvement and, when youth in Sebokeng and Evaton launched an anti-crime campaign, Kheswa inevitably came into conflict with some of his former associates in the ANCYL. One of the allegations

against Kheswa was that he had killed a young women by forcing her to drink acid. Christopher Nangalembe sat on the ‘panel’ of a ‘people’s court’ that accused Kheswa of this and other crimes. Kheswa was then shot, allegedly by members of the ‘people’s court’. Kheswa survived the attack.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

743 The task team was set up and investigated over a hundred cases of torture and assault as well as seventeen cases of extra-judicial executions, two of which involved sixteen-year-old Mr Nixon Phiri [JB01068/03WR] and fifteen-year-old Mr Eugene Mbulawa [JB00462/03WR]. Both youths died after being detained by the SAP. The police claimed that Phiri died as a result of an epileptic fit. There was no history of him having this condition at the time of his detention. Two witnesses who were detained with him and who witnessed his assault died in ‘unrest incidents’ shortly after making statements to the Phiri family’s attorneys. THE COMMISSION FINDS THE SAP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH IN CUSTODY OF MR EUGENE MBULAWA AND MR NIXON PHIRI.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

71 The COSATU submission also recalled the notorious Kinross mining disaster, the largest accident in the history of gold mining in South Africa. On 15 September 1986, 177 workers were killed as the result of a polyurethane fire. The submission records the shocking way in which the mine reacted to the disaster:

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa’s history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

10 South Africa’s history of repression and exploitation severely affected the mental well-being of the majority of its citizens. South Africans have had to deal with a psychological stress which has arisen as a result of deprivation and dire socioeconomic conditions, coupled with the cumulative trauma arising from violent state repression and intra-community conflicts.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

150 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the

incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people's courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

164 Finally, in the context of a society moving towards reconciliation, South Africans need to acknowledge this country's divided history and its regional burden; to understand the processes whereby all, citizens included, were drawn in and are implicated in the fabric of human rights abuse, both as victims and perpetrators – at times as both.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

Central to most of these testimonies [by ex-conscripts] is the notion that the present has destroyed the foundations of 'meaning' these conscripts adopted to cope with their traumatic experiences. It is easier to cope with having killed someone you believe to be the sub-human agent of forces that wish to destroy everything you hold dear than it is to cope with having killed a normal man, woman or child that history happened to cast as 'your enemy'. This crisis is greatly intensified when it is revealed to you that the person you have killed is a 'hero' or 'freedom fighter' or 'innocent civilian' – which the South African transformation correctly described him or her to have been. Most of these conscripts have, up until now, silently considered themselves victims (of neglect and manipulation) but are now publicly portrayed as perpetrators (of apartheid military objectives or even of gross human rights violations)... The Truth Commission has helped break the silence of past suffering, atrocities and abuses. In so doing, it has both released some traumatised ex-conscripts from the prison of silence and trapped them in the role of perpetrators of apartheid. For some, the contradictions of their experience might prove intolerable; for others, the process of revealing the truth about the past might allow them to confront and deal with their experiences.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the past and current community dynamics. Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories. One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history. Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing

processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth. Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is dependent on people's ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases. Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation. Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator – namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future – which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

26. As we have seen with other cases, the particular event Mrs Tenza reported to the Commission was little more than a punctuation mark in a life of ongoing difficulties. Both she and her family made political decisions at times influenced at least as much by attempts to survive violence and poverty as by ideological persuasions. The tone throughout is of a long struggle to eke out a meagre existence in a violent world. Mrs Te n z a 's life story paints a vivid picture of the convoluted political history of KwaZulu/Natal and the human consequences. The awful experience of seeing her nephew murdered in front of her is just one example of a broader tragedy.

#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

1. The issue of reparation and rehabilitation is real for every victim, though to varying degrees. As history takes the country further and further away from the historical moment of the

negotiated settlement in South Africa, and as other challenges, especially that of HIV/AIDS, press ever more insistently on the national consciousness, it may become more and more tempting to deal dismissively with the issue of reparation and rehabilitation. There may be those who feel that there are things that cannot be repaired or rehabilitated. This too may discourage further consideration of the issue. Moreover, it may be argued that there is something very positive about a country that wishes to move forward.

#### Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

There were very many victims of apartheid and, certainly, those who came before the Commission are only a subset of a much larger group. This is why, when balancing individual and socially oriented reparations, the Commission sought to address the specific needs of those who came before it in order to contribute to the wider truth about the nation's history, whilst at the same time addressing the broader consequences of apartheid. It is almost impossible to design a reparation programme without leaving some gaps. Nevertheless, the fact that not all victims will receive individual financial grants cannot be allowed to prevent at least some clearly deserving victims from getting such awards.

#### Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

120. In their applications, they sketched the turbulent political history of the township since 1985, including serious clashes with security forces. They testified that local farmers served as police reservists and had played a role in other forms of political repression. As a consequence, groups of up to forty youths, including the applicants, had embarked on raids and robberies on white farmers. In most instances, the motive was to acquire weapons and ammunition. In some of the attacks, farmers or farm workers were shot and injured. Amnesty was granted for four of the attacks and refused for one.

#### Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

[T]he attack on white civilians is not a new thing, when you look back at the history of PAC – the formation of Poqo on the 11th of September 1961. If you remember the attacks at Mbashe, Paarl and Komane, those comrades of those days were members of the PAC which was converted into APLA. They were attacking white civilians during those days; even history confirms that. Therefore I find it difficult for me when one of the panel members says we're shifting as to our targets. Instead of attacking security forces, we were attacking white civilians which I refer to as 'soft targets' ... That's the reason why I say I am confused when they say we have shifted in constituting targets because this started long ago. (Pietemmaritzburg hearing, 11 February 1998.)

#### Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

94. In response to Mr van Jaarsveld's statement, Terre'Blanche told the Committee: Mr Chairman, all these things did not happen because the professor was tarred and feathered; these things happened because of the incorrect version of the Covenant and the fact that history was twisted, which can be the worst that can happen to a nation if you abuse your power to rewrite

history so that you all of a sudden can become acceptable to other nations. If we sit here at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is scaring to think that the Van Jaarsveld's family admit in front of this body seeking reconciliation and truth, that his father testified the truth in this way to the extent that his books were no longer published as textbooks because what he said was not acceptable to students and pupils. (Klerksdorp hearing, 10 May 1999.)

#### Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

36. David Simelane and Obed Masina, for example, were granted amnesty for the killing of Sergeant Orphan Hlubi Chapi outside his Soweto home in June 1978. It was, however, the formation of the ANC Special Operations Unit in 1979 that led to the launch of several high-profile attacks on police stations, state infrastructure and a major attack on SADF personnel, namely the Church Street bombing. Here a car bomb placed outside the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria led to the deaths of nineteen people. In terms of the numbers of casualties, this was the most devastating attack by MK in its entire history. The Commission received amnesty applications for a total of seventy-nine incidents carried out by this unit during this period.<sup>63</sup>

#### Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

There were other reasons why many people did not come forward to tell their stories. Some were afraid; some chose not to participate because they did not support the process, particularly the concept of granting amnesty. The choice not to make a statement had to be respected by the Commission and as a consequence, many cases that may be expected to appear here do not, including those of a number of well-known victims. Despite their exclusion from these summaries, we recognise that their stories too form part of this period of the history of South Africa.

## *Violence*

References or discussions of violence, violent acts, or violent events

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 46 references coded [0.11% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

1 All South Africans know that our recent history is littered with some horrendous occurrences - the Sharpsville and Langa killings, the Soweto uprising, the Church Street bombing, Magoo's Bar, the Amanzimtoti Wimpy Bar bombing, the St James' Church killings, Boipatong and Sebokeng. We also knew about the deaths in detention of people such as Steve Biko, Neil Aggett, and others; necklacings, and the so-called 'black on black' violence on the East Rand and in KwaZulu Natal which arose from the rivalries between IFP and first the UDF and later the ANC. Our country is soaked in the blood of her children of all races and of all political persuasions.

2 It is this contemporary history - which began in 1960 when the Sharpsville disaster took place and ended with the wonderful inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically-elected President of the Republic of South Africa - it is this history with which we have had to come to terms. We could not pretend it did not happen. Everyone agrees that South Africans must deal with that history and its legacy. It is how we do this that is in question - a bone of contention throughout the life of the Commission, right up to the time when this report was being written. And I imagine we can assume that this particular point will remain controversial for a long time to come.

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

3 Before starting on the long journey through these volumes, two major points or themes need to be developed in order to place their context in fuller political and historical perspective. The first of these relates to the fact that this report covers only a small fraction of time - although possibly the worst and certainly, in regard to the wider region, the bloodiest in the long and violent history of human rights abuse in this subcontinent. The second point to be made is that the report tells only a small part of a much larger story of human rights abuse in South and southern Africa.

4 In developing these two themes in this chapter, special attention will be given to the role and contribution of two phenomena or factors in the shaping of this country's history, namely violence and the law, and the relationship between them.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

8 It is also important to remember that the 1960 Sharpsville massacre (with which the mandate of the Commission begins) was simply the latest in a long line of similar killings of civilian protesters in South African history. It was, for example, not a National Party administration but the South African Party government, made up primarily of English-speaking South Africans, that in July 1913 crushed a series of miners' strikes on the Reef - sending in the army and killing just over one hundred strikers and onlookers. Thrice in 1921 and 1922, this same governing party let loose its troops and planes: first, against a protesting religious sect, the Israelites at Bulhoek,

killing 183 people; second, against striking white mineworkers on the Reef in 1922, resulting in the deaths of 214 people<sup>3</sup>; and third, when the Bondelswarts people, a landless hunting group of Nama origin in South West Africa, in rebellion against a punitive dog tax in 1922, were machine-gunned from the air. One hundred civilians, mostly women, were killed.

#### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

11 Indeed, one of most ambitious and far-reaching attempts at social engineering in twentieth century South African history was introduced by the first post-unification South African Party government in the form of the 1913 Land Act. No other piece of legislation in South African history more dramatically and drastically re-shaped the social map of this country. Not only did it lay the basis for the territorial separation of whites and Africans; it destroyed, at a stroke, a thriving African landowning and peasant agricultural sector. It did so by prohibiting African land ownership outside of the initial 7 per cent of land allocated to the so-called traditional reserves and ending sharecropping and non-tenancy arrangements on white-owned farms. The Land Act set in motion a massive forced removal of African people that led, amongst other things, to the deaths of many hundreds of people who found themselves suddenly landless.

#### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

##### ■ THE LAW AND VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

68 Violence has been the single most determining factor in South African political history. The reference, however, is not simply to physical or overt violence - the violence of the gun - but also to the violence of the law or what is often referred to as institutional or structural violence.

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

■ INTRODUCTION 1 The story of apartheid is, amongst other things, the story of the systematic elimination of thousands of voices that should have been part of the nation's memory. The elimination of memory took place through censorship, confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a range of related actions. Any attempt to reconstruct the past must involve the recovery of this memory – much of it contained in countless documentary records. The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. As this chapter will demonstrate, the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

surgery. In that instance, the investigating officer was killed, and other detectives were afraid to pursue their investigations. Ms Mary de Haas of the University of Natal gave a background submission on the political history of the area, and the failure of the SAP and KZP to investigate properly and deal with the situation.



#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

28 The history of resistance in South Africa was frequently associated with shifts in the patterns and forms of gross violations of human rights, as well as in the changing identities of perpetrator groups. In response to the events of 1960 and the liberation movements' adoption of the armed struggle, the former state invoked the full force of its security legislation to curb resistance. Detention of political activists became the primary means of intensifying repression. Torture of detainees and other abuses associated with detention were the main forms of violation reported to the Commission for this early period. The most frequently reported perpetrator grouping was the security police.

#### Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

88 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985-1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by 'people's courts' and it was not possible to establish whether the IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have played a factor.

#### Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

298 First, forms of vigilante activity in the KwaNdebele area predate the unrest of the mid-1980s by at least a decade. SS Skosana, elected the first president of the Imbokodo when it was officially constituted in 1986, has traced the organisation's roots to a "cultural society" formed in 1976 "when there were riots and schools were burned". Throughout the intervening decade, a number of vigilante attacks were carried out against perceived political opponents of the KwaNdebele government and its various tribal authorities. In addition, numerous tactics, including roadblocks, were used to identify and "discipline" various "agitators" especially "outsiders" – generally perceived as politicised youth from the Rand – operating in the homeland. Vigilantism thus has a long, indigenous history in the area.

#### Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

112 What is tragic is that so heroic a figure as Ms Madikizela-Mandela, with her own rich history of contribution to the struggle, became embroiled in a controversy that caused immeasurable damage to her reputation. There can be no doubt that she showed poor judgment in ignoring the advice of the community leaders and members of the MDM. The Commission has been unable to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to what went wrong, why Madikizela-Mandela was not accountable to the democratic structures inside the country, what influence the external liberation movement had over her, why she surrounded herself with persons of the calibre of Jerry Richardson and Xoliswa Falati, or why she became so isolated from democratic and community structures.

#### Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

149 In February 1991, in an ironic twist of history, Charles Sebe was shot dead by his former allies while on his way to the Bisho capital of Ciskei, apparently to overthrow Gqozo and fulfil his long-time dream of ruling Ciskei. Sebe was shot dead at a roadblock in an operation run by IR/CIS.

#### Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

175 Throughout its brief history, the ADM was involved in violent clashes with the ANC. After the Bisho massacre of September 1992, these clashes erupted into more overt warfare, with increasingly sophisticated weapons being used (see the Eastern Cape regional profile elsewhere in this report). The highest number of attacks appeared to have been carried out by the ANC-aligned groups.

#### Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

189 The Seven Day War in 1990 was one of the most significant events in the history of political violence in the province during the period. The Seven Day War is the collective name given to the events that occurred in the greater Edendale Valley in the greater Pietermaritzburg area in the seven days from Sunday 25 March 1990.

#### Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

239 In the run-up to the 1994 elections, Inkatha came into conflict with the central government and the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) concerning the issue of independence and sovereignty for KwaZulu. Inkatha adopted a publicly declared militant stance towards the rejection of its demands, culminating in a decision not to participate in the April 1994 elections. It was only on 19 April 1994, just six days before the elections, that Inkatha did an about-turn and announced that it would contest the elections. In the interim period, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region's history. Approximately 3 000 gross violations of human rights were perpetrated by Inkatha in KwaZulu and Natal from July 1993 to May 1994. This constituted more than 55 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission's Durban office for this period.

#### Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

function. For many security force members, their existence undoubtedly confirmed that pronouncements of levelling the playing fields and normalising the political situation for free and fair elections represented the public face of NP policy, but at another, covert level, the war was to continue. In this regard, the Harms, Kahn and Goldstone Commissions and Steyn investigation were seen by many as public relations exercises rather than determined initiatives to root out 'dirty practices'. The long history of cover-ups and condonation of lying to such commissions merely reinforced this perception. Consequently, many operatives continued to conduct an all-out war against 'the enemy' and, as indicated earlier, elimination and the deadly use of force continued as a matter of routine.

#### Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

523 Of particular relevance in the 1990s is a previous history of encouraging divisions between Inkatha and the UDF. What is important to note is that this covert policy of encouraging and fomenting such divisions predates the outbreak of violent conflict in Natal and that, when the conflict assumed violent proportions, this was simply noted and no attempt was made to change the overall strategy. This indicates, at the very least, that this was regarded as acceptable, possibly even desirable. Operation Marion and the Caprivi training must thus be seen in the context of this overall State Security Council policy. A similar strategy was reflected in Operation Katzen and support for vigilante groups. Covert support for anti-UDF/ ANC groupings was well established by the 1990 and was seen as legitimate and authorised. This support led to the development of links between individual security force operatives and conservative individuals at a local level, providing a basis for ongoing destabilisation on the ground. The connection between this strategy and the violence in the 1990s is obvious. Indeed, support for Inkatha continued into the 1990s. It is thus not surprising that security force members believed that it was legitimate to provide support, including arms, to Inkatha, or to seek to protect and foster IFP-linked forces when policing violence-torn communities.

#### Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

6 ‘State and allied groupings’ comprises reported violations associated with public order policing, detention and torture, covert actions of the security forces and contra-mobilisation. ‘Resistance and revolutionary groupings’ comprises, for the most part, violations perpetrated by such groupings, including attacks on ‘collaborators’, necklacings, armed actions and sabotage, inter-organisational conflict and so forth. Where the history of violations occurring in the mandate period of the Commission was not amenable to these categories (particularly in the 1990s – the years of political transition), a thematic approach has been used.

#### Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

427 In the months leading up to the elections, KwaZulu and Natal experienced the worst wave of political violence in the region’s history. The incidence of politically motivated human rights violations rose dramatically following the announcement of the election date.

#### Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

124 On 26 October, the state of emergency was extended to the western Cape, which prohibited up to a hundred organisations from holding meetings and also restricted the media. Four hundred people were detained in the first two weeks of the emergency, and the death toll continued to rise. Under these harsh restrictions, political protest adopted more varied forms such as candlelight protests, hunger strikes and church services, many of which were violently disrupted by police. The Divisional Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape, Brigadier Chris Swart, said that the candlelight protests were not innocent, but “deliberate tactics aimed at stirring people’s emotions, which leads them to violent acts”. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE GOAL OF THE ‘POLLSMOOR MARCH’ WAS SYMBOLIC IN NATURE, NAMELY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO MR MANDELA AND DEMAND HIS RELEASE. MANY OF

THE GROUPS OF MARCHERS WERE LED BY CLERICS, STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THE ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES ON THE DAY OF THE POLLSMOOR MARCH AND THE FOLLOWING FEW DAYS WERE THEREFORE UNWARRANTED AND USED EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT A MINIMUM OF TWENTY-EIGHT DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE HARSH REPRESSION OF THIS ACT OF PEACEFUL PROTEST PROPELLED THE REGION INTO THE MOST EXTENSIVE PERIOD OF PUBLIC UNREST IN ITS HISTORY, LASTING SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

107 In 1976, the Johannesburg area was the centre of the most sustained and violent protests the country had ever seen. 1976 has frequently been described as a turning point in South Africa's political history. The conflict sparked by the former state's attempt to impose Afrikaans as a medium of instruction on black school children lasted fifteen months and spread to 200 towns and cities across South Africa.<sup>18</sup>

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

164 'Rooi Rus' Swanepoel, who became known for his brutality in the course of the protest, already had a long history of involvement in gross human rights violations as chief interrogator of the Security Branch. He was, moreover, the founder of an anti-terrorist unit which later became Koevoet.

Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

538 Conflict between hostel-dwellers and residents of adjacent townships and settlements was a major site of conflict in this period. Since the 1976 attack by Mzimhlope hostel residents on protesting students in Soweto in which seventy people died, there had been a history of animosity between the two communities. This was exacerbated during the 1980s as the urban-centred nature of township politics frequently marginalised hostel residents.

Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

564 In the attack which has become known as the Nangalembe Night Vigil Massacre in Sebokeng on 12 January 1991, forty-five people were killed at a night vigil for ANC Youth League (ANCYL) member, Mr Christopher Nangalembe [JB00317/03VT]. Mr Victor Khetisi Kheswa was allegedly responsible for Nangalembe's death. According to Kheswa's mother, the two boys had grown up together. Kheswa, however, had a long history of criminal involvement and, when youth in Sebokeng and Evaton launched an anti-crime campaign, Kheswa inevitably came into conflict with some of his former associates in the ANCYL. One of the allegations against Kheswa was that he had killed a young woman by forcing her to drink acid. Christopher Nangalembe sat on the 'panel' of a 'people's court' that accused Kheswa of this and other crimes. Kheswa was then shot, allegedly by members of the 'people's court'. Kheswa survived the attack.

#### Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

718 From 1989–91, there were at least seventeen extra-judicial executions in Khutsong, a small township outside Carletonville on the West Rand. The victims were all members of the Khutsong Youth Congress (KYC). The KYC split into two factions – the ‘Zim-Zims’ and the ‘Gaddaffis’, both active UDF/ANC supporters. The Commission received over sixty statements relating to this particular period in Khutsong’s history.

#### Reference 26 - 0.01% Coverage

743 The task team was set up and investigated over a hundred cases of torture and assault as well as seventeen cases of extra-judicial executions, two of which involved sixteen-year-old Mr Nixon Phiri [JB01068/03WR] and fifteen-year-old Mr Eugene Mbulawa [JB00462/03WR]. Both youths died after being detained by the SAP. The police claimed that Phiri died as a result of an epileptic fit. There was no history of him having this condition at the time of his detention. Two witnesses who were detained with him and who witnessed his assault died in ‘unrest incidents’ shortly after making statements to the Phiri family’s attorneys. **THE COMMISSION FINDS THE SAP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH IN CUSTODY OF MR EUGENE MBULAWA AND MR NIXON PHIRI.**

#### Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

16 The greatest number of instances of severe ill treatment are attributed to the SAP, followed by the ANC, with the Bophuthatswana security forces and IFP showing a similar number. As is the case for killings, the pattern changes at different periods of history, and closely matches the pattern of killings for the top three organisations: ~

#### Reference 28 - 0.01% Coverage

71 The COSATU submission also recalled the notorious Kinross mining disaster, the largest accident in the history of gold mining in South Africa. On 15 September 1986, 177 workers were killed as the result of a polyurethane fire. The submission records the shocking way in which the mine reacted to the disaster:

#### Reference 29 - 0.01% Coverage

54 There are some well-known examples of cases where doctors reported false causes of death. These include the numerous detainees who supposedly died from such causes as slipping on a bar of soap, dying of an epileptic seizure where no prior history of epilepsy existed, having a heart attack without a history of heart disease, choking on food or suffocating or committing suicide. In addition, doctors were known to give expert advice on the mental health of deceased prisoners, or to conclude that someone had committed suicide because of mental instability, without ever having met the person involved. This type of evidence was advanced at the inquest into the death of Neil Aggett.

#### Reference 30 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa's history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

#### Reference 31 - 0.01% Coverage

99 Psychological, social and economic stresses are compounded when children are faced with physical danger from and abuse by the authorities that are meant to protect them. Not only were child protection laws ignored, but the authorities systematically attacked children, resulting in grave emotional and physical harm. Mr Maxlesi described the persistent physical reminders of a violent history:

#### Reference 32 - 0.01% Coverage

10 South Africa's history of repression and exploitation severely affected the mental well-being of the majority of its citizens. South Africans have had to deal with a psychological stress which has arisen as a result of deprivation and dire socioeconomic conditions, coupled with the cumulative trauma arising from violent state repression and intra-community conflicts.

#### Reference 33 - 0.01% Coverage

150 Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people's courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.

#### Reference 34 - 0.01% Coverage

Thus ranged against one another, in intensifying conflict, were the oppressor and the oppressed, the owners of wealth of the country and the dispossessed, the rightless and the privileged. The ANC was a product of this history and this conflict, not their creator.

#### Reference 35 - 0.01% Coverage

Central to most of these testimonies [by ex-conscripts] is the notion that the present has destroyed the foundations of 'meaning' these conscripts adopted to cope with their traumatic

experiences. It is easier to cope with having killed someone you believe to be the sub-human agent of forces that wish to destroy everything you hold dear than it is to cope with having killed a normal man, woman or child that history happened to cast as 'your enemy'. This crisis is greatly intensified when it is revealed to you that the person you have killed is a 'hero' or 'freedom fighter' or 'innocent civilian' – which the South African transformation correctly described him or her to have been. Most of these conscripts have, up until now, silently considered themselves victims (of neglect and manipulation) but are now publicly portrayed as perpetrators (of apartheid military objectives or even of gross human rights violations)... The Truth Commission has helped break the silence of past suffering, atrocities and abuses. In so doing, it has both released some traumatised ex-conscripts from the prison of silence and trapped them in the role of perpetrators of apartheid. For some, the contradictions of their experience might prove intolerable; for others, the process of revealing the truth about the past might allow them to confront and deal with their experiences.

#### Reference 36 - 0.01% Coverage

I don't want to blame the [Commission] – the media is inclined to look at these atrocities. But the same names, the same police are repeatedly referred to, while there is no mention made of the majority of people who were in the police and the Defence Force who weren't involved in the atrocities. They provided a service for the country, because they loved the country. This is still the case at present and they would probably do it again. Commissioner Malan: Could I just interrupt you here, because I think we've got the message. I refer to the other part, you hear the same names and things but those are things that you didn't hear when you were in the army? That is my question. Mr Van Eeden: I can honestly say to you that these kinds of acts, no one can approve of. It makes you furious and angry because that is not what myself and thousands of young Afrikaner men got involved to do. Commissioner Malan: Can I take the question a bit further and the answer. I know is very difficult for people to understand who look at this whole history from a different perspective... How is it possible that you didn't know anything of it or did anything about it? Do you have a perspective on that? Mr Van Eeden: War as such is a crime against humanity; there are no victors. I had personal knowledge because I saw it, of certain of these actions that took place. I saw the result of bodies being burnt. I had knowledge of that. I didn't have knowledge of orchestrated efforts of forces that I served to incite such incidents... Commissioner Malan: You say that you saw bodies that were burnt. What did you think was the reason for that? Who burnt them? Mr Van Eeden: I didn't have to think of what the reason was; it was quite clear. I did my service in Vaal Triangle in the 1990s and it was black on black violence. That it could have been incited from another force, well we have evidence for that now. But I have personal knowledge of, well, let's refer to it as violence between ethnic groups, black ethnic groups in the Vaal Triangle, I saw that.

#### Reference 37 - 0.01% Coverage

70 Trust Feed is a rural community situated north-west of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZuluNatal. It is a freehold area with a hierarchical structure of landowners and tenants. The area has a long history of peaceful co-existence that changed in the mid 1980s as a result of political tensions between the UDF and the IFP. Threatened by the activities of the UDF, the local police unit

colluded with the IFP to wipe out UDF members. This led to a sequence of atrocities culminating in the Trust Feed massacre in December 1988.

#### Reference 38 - 0.01% Coverage

26. As we have seen with other cases, the particular event Mrs Tenza reported to the Commission was little more than a punctuation mark in a life of ongoing difficulties. Both she and her family made political decisions at times influenced at least as much by attempts to survive violence and poverty as by ideological persuasions. The tone throughout is of a long struggle to eke out a meagre existence in a violent world. Mrs Te n z a 's life story paints a vivid picture of the convoluted political history of KwaZulu/Natal and the human consequences. The awful experience of seeing her nephew murdered in front of her is just one example of a broader tragedy.

#### Reference 39 - 0.01% Coverage

45. During this period the ANC's Special Operations Unit launched several high profile armed attacks on economic and energy installations, infrastructure and police stations, as well as an attack on the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria, in which nineteen people died. In terms of casualties, this was the l a r g e s t attack in MK history. Other high-profile attacks included the 1980 SASOL attacks, the 1982 attack on the Vo o r t rekkeerhoogte SADF base, attacks on police stations and the 1982 sabotage attack on the Koeberg nuclear power station.

#### Reference 40 - 0.01% Coverage

120. In their applications, they sketched the turbulent political history of the township since 1985, including serious clashes with security forces. They testified that local farmers served as police reservists and had played a role in other forms of political re p re ssion. As a consequence, groups of up to forty youths, including the applicants, had embarked on raids and robberies on white farmers. In most instances, the motive was to acquire weapons and ammunition. In some of the attacks, farmers or farm workers were shot and injured. Amnesty was granted for four of the attacks and refused for one.

#### Reference 41 - 0.01% Coverage

The question is – and I am looking at each one, every single one of you now, di rectly across this table – I want to know from each one of you and your leaders, to explain to us why this was done, if there was any logical reason for what you have done, to launch a senseless terrorist attack on a pub with young, cheerful, innocent students at a time in South Africa's history when we were already on the road to democracy after you had all accepted and taken part in the accepting of an interim constitution on the 3rd of December? Is there any reason, sensible reason, why you had to still continue with something like that? Could you not think for yourself? (Cape Town hearing, 27 October 1997.)

#### Reference 42 - 0.01% Coverage



[T]he attack on white civilians is not a new thing, when you look back at the history of PAC – the formation of Poqo on the 11th of September 1961. If you remember the attacks at Mbashe, Paarl and Komane, those comrades of those days were members of the PAC which was converted into APLA. They were attacking white civilians during those days; even history confirms that. There f o r e I find it difficult for me when one of the panel members says we're shifting as to our targets. Instead of attacking security forces, we were attacking white civilians which I refer to as 'soft targets' ... That's the reason why I say I am confused when they say we have shifted in constituting targets because this started long ago. ( P i e t e rmaritzburg hearing, 11 February 1998.)

#### Reference 43 - 0.01% Coverage

93. Mr van Jaarsveld confirmed that one of the consequences of the incident was that Afrikaans publishers like Perskor turned their backs on Professor van Jaarsveld and removed 'his popular and well-known history textbooks from the market'. He was ignored by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to which he had regularly contributed to radio programmes. He was investigated by the security police and threatened with anonymous telephone calls and hate mail. Shortly after Te r r e'blanche and others had been found guilty, an attempt was made on the pro f e s s o r 's life and he was shot at with a cro s s b o w. Other members of the family were threatened and a stone-throwing incident took place at the family home.

#### Reference 44 - 0.01% Coverage

94. In response to Mr van Jaarsveld's statement, Te r r e'Blanche told the Committee: Mr Chairman, all these things did not happen because the professor was tarre d and feathered; these things happened because of the incorrect version of the Covenant and the fact that history was twisted, which can be the worst that can happen to a nation if you abuse your power to rewrite history so that you all of a sudden can become acceptable to other nations. If we sit here at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is scaring to think that the Van Jaarsveld's family admit in front of this body seeking reconciliation and truth, that his father tre a ted the truth in this way to the extent that his books were no longer published as textbooks because what he said was not acceptable to students and pupils. (Klerksdorp hearing, 10 May 1999.)

#### Reference 45 - 0.01% Coverage

36. David Simelane and Obed Masina, for example, were granted amnesty for the killing of Sergeant Orphan Hlubi Chapi outside his Soweto home in June 1978. It was, however, the formation of the ANC Special Operations Unit in 1979 that led to the launch of several high-profile attacks on police stations, state infras t r u c t u r e and a major attack on SADF personnel, namely the Church Stre e t bombing. Here a car bomb placed outside the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria led to the deaths of nineteen people. In terms of the numbers of casualties, this was the most devastating attack by MK in its entire history. The Commission received amnesty applications for a total of seventy-nine incidents carried out by this unit during this period.<sup>6 3</sup>

#### Reference 46 - 0.01% Coverage

example of such an attack. His children testified in the amnesty hearing that this attack had contributed to the humiliation of their father and his loss of standing in his community. While the expressed motive for the attack was that that they re g a rded the new direction that Van Jaarsveld had given to Afrikaner history as contrary to the then South African Constitution, which re c o g n i s e d God as the highest authority, it became quite clear during the hearing that the real motivation for the attack was his willingness to accommodate change.

## *Youth*

References or discussions of youth, children, etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Africa\\SouthAfrica.TRC\_.Report-FULL> - § 8 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

### Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

3 The hearings provided an opportunity to focus on the impact of apartheid on children and youth. Over the years, children and young people were victims of and witnesses to of many of the most appalling gross human rights violations in South Africa's history. The effects of exposure to ongoing political violence may have had serious effects on the development of many of these children.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, considered imperative that the trauma inflicted on children and young people be heard and shared within the framework of the healing ethos of the Commission. Recognition of the inhumanity of apartheid was seen as a crucial step towards establishing a human rights framework for children and young

### Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

77 Exile is often experienced as a brutal rupture in an individual's personal history, resulting in a lack of continuity that frequently becomes a serious obstacle to the development of a meaningful and positive sense of identity. It has been argued that political repression and exile tend to distort normal socialisation in a child or young person. Some of the significant consequences of life in exile include a feeling of 'transitoriness', a profound sense of loss of security, feelings of guilt, and a range of more severe psychological problems and disorders.

### Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

harnessed vast amounts of energy, courage and resilience during the apartheid era. For many young people, active engagement in political activity resulted in the acquisition of skills such as analysis, mobilisation and strategising, as well as the ability to draw strength from friends and comrades in times of hardship. Many of today's leaders come from a politically active history and have displayed a remarkable capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation.

### Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

99 Psychological, social and economic stresses are compounded when children are faced with physical danger from and abuse by the authorities that are meant to protect them. Not only were child protection laws ignored, but the authorities systematically attacked children, resulting in grave emotional and physical harm. Mr Maxlesi described the persistent physical reminders of a violent history:

### Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

After the unbanning of the ANC, they (the BMW members) were left to their own devices. As things simmered down, they found themselves naked and vulnerable, lost and exposed, without

direction. These guys were literally born on the streets, born in the eye of the storm. They did not have a history before 1986. They had little schooling or skills, except in zipguns and petrol bombs. They were the shocktroops.<sup>7</sup>

#### Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

120. In their applications, they sketched the turbulent political history of the township since 1985, including serious clashes with security forces. They testified that local farmers served as police reservists and had played a role in other forms of political repression. As a consequence, groups of up to forty youths, including the applicants, had embarked on raids and robberies on white farmers. In most instances, the motive was to acquire weapons and ammunition. In some of the attacks, farmers or farm workers were shot and injured. Amnesty was granted for four of the attacks and refused for one.

#### Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

90. Terre'Blanche testified that, after the tarring and feathering, history books written by the professor were withdrawn from schools and that the AWB had therefore partially succeeded in its political objective since Professor van Jaarsveld could no longer influence the minds of the youth, the voters of the future.

#### Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

example of such an attack. His children testified in the amnesty hearing that this attack had contributed to the humiliation of their father and his loss of standing in his community. While the expressed motive for the attack was that they regarded the new direction that Van Jaarsveld had given to Afrikaner history as contrary to the then South African Constitution, which recognised God as the highest authority, it became quite clear during the hearing that the real motivation for the attack was his willingness to accommodate change.