



Centre for
Human Rights and
Restorative Justice

HISTORY REFERENCES

Timor-Leste Truth Commission

Abstract

Notes on discussions of history, as well as a list of coding themes and references to history in the Timor-Leste Truth Commission.

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Researcher Notes

Report details:

- published in 2013
- pdf has 3126 pages
- report has a separate section dedicated to history
 - this section is 206 pages
- according to NVivo's text search, the word history (using stems) is referenced 502 times, representing 0.19% coverage
- after deleting references from the bibliography, notes or headers, there are **92 broad references** to history in the content of the report
- detailed discussions of the history of the country from the country's time under Portuguese colonialism to 1999
- detailed discussions of the occupation of Timor-Leste and the actions of the Indonesian armed forces

History is referenced in the report in the following ways:

- need to look at the past to establish accountability and identify who is responsible for human rights violations
- discussions of historical human rights violations
- examining the role of institutions in past events
- determine the true history
- accounts of victims and violence
- idea that the commission will get at the experiences of "ordinary people" (they put this in quotations) who died or survived
- not a history of the events and leaders but the voices of the people
- need the truth to learn from the conflict
- need to approach the past carefully to not create new wounds
- disagreement and denial of facts prevents sides from coming together
- elements of accounts that cannot be confirmed but it is not the role of the commission to make such definitive judgments
- commission is making space for the silenced voices
- looking at the collective memory of both nations
- decolonization and UN – looking at UN security council country alliances and how that affects decolonization and the history and remembrance of events in Timor-Leste
- tendency to see the commissions mandate not complete if it did not examine pre 1999 events
- had female only groups to tell stories to help them feel more comfortable discussing traumatic experiences
- Commission was able to chart/map stories in each community to see the social and economic effects on communities

History and truth are discussed in the following ways:

- commission argues that the country needs the truth of past events to learn from them
- need to determine the true history and establish accountability for human rights violations
- truth needs to come from the words of those who experienced the past
- disagreement and denial of facts prevents Indonesia and Timor-Leste from coming together

*References of history and truth appear under the highlighted coding theme/section **True or Accurate** starting on page 71

Links to Data Visualization

This section contains links to all data visualization for the Timor-Leste report.

Word Frequency

- word frequency cloud
- excel sheet of word frequency cloud findings

Word Trees

- history
- women
- children
- youth
- forgive
- victim
- truth
- reconciliation
- land

*NVivo software can only edit word trees by changing the central search term and branch sizes. Word trees includes references from bibliography, headers, and notes that cannot be edited out using NVivo software. Researchers will need to manually remove unsightly branches using editing software (e.g., paint, photoshop, etc.)

History Hierarchy Coding Chart

- history hierarchy coding chart
- excel sheet of history hierarchy coding chart results

History Coding for the Timor-Leste Report

The following chart breakdowns the child nodes used for coding history references based on themes and discussions surrounding history in the Timor-Leste report.

History	All references or discussions of history in the Timor-Leste report
Accountability	References or discussions of who bears responsibility or who is accountable for past events or wrongs
Archive and library	References or discussions of libraries or archives
Colonialism	References or discussions of colonialism
Commemoration	References or discussions to heritage and commemoration projects
Community	References or discussions of community (e.g., identity, education)
Human Rights	References or discussions of human rights or human rights violations
Institutions	References or discussions of institutions (e.g., military, police etc.)
Learn or Educate	References or discussions to learning from or educating about the past
Legacy	References or discussions of legacy, consequences, and lasting impact of past events, actions, policy, etc.
Nation	References or discussions of nation, nations, nationals, or nation building
Reconciliation	References or discussions of reconciliation
Resistance	References or discussions of resistance
True or Accurate	References or discussions of the truth and true, genuine, or accurate history
UN Security Council	References or discussions of the UN security council
Victims	References or discussion of the accounts or experiences of victims who died or survived
Violence	References or discussions of violence

History References

This section contains all references to history from the Timor-Leste report.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 92 references coded [0.34% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

am deeply honoured to introduce this precious document. Chega! is an extraordinary report about an extraordinary chapter in the history

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

provide essential background information to an understanding of the context and causes of the human rights violations which occurred during the mandate period: for example, Vol. I Part 3: The History of the Conflict; Vol. I Part 4: The Regime of Occupation; Vol. I Part 5: Resistance: Structure and Strategy. The main body of the Report is found in Vols. II-III Part 7, which is organised thematically into the main human rights violations committed during the mandate period. Within each of the sections in this part, violations are examined within a structure which divides the mandate period in up to seven main phases, as appropriate: • April 1974-September 1975: the internal political and armed conflict • September 1975-January 1976: the period of Fretilin administration, the aftermath of the internal conflict and Indonesian incursions • December 1975, the full-scale Indonesian invasion • 1976-1979: the period of large-scale Indonesian military operations and the armed resistance led by Fretilin • 1980-1984: the period of Indonesian military "consolidation" and the rebuilding of the Resistance • 1985-1998: the period of "normalisation" • 1999: the period leading up to and following the Popular Consultation of 30 August 1999.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

35. The truth contained in this Report comes largely from the words of those who directly experienced the years of conflict. The Commission has attached special importance to listening directly to those who suffered human rights violations throughout the 25-year period, most of whom had not spoken outside the narrow circle of their family. These many voices, from across the country, have given Timor-Leste a priceless asset. They tell us who we are, what we have been through, what we have lost, and show us the value of what we have gained. From the stories of our sisters and brothers we learn that victory is not a simple matter of heroes and villains; that history is more than the listing of major events or the biographies of those who are called leaders. The experiences of “ordinary people”, both the many who died and those who survived, tell us where we have come from and help us understand who we are today. From their stories we see more clearly both the extremes of human dignity and of human degradation that were manifested in our country during these 25 years. We must learn from both sides of this human story. We must acknowledge our potential for both extremes, and strive always to bring the best of our humanity into our lives and relationships – our families, our communities and our nation – each day as we build a new future.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

- Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims
- Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television
- Implementing community reconciliation procedures
- Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them
- Conducting victims’ hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for

their courage and for the suffering they had endured • Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing • Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance • Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation • Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor • Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders • Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

events during the conflict which had previously remained hidden to them. This fostered a feeling of solidarity among victims and their communities. It helped to clarify the local history of the conflict. It also reinforced the determination that these painful events of the past should never be repeated.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

112. A number of Indonesians testified to CAVR National Public Hearings, and provided written submissions. Members of Komnas Perempuan (the Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women) testified at the CAVR National Public Hearing on Women and Conflict. A group of NGOs from West Timor (Indonesia), The West Timor Humanitarian Team, made a submission to the Commission at this hearing. The Indonesian human rights NGO Elsam (Lembaga Advokasi Masyarakat, Public Policy Studies and Advocacy) made two submissions to the CAVR: one providing detailed research into Indonesian military structures and operations, and the other testimonies from Indonesian military officers and their families titled "Story from the Behind the Lines". In addition, the well-known Indonesian historian Dr Asvi Warman Adam of LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Academy of Science) gave a paper titled "East Timorese History in the New Indonesia" to the CAVR National Public Hearing on SelfDetermination and the International Community. A number of other human rights workers and activists also testified at hearings, and their testimonies have been used in relevant chapters of this Report.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

119. Continuing disagreement about and denial of historical fact prevents different sides to a conflict from finding a common basis to begin the painful, difficult and slow process of reconciliation. The truth-seeking activities were aimed at providing a history of events which was based on objective information rather than rumour or propaganda. Such a solidly founded version of the truth could in turn open the way to the admission of responsibility, acceptance and forgiveness.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

Commission's programmes whether giving statements, testifying at public hearings, attending community reconciliation processes or participating in healing workshops • Facilitating group discussions and recording local histories focusing on the impact of human rights violations on individual communities • Helping victims with urgent needs by assessing their cases, referring them to appropriate agencies and providing modest financial assistance, as part of the Commission's Urgent Reparations scheme.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

142. In addition to the detailed official Final Report, the Commission produced a range of more accessible related material. A two-and-a-half-hour documentary film version was produced in Tetum, with English, Portuguese and Indonesian sub-titles, as well as a Tetum radio version, a photographic exhibition and a series of books on the thematic national public hearings of the Commission in Tetum, Indonesian and English. A photographic exhibition of survivors of violations promoted their dignity and aspirations, together with the publication of a photographic book of survivors expressing their hopes for the future. The Commission believes that the report and the associated research material in the CAVR Archive provides a rich source of resources which can become the basis for the production of accessible educational materials about human rights, reconciliation and East Timorese history.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

heritage value of the building would be preserved and that Assepol would be consulted throughout the physical rehabilitation. The plan for the building included its use as the Commission's national office. It was also to house an archive containing documents and other materials relating to the history of human rights violations in TimorLeste history which would be made accessible to the public after the end of the Commission's mandate.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

The company selected after public tender to carry out the construction work, P.T. Rosario, was headed by a former Comarca prisoner, Julio Alfaro. Reconstruction began in September 2002. A large traditional meeting house was built in the former exercise courtyard, for use in the Commission's national public hearings and other events. Gardens were planted by Maria José Franco Pereira, who was detained as a four-year old at the Comarca with her mother in 1976. A traditional cleansing ceremony, symbolising the removal of harmful spirits associated with the prison's history of abuse, was conducted on completion of construction work.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

24. This provision may have prevented the Commission from gaining some important information that would have assisted its truth-seeking function. However the Commission also recognises that it was established as an institution whose work was in some respects to complement the Serious Crimes process. The provisions of the Regulation reflect a policy decision that the work of the prosecution service should not be compromised by the truth-seeking function of the Commission. This policy is based on recognition of the importance of

establishing strong and clear mechanisms to achieve justice and promote respect for the rule of law in the context of a fragile new nation with a history dominated by injustice. The Commission is satisfied that, notwithstanding this limitation, the robust powers it was granted were sufficient to enable it to compile a Report that contains a strong, objective and comprehensive account of the violations that occurred during the period of the political conflicts.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

59. These programmes included Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRPs), local public hearings for victims, participatory workshops on the history of human rights violations in communities, victims' healing workshops, a special reparations scheme for victims with urgent needs, radio programmes focusing on local reconciliation issues, and information programmes aimed at East Timorese people in West Timor, Indonesia.

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

History of the Conflict 3. Introduction

1. This part provides an historical context to events covered in the violations sections of the Report. It is based on primary sources of the Commission itself, from statements, interviews and testimonies delivered at public hearings; on documentary evidence available to the Commission; and on an analysis of relevant secondary sources. It is generally limited to a quick overview of the key events, moments and turning points in the period of the Commission's mandate relevant to the political conflicts, the efforts to resolve those conflicts and the human rights violations which occurred in those conflicts. Within the scope of this Report, it has not been possible to provide definitive accounts of some of the key issues which remain points of historical conjecture about this period and these events. Nor is it the role of the Commission to make such definitive judgements. The part does attempt at least to identify what some of these issues are, and the Commission encourages further research, writing and analysis of these important aspects of East Timorese history.

2. This analysis and writing of East Timorese history is a critical step in nation building, and how it is done will reflect what kind of society our new nation fosters. The Commission's Report is based largely upon the statements and interviews provided by ordinary East Timorese people from across the country, and seeks to bring their voice into the continuing dialogue for building our new nation. It does not seek to be an exclusive history, recording only the perspectives or achievements of national leaders, or of people from only one side or the other of the political divide. It is based on the idea that the recording and analysis of history must be open to new information and ideas, and to information and perspectives that are not necessarily politically popular. While history is critical for nation building, a simplistic history that seeks to sweep under the carpet unpleasant realities or to make invisible the contributions of people from all walks of life cannot help build a resilient and sustainable nation. History telling that acknowledges complexity, that makes space for the voice of those often silenced, and that opens the way for open-minded reflection can make a contribution to building

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Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

3. The telling of East Timorese history is critical for the foundations of our relationship with our international neighbours, especially Indonesia. As the Indonesian historian Dr Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission at its hearing on Self-Determination and the International Community:

The collective memory of both nations will determine the nature and the strength or weakness of the relationship. This will be reflected in the writing of history of both countries.¹

4. This part begins with a brief overview of the colonial history of Timor-Leste under Portuguese control. It deliberately places the emphasis upon the period leading up to the internal conflict of August–September 1975 and the subsequent Indonesian invasion. This looks at events and relationships surrounding the decolonisation process in Portuguese Timor, within the territory, in Indonesia and in the regional and wider geopolitical context. They are vital to an understanding of the causes of the political conflicts in Timor-Leste, the lost opportunities to avoid war and seek peaceful solutions to political concerns based on the principles of international law, and involved Timorese, Indonesian and international actors.

Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

7. It is the hope of the Commission that this brief history will both assist the reader to understand the contents of other parts and sections of this Report, and that it will inspire current and future generations of East Timorese historians to work further on understanding our past as part of our constant efforts to build a future based on respect for each other, human rights and the love of peace.

Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

euphoria and concern. The Commission heard testimony from a range of leading East Timorese figures in its hearing on the Internal Political Conflict of 1974-76. They spoke of the excitement events in Lisbon and the other colonies generated among the mostly young people who had an interest in politics. But they also generally agreed that East Timorese society was ill-prepared by its history to engage in political activity.³⁵

Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

104. Among East Timorese soldiers who formed the bulk of the army there was a growing perception that Portugal was in the process of turning its back on Timor.¹¹² Many East Timorese members of the armed forces were drawn to political involvement at what they saw as a critical moment in their country's history. Mário Lemos Pires recalled to the Commission:

Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

243. Noting the scale of the attack on Dili, Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission that it could be “compared to the attack to put down the PRRI/Permesta rebellion (in 1958), which was the biggest military operation in Indonesian war history.”

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

321. The period from late 1977 to 1979 saw the greatest humanitarian tragedy in Timor-Leste's history. Widespread famine was a consequence of massive Indonesian military operations aimed at destroying the Fretilin Resistance. This military
Meanwhile, military 228 | Chega! - Volume I, Part 3: History of the Conflict

Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

344. Ataúro has had a history of being used as a prison island by successive regimes in Timor-Leste. The Portuguese colonial administration did so over a long period, as did the Japanese occupying forces in World War II. The Indonesian regime of occupation initiated a similar policy commencing in 1980. The Commission received expert testimony that this was an extension of the policy of separating civilians who were considered a possible future support base for the armed Resistance. Gilman dos Santos testified:

Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

578. This international presence was unprecedented in the history of Timor-Leste. In the 25-year period of Indonesian presence it had been unthinkable that the territory could have been so open to the international community. After the months of bloody violence against civilians leading to the 5 May Agreements, when there was almost no international presence in Timor-Leste, the presence of internationals across the territory provided a level of monitoring that may have contributed to the reduction in large-scale attacks by militia or TNI.

Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

615. 30 August 1999 dawned as a remarkable day in the history of Timor-Leste. Despite months of intimidation and violence, people across the country came out in droves to cast their ballot.⁷⁷³

Reference 26 - 0.01% Coverage

19. Indonesia's police force was structurally part of the military throughout the New Order. This long history of effective subservience to the leadership of the armed forces had a profound effect on the independence of the police and their capacity to enforce law and order. This history has contributed to the impunity enjoyed by the armed forces and those who work with it. The police force doctrine, founded on a belief that security is the responsibility of the total population, is similar to that of the armed forces. Under its System of Neighbourhood Security (Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan, Siskamling) members of the community have a role in maintaining security in their locality.¹⁰ Like the military, the police force also has a territorial structure, including a presence at the village level (Bintara Polisi Daerah, Binpolda). In addition to its normal duties, the police maintain an armed division called the Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, Brimob). Brimob originally had responsibility for internal security, but as this role was taken over by the military during the New Order this division began to specialise in riot control and was used extensively for this purpose.

Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

50. In July 1988 the Army Strategic Reserve Command Second Infantry Division was appointed to replace the First Infantry Division within the structure of the Security Operations Command for East Timor. A military history book indicates that at the time of the handover, ABRI considered Falintil to be weak, but acknowledged its capacity to both mount operations and influence the population.

Reference 28 - 0.01% Coverage

118. Many of the militias which emerged in 1998-99 had roots in groups formed much earlier in the occupation period. Below is a chart of the history of Timorese militias, including the names of the Timorese leaders, by sector and district, founded from 1975–1999.

Reference 29 - 0.01% Coverage

1. The Resistance against Indonesian occupation in Timor-Leste went through a complex development. This part provides an overview of the Resistance movement including: its emergence during the period of Fretilin administration following the coup; the effect of destruction of the Fretilin bases in 1978-79 by the Indonesian military including the loss of a number of Fretilin/Falintil leaders and the end of the protracted people's war strategy; the regeneration of Falintil, the armed front of the Resistance, after 1987 and its structure and strategies until the referendum in 1999; and the structure and strategies of the clandestine front over the course of the occupation. The third front in the Resistance movement, the diplomatic front, is discussed in Vol. II, Part 7.1: Self-Determination, and so has not been considered in detail here. The Commission notes that this part is only a first step in understanding the complex history of this aspect of Timorese history and that there is considerable scope for further research in the future.

Reference 30 - 0.01% Coverage

39. The most common educational activity was political education. Fretilin gave much attention to providing political training for Fretilin cadres to increase their capacity for organising people and their political and ideological knowledge. The commissariat in each sector established a Centre for Political Training (Centro da Formação Política, Ceforpol). Ceforpol was obligatory for quadro medio (mid-level cadres, the regional and zone committees), but sometimes was attended by quadro inferior (menial cadres, administrators of suco and aldeia). Topics covered included the history of Timor-Leste from the arrival of the Portuguese, theories of social development, the philosophy of dialectical materialism, building people-power, the organisational principles of "the mass line" (linha de massa) and democratic centralism (centralismo democrático), women's emancipation and collective food production. Military strategy and national liberation were also discussed, as well as national liberation wars in other countries such as Guinea Bissau, China and Vietnam. The instructors in the Ceforpol were members of the Fretilin Central Committee and Falintil commanders.³¹ Overall, the Ceforpol were under the supervision of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica, DOPI), which was a department of the Fretilin Central Committee.³²

Reference 31 - 0.01% Coverage

145. The history of the clandestine movement during the Indonesian occupation is highly complex and, because of the nature of the movement, there has been very little written on the structures and strategies of the movement. The following overview has been compiled from interviews with former members of the Resistance, but the Commission notes that there is much scope for further research into this fascinating aspect of Timorese history.

Reference 32 - 0.01% Coverage

26. The Commission was acutely aware of the sensitivity and importance of the estimation of total and disaggregated mortality patterns. Other truth commissions (particularly those in El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru) benefited from the existence of extensive, if still partial, registries of deaths that had been documented before the commissions began their work. Information of this kind was not available to the CAVR, and so three new datasets were created: a qualitative survey of respondents self-motivated to give testimony to the Commission; a probability sample of 1,396 households from which retrospective conflict-related mortality histories were taken; and a census of public graveyards in Timor-Leste. These sources fit Cribb's second and third definitions of data sources that could be used to analyse mortality.

Reference 33 - 0.01% Coverage

by deprivation [of food and medication] and killings of civilians. The respondents selected themselves to give reports to the Commission. Therefore, the results of this project may not represent the entire universe of all people who suffered human rights violations. • The Retrospective Mortality Survey (RMS) recorded the mortality histories of a probability sample of 1,396 households. In each household, two adult respondents were chosen at random. For male respondents, the respondent's parents and siblings were enumerated, including whether they are living or dead. If they were dead, the date, place, and manner of death were recorded. For female respondents, the respondent's children were enumerated in a similar fashion. In 60% of the households, only respondents of one sex were available at the time of the interview, and so one respondent gave information about parents, siblings and children. • A census of public graveyards in Timor-Leste, documenting more than 319,000 graves (denoted GCD).

Reference 34 - 0.01% Coverage

32. As a result of these initiatives, the decade of the 1960s is often described as the decade of decolonisation and independence. No fewer than 42 countries, mostly in Africa, gained independence and membership of the UN during the 1960s, more than any other decade during the history of the UN. However, Timor-Leste was not to join them for another 40 years.

Reference 35 - 0.01% Coverage

I found my beloved country much the same as I had left it (in 1970). East Timor, under the Portuguese, seemed to sit still in history. The clock of development didn't tick there.¹⁹

Reference 36 - 0.01% Coverage

221. The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a close ally of both Portugal and Indonesia based on a long history of relationships with both peoples dating back several hundreds of years. However, successive British Governments took only a limited interest in the question of Timor-Leste during most of the territory's nearly 40-year history of decolonisation.

Reference 37 - 0.01% Coverage

Real ignorance of Timorese history and culture, the geo-strategic context of the territory and its remoteness from the metropolis, as well as the secrecy of negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia, helped keep the discussion about Timor on a lower, mainly ideological plane with little practical value. Portuguese citizens who were interested in the rights of the Timorese people were incapable of imposing on the political powers of the time the fundamental strategic changes that could eventually have changed events, such as reinforcement of the Portuguese presence and action, and the internationalisation of the issue.²³⁶

Reference 38 - 0.01% Coverage

Chomsky's words on this matter had a real influence, sometimes indirect, and history should record it, because it was of vital importance in helping alter the state of widespread ignorance about East Timor that then existed in the United States and elsewhere.²³⁹

Reference 39 - 0.01% Coverage

Resistance in Timor-Leste and the women had been calling for their cancellation for three years during which time Britain had become Indonesia's second largest arms supplier. The women – Andrea Needham, Lotta Kronlid, Joanna Wilson and Angie Zelter – informed the company of their action and were arrested. Their trial in 1996 made legal history: they were acquitted by a jury in Liverpool who found that they had acted in order to prevent the greater crime of genocide.²⁴³

Reference 40 - 0.01% Coverage

489. While this period was notable for the impact of the video image on public awareness, the growth of new organisations and their co-ordination owes much to the advent of the internet age. The general availability of the internet in the 1990s more or less coincided with Indonesia's decision to partially relax access to TimorLeste. This timing was not only a happy coincidence; the internet also perfectly suited the requirements of human rights activists. It was fast, cheap, secure, user-friendly, interactive and had significant carrying capacity and global reach. Information, a scarce commodity on Timor-Leste for the previous 15 years, was now widely available through the internet thanks to the skills and commitment of civil society members. John MacDougall's pioneering apakabar, a free electronic mailing list which covered both Indonesia and Timor-Leste, was followed by reg.easttimor which became the main clearing house and

channel for rapid communication on Timor-Leste across the globe. Established in 1994 and co-ordinated by ETAN/US, reg.easttimor enabled the public and civil society organisations in the Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America to have interactive conferences and to access reports on Timor-Leste and translations from wire services and the Indonesian, Portuguese and other media as well as official documents from the UN, governments and other sources. The relatively few books available on Timor-Leste were now supplemented by publicly accessible websites. TimorNet at the University of Coimbra in Portugal provided links to information on the history, geography and culture of Timor-Leste, key UN documents, human rights violations, articles, publications and suggestions for action. Activists used email to proliferate information and to co-ordinate and organise. Colin Renwick set up Minihub to help small, vulnerable NGOs in Indonesia and Timor-Leste establish cheap, accessible and secure internet access and also gave training to selected East Timorese activists,* increasing the underground's effectiveness. With these skills, East Timorese supporting Xanana Gusmão in Jakarta could send encrypted email messages to colleagues abroad, including to José Ramos-Horta.

Reference 41 - 0.01% Coverage

491. The decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta on International Human Rights Day, 10 December 1996, was an enormous moral, political and organisational boost to civil society's work for self-determination. The prize was given independently by the Nobel Committee and thoroughly earned by the two awardees, Bishop Belo and José Ramos-Horta, but the nomination owed much to civil society's initiative, and particularly to old friends of Timor-Leste working behind the scenes in the United States. The prestigious award confirmed the moral correctness of civil society's work and further weakened the case advanced by the Indonesian government and its co-defenders, including Indonesia's version of the history of the conflict. It was also politically helpful in that it highlighted the necessity of self-determination to resolve the conflict – the centrepiece of civil society advocacy for 20 years – and identified this as the key issue.* The Prize was a bonus to civil society organising. The global media coverage it attracted, which continued as José Ramos-Horta travelled the world in his new role, generated new public interest and support for the civil society campaign in many countries.

Reference 42 - 0.01% Coverage

526. The Commission believes that the following lessons can be drawn from this experience: • Civil society's contribution to the resolution of the Timor-Leste question was only possible because civil society existed and was permitted to function freely as an independent sector in many parts of the world or because, as in Indonesia and Timor-Leste itself, civil society asserted itself against repression. Timor-Leste's experience is that a robust civil society is critical to the proper functioning of individual societies and the international community. • During 25 years of struggle, a strong partnership was forged between many of Timor-Leste's current leaders in all walks of life and international civil society that is rare in the history of nation-building. This partnership, which is now in a new phase, should be nurtured on both sides because it is an important longterm asset for Timor-Leste. • Civil society should take from its Timor-Leste experience that, while it has to be strategic, it is most effective when it (a) sticks to principle, (b)

is politically disinterested, (c) is non-violent, (d) is open to everybody's contribution and (e) independent but ready to co-operate with government and business when possible.

Reference 43 - 0.01% Coverage

We must speak objectively. That a war took place is part of our history. UDT started it, then Fretilin avenged the killings during the "counter coup". At the time, there was little respect for humanity or justice. Seven people were killed in Darulete.⁴⁷

Reference 44 - 0.01% Coverage

370. On 19 September 1977, the Fretilin Central Committee issued a communiqué announcing Francisco Xavier do Amaral's arrest ten days earlier and his impending trial. Calling Francisco Xavier do Amaral "the vilest traitor that our history has known", it recounted a whole range of serious offences that he and his followers were alleged to have committed, including planning the elimination of the leadership of the Central Committee and a number of deviations from Fretilin ideology, including trying to "separate the civil from the military tasks". The communiqué announced that the President of Fretilin had committed the crime of high treason and had been expelled from the party.³⁷⁸

Reference 45 - 0.01% Coverage

Asia Watch reports on the Court Martial held in Bali between 29 May and 6 June 1992, as well as its report Remembering History in East Timor, as well as the Commission's collection of military documents in relation to Santa Cruz and the Ndiaye Report by the UN Special Rapporteur.⁷⁹⁰

Reference 46 - 0.01% Coverage

665. At the same time, militia members were asserting their new power over the population through random acts of violence. Militia groups were composed largely of young men who were marginalised and angry, or who had long histories of involvement in Indonesian paramilitary or civil defence groups. Some were also just opportunists and, in this period of lawlessness and heightened tension and violence, were given free rein to do as they pleased with impunity. Indeed, the evidence is clear that the military not only allowed but actively encouraged brutality on the part of the militias.

Reference 47 - 0.01% Coverage

We believe in human transformation. The history of struggle in other countries has proven that a person considered a revolutionary today can be seen as a traitor tomorrow, and that a person considered a traitor today could be a revolutionary tomorrow...A man's common sense can improve the man. We have to believe in people's ability to transform themselves.²⁴⁴

Reference 48 - 0.01% Coverage

It is unfortunate that the defence lawyer's argument did not benefit the security and stability in East Timor, [it] could lead to loss of confidence about the history of integration of East Timor into The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.¹³⁴

Reference 49 - 0.01% Coverage

196. Legal argument by defence teams were based on the claim that Timor-Leste's integration into Indonesia was illegal, and would continue to be so until the East Timorese were given an opportunity to participate in a free and fair choice concerning their political status. This was argued in a number of ways, for example through detailed accounts of East Timorese history from the pre-colonial period up until the Indonesian invasion and occupation; by disputing the validity of the Balibó declaration; by arguing that self-determination was supported by the 1945 Indonesian Constitution; as well as arguments based on international law and UN Security Council resolutions. If the Indonesian claim over Timor-Leste was illegal then there could be no substance to charges that East Timorese had committed treason by not supporting the sovereignty of Indonesia in Timor-Leste.

Reference 50 - 0.01% Coverage

198. Political arguments were also taken up by some defendants. The statement by Jacinto Alves, entitled "Struggle is the Discovery of a Nation that has never Died", drew parallels between the struggles for East Timorese independence and Indonesia's own struggle for freedom. History is a constant and irreversible march, it continues to move forward, never backward, and shapes the human self across generations of people who tune into its rhythm. From this point of view, we revisit the history of Timor-Leste and draw parallels with the history of the Indonesian Nation.¹⁴⁰

Reference 51 - 0.01% Coverage

374. Xanana Gusmão's defence statement is a significant document in the history of the Timorese struggle for independence. From a prison cell, Xanana Gusmão crafted a range of arguments that were legally, politically and emotionally powerful. The judges, however, considered this statement to be irrelevant before they had even heard its contents.

Reference 52 - 0.01% Coverage

175. In the early 1980s, Falintil continued to recruit soldiers under the age of 18. The UNICEF study includes the case of 12-year-old Bersama, who was taken in by Falintil after his father, a clandestine leader, was killed in the forest by the Indonesian army. Commander Ular remembered: "There was no choice. We could not leave Bersama behind when we withdrew."¹³⁹ Bersama was given the job of writing first lists and inventories and later letters and histories of the war. After two years he also began to take part in combat operations:

Reference 53 - 0.01% Coverage

399. Other organisations, with no history of transferring children from Timor-Leste, became active only after the referendum. The best known of them was the Heart Foundation (Yayasan Hati), which sent some 150 children from camps in West Timor to Central Java. They were placed either in Catholic institutions or in a private institution in Wonosari, 45 km east of Yogyakarta. Wonosari was founded by a former Indonesian Government official who had worked in Dili as head of the local branch of the Department of Education and Culture.²⁹⁸

Reference 54 - 0.01% Coverage

123. The institutional problems described above and a curriculum in which indoctrination played a major part were not unique to Timor-Leste; they are in fact the rule in Indonesian education more generally. Morning recitals of the five Pancasila principles are a daily ritual in schools throughout the country, and courses on the “Full Understanding and Culturalisation of the Principles of Pancasila” are required for graduation from primary and secondary schools. Rote learning of nationalist slogans and songs, the teaching of an approved version of history, and conformity and unquestioning respect for authority are emphasised at the expense of basic skills development, especially of critical thinking and problem solving.*

Reference 55 - 0.01% Coverage

reflected in a breakdown of the textbooks procured for use in schools: between 1984 and 1989 the government bought 161,560 textbooks on the Indonesian language, 39,926 on the Indonesian governmental and administrative systems, and 9,398 on natural history and physics.¹⁴⁰ There is no doubt that the campaign to teach Indonesian in schools was effective: by 1998, 99% of children aged 10-19 and 85% of those aged 20-29 could speak Indonesian (compared with 20% of those 60 and older).¹⁴¹

Reference 56 - 0.01% Coverage

Recently problems in the development of the social-economic situation have been brought about by the younger generation who seem dissatisfied with the present situation. To handle such social and political unrest, the regional government, among other things, has given guidance to the...students of junior and senior high school by socialising the history of East Timor’s integration into the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, guidance has also been given to university students studying at universities in and outside East Timor province... and to youth organisations.¹⁴³

Reference 57 - 0.01% Coverage

11. Although the events surrounding the ballot were freshest in the minds of all East Timorese at the end of 1999, that violence was in fact inseparable from the entire history of the political conflicts going back to 1974. Many were still divided over their political affiliations during the internal conflict of 1975. Many who had supported independence during the Indonesian occupation nursed anger and resentment towards those who had collaborated with the Indonesian security forces; independence supporters, their friends and family members had suffered

violations as a result of such collaboration. The Indonesian withdrawal after the ballot seemed to open up the possibility that these long-standing grievances would flare into violence.

Reference 58 - 0.01% Coverage

127. Other public hearings aired the experiences of victims from all sides to the conflict and so contributed to a more balanced and accurate public perception of shared history. Victims' Hearings and Healing Workshops helped restore the dignity denied to individual victims, and dispelled some of the residual anger that fuels continuing division. Community mapping exercises promoted a village-level exploration of the past and helped to develop a collective version of events. The weekly radio programme produced by the Commission encouraged reflection and debate on reconciliation. Through the information campaign in West Timor, refugees became aware of the work of the Commission, including the CRP programme for those that returned to Timor-Leste, and that they could give statements that could contribute to a balanced Final Report. It is hoped that this Report will also foster reconciliation by producing a version of events that is based on careful and objective research rather than limited information and rumour.

Reference 59 - 0.01% Coverage

164. In addition to the large number of individuals who were successfully reintegrated into their communities, the CRP produced a number of other benefits. It created a mechanism for communities to explore their own part in the history of the conflict and to clarify the role of individual perpetrators and victims in these events.

Reference 60 - 0.01% Coverage

70. There was a tendency to see the Commission's truth-seeking mandate as limited to abuses committed in 1999. This was accompanied by demands that history could only be "made straight" if abuses committed in 1974-1975 were also thoroughly investigated.

Reference 61 - 0.01% Coverage

112. For many the December 2003 hearing on The Internal Political Conflict of 1974-1976 will remain the indelible moment of the Commission's work. For the first time Timor-Leste's leaders came forward to speak publicly and in an official forum of the violence between Timorese in 1974-1976. Uncertainty as to how political leaders would react to this opportunity surrounded the hearing. In the end the former political foes expressed humility and sorrow at what had occurred, accepted responsibility and gave a public demonstration of the spirit of reconciliation, making the hearing a momentous event in the nation's history.

Reference 62 - 0.01% Coverage

Why are we here today? Because of a historical time, because of the wounds of the past, all Timorese people have waited, so that we can make reconciliation. Reconciliation for the past suffering, for our land. All Timorese have suffered. We Timorese people need to be reconciled

within ourselves, with our land and with our history. We know this is a good idea, but it is very difficult to do. We hear words of justification and rationalisation: “Because of war I did this”... We need to examine this.

Reference 63 - 0.01% Coverage

I am not keeping the bad things that were done to me hidden in my heart. I will tell them so that they can be recorded in history for our children and grandchildren.

Reference 64 - 0.01% Coverage

Background 194. Community Profile workshops added a group dimension to the District team victim support and truth-seeking work. Small groups from village communities discussed the impact of human rights abuses at the community level. The workshops were facilitated and recorded by the Victim Support members of the District team. Communities were thus able to examine the history of conflict from their own local perspective. The communal focus of the workshops also acknowledged the fact that communities, just as much as individuals, were victims in the years of conflict and needed support.

Reference 65 - 0.01% Coverage

197. The Commission trained two district Victim Support staff, one woman and one man in each district, in participatory methods for facilitating the Community Profile workshops. Teams aimed to hold five community discussions in each sub-district. Participants in at least one of the five discussions were to be recent returnees, with priority given to those who were being ostracised by the communities to which they had returned. Another discussion group was to consist exclusively of women. The purpose of having women-only groups was to overcome women's reticence about taking an active part in group discussions, especially when what is under discussion is the traditional male preserve of recounting history,

Reference 66 - 0.01% Coverage

199. In practice the number of Community Profile workshops held in each subdistrict varied. Some teams did not meet the target of five community discussions, and others managed to hold workshops in every village in their district. Sometimes district staff held joint workshops in which two or more villages took part. In several sub-districts, as, for example in Natarbora Sub-district (Manatuto) and Bobonaro Subdistrict (Bobonaro), communities with a history of conflict were intentionally brought together. Through truth-telling and the sharing of perspectives, communities were

Reference 67 - 0.01% Coverage

The neighbouring villages of Oeleu, Tapo, and Leber were intentionally chosen for a joint discussion because they had a long history of conflict. For many decades the men of these villages had fought each other over community land and boundaries. During the civil conflict of 1974-1975 the tensions among the three villages exploded into violence. Although the

Indonesian invasion and occupation put a stop to open conflict, communal and political differences were expressed through their different relations to the occupier. Feelings of distrust and the desire for revenge continued to fester below the surface, only to re-emerge following the Popular Consultation in August 1999.

Reference 68 - 0.01% Coverage

These initial suspicions and tensions began to fade, however, as each community related its own horrifying history of violations.

Reference 69 - 0.01% Coverage

youth from their village were captured and tortured at the Maliana military post, then forcibly recruited to become militia members. As in the case of Oeleu, Tapo's history of violation ended with villagers suffering from illness and hunger in refugee camps in West Timor.

Reference 70 - 0.01% Coverage

their accounts of violations in their community, more or less in chronological order, they were invited to show on the map where the violations occurred. This helped give a context for the discussion of specific issues. This approach tended to result in Community Profile reports that charted community histories better than an analysis of the social and economic impact of violations on the community.

Reference 71 - 0.01% Coverage

211. Some maps used colour coding to distinguish events and their impact. For example, in some maps Falintil posts were marked by yellow and white flags so that they could be distinguished from Indonesian military posts that had red and white flags. Pink crosses were used to indicate places where people were murdered by the Indonesian military and blue crosses to mark sites of death due to starvation and illness, or death counts were highlighted by using pink or red markers (see Sketch Map 11 below). Some maps focused on events over a period of only a year or two; for others a longer timeframe was shown in different ways. For example Diagram 1 – Sketch Map Iliomar I (Iliomar, Lautém) used annotation to record period information, whereas Diagram 2 – Sketch Map Pairara Moro, (Lautém) added arrows to record abuses at the same location but at different points in history.

Reference 72 - 0.01% Coverage

216. Sketch Map 14: Beidasi (Fatululik, Covalima) is a reminder that, despite the scope and magnitude of the violence in Timor-Leste, in local communities its impact was never anonymous. The map's poignancy is captured in the names written by each house that give identity by ownership, residency, and community. It is the juxtaposition between this close-knit community, where everyone knows and is connected to each other, and just a few short annotations – "Veronica died here" next to a double black and pink cross to indicate that she was killed by the militia, "82 killed by TNI" written below a pink cross, and "30 children die" written

above a black cross to indicate death by starvation – that is striking. It turns an otherwise ordinary neighbourhood map into a document that records a history of violence and suffering in a community: for years violations occurred in the neighbourhood of Alberto and Carlos, Martinho and Mauseu, and to so many other individuals and families.

Reference 73 - 0.01% Coverage

History teaches us that nations recovering from long conflict face a difficult task to develop the democratic institutions and laws that can protect and guarantee human rights. Some nations fail to meet this challenge and revert to violence. It should not be taken for granted that human rights will automatically be protected in Timor-Leste. Vigilance against the kind of practices that lead to violations needs to be constant.

Reference 74 - 0.01% Coverage

This Report is disseminated at all levels in each of the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to deepen appreciation of Timor-Leste's recent history and its needs as a new candidate member of this important regional body.

Reference 75 - 0.01% Coverage

The Vatican and the governments of China, Britain, France, Japan, and Russia make available to Timor-Leste their classified and other archival material on the period 1974-1999 so that this information can be added to that already provided by other countries to ensure that Timor-Leste, after so many years of isolation, can build a comprehensive depository of information on its history.

Reference 76 - 0.01% Coverage

1.14. Support, both practical and financial, be given by business, philanthropic bodies, corporations and academic institutions to assist key East Timorese figures and others to document their histories and experiences in order to build up the limited stock of East Timorese-generated literature for future generations.

Reference 77 - 0.01% Coverage

on reconciliation and its inquiry into the period 1974-1999 - as a way of enriching East Timorese content in the education curriculum and to assist in the teaching of history, political science, conflict-resolution, international relations and law.

Reference 78 - 0.01% Coverage

The freedoms required for the flowering of civil society were denied for most of TimorLeste's colonial history and harshly repressed during the Indonesian occupation. Nevertheless, civil society emerged as a positive force for change both in TimorLeste itself and in Indonesia and, together with international civil society, played an important role in the struggle for self-

determination and independence. This role, the independence of civil society and the values of initiative and commitment to human rights that inspired it, are equally critical today. Outside government and political parties, civil society is the principal vehicle for the participation and contribution of citizens to nation-building. It is important that this sector enjoys an enabling environment as Timor-Leste continues to make the transition from opposition to constructive interaction between government and civil society.

Reference 79 - 0.01% Coverage

Timor-Leste's recent history shows how state institutions that are not respectful of the rule of law have a disproportionate capacity to contribute to human rights violations. For most of the period reviewed by the Commission, the East Timorese people lived without the protections of effective rule of law or the functioning of a financially accountable administration. Establishing these as the norm is a significant challenge for the government, civil society and the community.

Reference 80 - 0.01% Coverage

The Catholic Church has a significant place in East Timorese history and society. Though largely compromised during the Portuguese period, the Church was a strong advocate for human rights in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation consistent with Catholic social doctrine based on the dignity and value of each human person. In partnership with other faith communities, it has a responsibility and resources to continue as a major force for human rights in the new democratic era.

Reference 81 - 0.01% Coverage

7.4.2. The Ministry of Education in the Government of Timor-Leste works with the post-CAVR institution to utilise the Final Report and other Commission materials in the development of curricula and other educational resources related to human rights, reconciliation, history, law, gender studies and other relevant disciplines.

Reference 82 - 0.01% Coverage

7.5.3. The archives form an integrated part of an active human rights centre to be developed in the former Balide Comarca whose overall purpose will be to remember, honour and learn from Timor-Leste's recent human rights history.

Reference 83 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission addressed these splits through a multi-leveled approach. At the national leadership level, party leaders were asked to publicly explain what took place during the civil war of 1975. The 4-day CAVR National Public Hearing on the Internal Political Conflict of 1974-76 in December 2003 was a landmark in the history of East Timorese political life, and an important time for all East Timorese people to better understand the events of this tragic period and listen to leaders taking responsibility.

Reference 84 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission has made a certain contribution to the nation building process of Timor-Leste in the early years of transition in our new democracy. This transition will be an ongoing and long process. It is the Commission's view, based on three years of dialogue with local communities, that many aspects of its work should be followed up as part of the national effort to build a society based on acknowledging the truth of the past, non-violence, reconciliation and reparations. The work of recording, preserving and sharing the truth of our history, of continuing the promotion of lasting reconciliation, and of creating a society based on human rights and the rule of law can all be enhanced by the establishment of an institution to carry on aspects of the Commission's work.

Reference 85 - 0.01% Coverage

71. The system of territorial military command ran parallel to the structures of civilian political authority down to the village level – the Korem Commander shadowed the Governor; the 13 Kodim Commanders looked over the shoulders of the 13 District Heads (Bupati); the 62 Koramil Commanders supervised the 62 Sub-District Heads (Camat); and the 442 Babinsas operated alongside an equal number of Village Heads (Kepala Desa). In this way, the territorial military command effectively ensured military involvement in and dominance over, the formulation and implementation of policy at every level. Thus, even if civilian authorities such as the Governor and the Bupatis were formally in charge, in the final analysis military officers within the territorial command exercised greater power. 72. In addition to the territorial command system that was a feature of Indonesian rule everywhere, in 1999 military power in Timor-Leste had a number of unique features that stemmed from its long history as an area of active military operations. It had, for example, two 'organic' infantry battalions permanently based in Timor-Leste. Battalion 744, with its headquarters in Dili, and Battalion 745, based in Lospalos, had been formed in the late-1970s, shortly after Indonesia's invasion. Though many of the soldiers in these units were East Timorese, the officers were predominantly Indonesian. Both units, moreover, were formally answerable to the Korem commander.‡

Reference 86 - 0.01% Coverage

a legacy of Timor-Leste's long history as a military operations area, and was evidently maintained to facilitate counter-insurgency operations there. There are indications that it played a key role in mobilising and coordinating the militias in 1999.

Reference 87 - 0.01% Coverage

312. Militias are not a new phenomenon in Timor-Leste. They have existed, in some form, at least since the time of Portuguese rule, and without interruption through the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian invasion. Since 1975, their history has been tightly intertwined with that of the Indonesian army, and especially its counterinsurgency force, Kopassus.

Reference 88 - 0.01% Coverage

314. That history offers compelling evidence that the militias that emerged in TimorLeste in 1999 were part of a carefully prepared and directed military intelligence operation. A glance at that history confirms that virtually everything about the organisation, language, style, and repertoire of the modern militias derives from well-established Indonesian military doctrine and historical practice. It also helps to explain how the militias could have sprung up as quickly as they did all across the country in 1998-99.

Reference 89 - 0.01% Coverage

1028. It is noteworthy that virtually all of the officers on this list were either deployed with Kopassus units in Timor-Leste, or shared career histories in Kopassus or military intelligence.*

Reference 90 - 0.01% Coverage

1076. The problem of international acquiescence and complicity was highlighted by the position taken by key powers on the issue of security for the 1999 Popular Consultation. In spite of the mounting militia violence in early 1999, and credible predictions of worse to come, the most influential states made no serious effort to ensure that there would be effective security arrangements for the referendum. Instead, the 5 May Agreements placed sole responsibility for maintaining law and order in the hands of Indonesian security forces. Even a brief glimpse at the history of the Indonesian armed forces, and its behavior in Timor-Leste, would have indicated what a dangerous approach that was.

Reference 91 - 0.01% Coverage

On the eve of the popular consultation, the Secretary-General issues an appeal to the people of Timor-Leste, calling on all sides to “live up to their responsibilities before history.”

Reference 92 - 0.01% Coverage

40. As a result, the questionnaire was organised into the following modules: • A household register • A head of household displacement register • An adult female birth history • An adult male/female sibling history • An adult male/female parental history • A general human rights violation section.

History Child Node References

The following section contains history references from the Timor-Leste report organized by the child nodes outlined in History Coding for the Timor-Leste Report. Some references appear under several subheadings since they contained discussions of multiple themes.

Accountability

References or discussions of who bears responsibility or who is accountable for past events or wrongs

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 5 references coded [0.02% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

119. Continuing disagreement about and denial of historical fact prevents different sides to a conflict from finding a common basis to begin the painful, difficult and slow process of reconciliation. The truth-seeking activities were aimed at providing a history of events which was based on objective information rather than rumour or propaganda. Such a solidly founded version of the truth could in turn open the way to the admission of responsibility, acceptance and forgiveness.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

112. For many the December 2003 hearing on The Internal Political Conflict of 1974-1976 will remain the indelible moment of the Commission's work. For the first time Timor-Leste's leaders came forward to speak publicly and in an official forum of the violence between Timorese in 1974-1976. Uncertainty as to how political leaders would react to this opportunity surrounded the hearing. In the end the former political foes expressed humility and sorrow at what had

occurred, accepted responsibility and gave a public demonstration of the spirit of reconciliation, making the hearing a momentous event in the nation's history.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

Why are we here today? Because of a historical time, because of the wounds of the past, all Timorese people have waited, so that we can make reconciliation. Reconciliation for the past suffering, for our land. All Timorese have suffered. We Timorese people need to be reconciled within ourselves, with our land and with our history. We know this is a good idea, but it is very difficult to do. We hear words of justification and rationalisation: "Because of war I did this"... We need to examine this.

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Archives and Libraries

References or discussions of libraries or archives

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 7 references coded [0.02% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

• Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims • Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television • Implementing community reconciliation procedures • Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them • Conducting victims' hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for their courage and for the suffering they had endured • Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing • Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance • Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation • Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor • Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders • Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

142. In addition to the detailed official Final Report, the Commission produced a range of more accessible related material. A two-and-a-half-hour documentary film version was produced in Tetum, with English, Portuguese and Indonesian sub-titles, as well as a Tetum radio version, a photographic exhibition and a series of books on the thematic national public hearings of the Commission in Tetum, Indonesian and English. A photographic exhibition of survivors of violations promoted their dignity and aspirations, together with the publication of a photographic book of survivors expressing their hopes for the future. The Commission believes that the report and the associated research material in the CAVR Archive provides a rich source of resources which can become the basis for the production of accessible educational materials about human rights, reconciliation and East Timorese history.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

heritage value of the building would be preserved and that Assepol would be consulted throughout the physical rehabilitation. The plan for the building included its use as the Commission's national office. It was also to house an archive containing documents and other materials relating to the history of human rights violations in TimorLeste history which would be made accessible to the public after the end of the Commission's mandate.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

Asia Watch reports on the Court Martial held in Bali between 29 May and 6 June 1992, as well as its report *Remembering History in East Timor*, as well as the Commission's collection of military documents in relation to Santa Cruz and the Ndiaye Report by the UN Special Rapporteur.⁷⁹⁰

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

175. In the early 1980s, Falintil continued to recruit soldiers under the age of 18. The UNICEF study includes the case of 12-year-old Bersama, who was taken in by Falintil after his father, a clandestine leader, was killed in the forest by the Indonesian army. Commander Ular remembered: "There was no choice. We could not leave Bersama behind when we withdrew."¹³⁹ Bersama was given the job of writing first lists and inventories and later letters and histories of the war. After two years he also began to take part in combat operations:

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

The Vatican and the governments of China, Britain, France, Japan, and Russia make available to Timor-Leste their classified and other archival material on the period 1974-1999 so that this information can be added to that already provided by other countries to ensure that Timor-Leste, after so many years of isolation, can build a comprehensive depository of information on its history.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

1.14. Support, both practical and financial, be given by business, philanthropic bodies, corporations and academic institutions to assist key East Timorese figures and others to document their histories and experiences in order to build up the limited stock of East Timorese-generated literature for future generations.

Colonialism

References or discussions of colonialism

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 12 references coded [0.05% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

3. The telling of East Timorese history is critical for the foundations of our relationship with our international neighbours, especially Indonesia. As the Indonesian historian Dr Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission at its hearing on Self-Determination and the International Community:

The collective memory of both nations will determine the nature and the strength or weakness of the relationship. This will be reflected in the writing of history of both countries.¹

4. This part begins with a brief overview of the colonial history of TimorLeste under Portuguese control. It deliberately places the emphasis upon the period leading up to the internal conflict of August–September 1975 and the subsequent Indonesian invasion. This looks at events and relationships surrounding the decolonisation process in Portuguese Timor, within the territory, in Indonesia and in the regional and wider geopolitical context. They are vital to an understanding of the causes of the political conflicts in Timor-Leste, the lost opportunities to avoid war and seek peaceful solutions to political concerns based on the principles of international law, and involved Timorese, Indonesian and international actors.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

344. Ataúro has had a history of being used as a prison island by successive regimes in Timor-Leste. The Portuguese colonial administration did so over a long period, as did the Japanese occupying forces in World War II. The Indonesian regime of occupation initiated a similar policy commencing in 1980. The Commission received expert testimony that this was an extension of the policy of separating civilians who were considered a possible future support base for the armed Resistance. Gilman dos Santos testified:

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

39. The most common educational activity was political education. Fretilin gave much attention to providing political training for Fretilin cadres to increase their capacity for organising people and their political and ideological knowledge. The commissariat in each sector established a Centre for Political Training (Centro da Formação Política, Ceforpol). Ceforpol was obligatory for quadro medio (mid-level cadres, the regional and zone committees), but sometimes was attended by quadro inferior (menial cadres, administrators of suco and aldeia). Topics covered included the history of Timor-Leste from the arrival of the Portuguese, theories of social development, the philosophy of dialectical materialism, building people-power, the organisational principles of “the mass line” (linha de massa) and democratic centralism (centralismo democrático), women’s emancipation and collective food production. Military strategy and national liberation were also discussed, as well as national liberation wars in other countries such as Guinea Bissau, China and Vietnam. The instructors in the Ceforpol were

members of the Fretilin Central Committee and Falintil commanders.³¹ Overall, the Ceforpol's were under the supervision of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica, DOPI), which was a department of the Fretilin Central Committee.³²

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

32. As a result of these initiatives, the decade of the 1960s is often described as the decade of decolonisation and independence. No fewer than 42 countries, mostly in Africa, gained independence and membership of the UN during the 1960s, more than any other decade during the history of the UN. However, Timor-Leste was not to join them for another 40 years.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

I found my beloved country much the same as I had left it (in 1970). East Timor, under the Portuguese, seemed to sit still in history. The clock of development didn't tick there.¹⁹

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

221. The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a close ally of both Portugal and Indonesia based on a long history of relationships with both peoples dating back several hundreds of years. However, successive British Governments took only a limited interest in the question of Timor-Leste during most of the territory's nearly 40-year history of decolonisation.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

Real ignorance of Timorese history and culture, the geo-strategic context of the territory and its remoteness from the metropolis, as well as the secrecy of negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia, helped keep the discussion about Timor on a lower, mainly ideological plane with little practical value. Portuguese citizens who were interested in the rights of the Timorese people were incapable of imposing on the political powers of the time the fundamental strategic changes that could eventually have changed events, such as reinforcement of the Portuguese presence and action, and the internationalisation of the issue.²³⁶

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

491. The decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta on International Human Rights Day, 10 December 1996, was an enormous moral, political and organisational boost to civil society's work for self-determination. The prize was given independently by the Nobel Committee and thoroughly earned by the two awardees, Bishop Belo and José Ramos-Horta, but the nomination owed much to civil society's initiative, and particularly to old friends of Timor-Leste working behind the scenes in the United States. The prestigious award confirmed the moral correctness of civil society's work and further weakened the case advanced by the Indonesian government and its co-defenders, including Indonesia's version of the history of the conflict. It was also

politically helpful in that it highlighted the necessity of self-determination to resolve the conflict – the centrepiece of civil society advocacy for 20 years – and identified this as the key issue.* The Prize was a bonus to civil society organising. The global media coverage it attracted, which continued as José Ramos-Horta travelled the world in his new role, generated new public interest and support for the civil society campaign in many countries.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

196. Legal argument by defence teams were based on the claim that Timor-Leste's integration into Indonesia was illegal, and would continue to be so until the East Timorese were given an opportunity to participate in a free and fair choice concerning their political status. This was argued in a number of ways, for example through detailed accounts of East Timorese history from the pre-colonial period up until the Indonesian invasion and occupation; by disputing the validity of the Balibó declaration; by arguing that self-determination was supported by the 1945 Indonesian Constitution; as well as arguments based on international law and UN Security Council resolutions. If the Indonesian claim over Timor-Leste was illegal then there could be no substance to charges that East Timorese had committed treason by not supporting the sovereignty of Indonesia in Timor-Leste.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

The freedoms required for the flowering of civil society were denied for most of TimorLeste's colonial history and harshly repressed during the Indonesian occupation. Nevertheless, civil society emerged as a positive force for change both in TimorLeste itself and in Indonesia and, together with international civil society, played an important role in the struggle for self-determination and independence. This role, the independence of civil society and the values of initiative and commitment to human rights that inspired it, are equally critical today. Outside government and political parties, civil society is the principal vehicle for the participation and contribution of citizens to nation-building. It is important that this sector enjoys an enabling environment as Timor-Leste continues to make the transition from opposition to constructive interaction between government and civil society.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

The Catholic Church has a significant place in East Timorese history and society. Though largely compromised during the Portuguese period, the Church was a strong advocate for human rights in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation consistent with Catholic social doctrine based on the dignity and value of each human person. In partnership with other faith communities, it has a responsibility and resources to continue as a major force for human rights in the new democratic era.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

312. Militias are not a new phenomenon in Timor-Leste. They have existed, in some form, at least since the time of Portuguese rule, and without interruption through the Japanese occupation

and the Indonesian invasion. Since 1975, their history has been tightly intertwined with that of the Indonesian army, and especially its counterinsurgency force, Kopassus.

Commemoration

References or discussions to heritage and commemoration projects

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 5 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

heritage value of the building would be preserved and that Assepol would be consulted throughout the physical rehabilitation. The plan for the building included its use as the Commission's national office. It was also to house an archive containing documents and other materials relating to the history of human rights violations in TimorLeste history which would be made accessible to the public after the end of the Commission's mandate.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

The company selected after public tender to carry out the construction work, P.T. Rosario, was headed by a former Comarca prisoner, Julio Alfaro. Reconstruction began in September 2002. A large traditional meeting house was built in the former exercise courtyard, for use in the Commission's national public hearings and other events. Gardens were planted by Maria José Franco Pereira, who was detained as a four-year old at the Comarca with her mother in 1976. A traditional cleansing ceremony, symbolising the removal of harmful spirits associated with the prison's history of abuse, was conducted on completion of construction work.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Asia Watch reports on the Court Martial held in Bali between 29 May and 6 June 1992, as well as its report Remembering History in East Timor, as well as the Commission's collection of military documents in relation to Santa Cruz and the Ndiaye Report by the UN Special Rapporteur.⁷⁹⁰

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

I am not keeping the bad things that were done to me hidden in my heart. I will tell them so that they can be recorded in history for our children and grandchildren.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

1.14. Support, both practical and financial, be given by business, philanthropic bodies, corporations and academic institutions to assist key East Timorese figures and others to document their histories and experiences in order to build up the limited stock of East Timorese-generated literature for future generations.

Community

References or discussions of community (e.g., identity, education)

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 19 references coded [0.09% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

35. The truth contained in this Report comes largely from the words of those who directly experienced the years of conflict. The Commission has attached special importance to listening directly to those who suffered human rights violations throughout the 25-year period, most of whom had not spoken outside the narrow circle of their family. These many voices, from across the country, have given Timor-Leste a priceless asset. They tell us who we are, what we have been through, what we have lost, and show us the value of what we have gained. From the stories of our sisters and brothers we learn that victory is not a simple matter of heroes and villains; that history is more than the listing of major events or the biographies of those who are called leaders. The experiences of "ordinary people", both the many who died and those who survived, tell us where we have come from and help us understand who we are today. From their stories we see more clearly both the extremes of human dignity and of human degradation that were manifested in our country during these 25 years. We must learn from both sides of this human story. We must acknowledge our potential for both extremes, and strive always to bring the best of our humanity into our lives and relationships – our families, our communities and our nation – each day as we build a new future.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried

out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

- Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims
- Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television
- Implementing community reconciliation procedures
- Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them
- Conducting victims' hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for their courage and for the suffering they had endured
- Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing
- Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance
- Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation
- Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor
- Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders
- Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

events during the conflict which had previously remained hidden to them. This fostered a feeling of solidarity among victims and their communities. It helped to clarify the local history of the conflict. It also reinforced the determination that these painful events of the past should never be repeated.

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

Commission's programmes whether giving statements, testifying at public hearings, attending community reconciliation processes or participating in healing workshops

- Facilitating group discussions and recording local histories focusing on the impact of human rights violations on

individual communities • Helping victims with urgent needs by assessing their cases, referring them to appropriate agencies and providing modest financial assistance, as part of the Commission's Urgent Reparations scheme.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

History of the Conflict 3. Introduction

1. This part provides an historical context to events covered in the violations sections of the Report. It is based on primary sources of the Commission itself, from statements, interviews and testimonies delivered at public hearings; on documentary evidence available to the Commission; and on an analysis of relevant secondary sources. It is generally limited to a quick overview of the key events, moments and turning points in the period of the Commission's mandate relevant to the political conflicts, the efforts to resolve those conflicts and the human rights violations which occurred in those conflicts. Within the scope of this Report, it has not been possible to provide definitive accounts of some of the key issues which remain points of historical conjecture about this period and these events. Nor is it the role of the Commission to make such definitive judgements. The part does attempt at least to identify what some of these issues are, and the Commission encourages further research, writing and analysis of these important aspects of East Timorese history.

2. This analysis and writing of East Timorese history is a critical step in nation building, and how it is done will reflect what kind of society our new nation fosters. The Commission's Report is based largely upon the statements and interviews provided by ordinary East Timorese people from across the country, and seeks to bring their voice into the continuing dialogue for building our new nation. It does not seek to be an exclusive history, recording only the perspectives or achievements of national leaders, or of people from only one side or the other of the political divide. It is based on the idea that the recording and analysis of history must be open to new information and ideas, and to information and perspectives that are not necessarily politically popular. While history is critical for nation building, a simplistic history that seeks to sweep under the carpet unpleasant realities or to make invisible the contributions of people from all walks of life cannot help build a resilient and sustainable nation. History telling that acknowledges complexity, that makes space for the voice of those often silenced, and that opens the way for open-minded reflection can make a contribution to building

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Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

615. 30 August 1999 dawned as a remarkable day in the history of Timor-Leste. Despite months of intimidation and violence, people across the country came out in droves to cast their ballot.⁷⁷³

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

11. Although the events surrounding the ballot were freshest in the minds of all East Timorese at the end of 1999, that violence was in fact inseparable from the entire history of the political conflicts going back to 1974. Many were still divided over their political affiliations during the internal conflict of 1975. Many who had supported independence during the Indonesian

occupation nursed anger and resentment towards those who had collaborated with the Indonesian security forces; independence supporters, their friends and family members had suffered violations as a result of such collaboration. The Indonesian withdrawal after the ballot seemed to open up the possibility that these long-standing grievances would flare into violence.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

164. In addition to the large number of individuals who were successfully reintegrated into their communities, the CRP produced a number of other benefits. It created a mechanism for communities to explore their own part in the history of the conflict and to clarify the role of individual perpetrators and victims in these events.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

Background 194. Community Profile workshops added a group dimension to the District team victim support and truth-seeking work. Small groups from village communities discussed the impact of human rights abuses at the community level. The workshops were facilitated and recorded by the Victim Support members of the District team. Communities were thus able to examine the history of conflict from their own local perspective. The communal focus of the workshops also acknowledged the fact that communities, just as much as individuals, were victims in the years of conflict and needed support.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

197. The Commission trained two district Victim Support staff, one woman and one man in each district, in participatory methods for facilitating the Community Profile workshops. Teams aimed to hold five community discussions in each sub-district. Participants in at least one of the five discussions were to be recent returnees, with priority given to those who were being ostracised by the communities to which they had returned. Another discussion group was to consist exclusively of women. The purpose of having women-only groups was to overcome women's reticence about taking an active part in group discussions, especially when what is under discussion is the traditional male preserve of recounting history,

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

199. In practice the number of Community Profile workshops held in each subdistrict varied. Some teams did not meet the target of five community discussions, and others managed to hold workshops in every village in their district. Sometimes district staff held joint workshops in which two or more villages took part. In several sub-districts, as, for example in Natarbora Sub-district (Manatuto) and Bobonaro Subdistrict (Bobonaro), communities with a history of conflict were intentionally brought together. Through truth-telling and the sharing of perspectives, communities were

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

The neighbouring villages of Oeleu, Tapo, and Leber were intentionally chosen for a joint discussion because they had a long history of conflict. For many decades the men of these villages had fought each other over community land and boundaries. During the civil conflict of 1974-1975 the tensions among the three villages exploded into violence. Although the Indonesian invasion and occupation put a stop to open conflict, communal and political differences were expressed through their different relations to the occupier. Feelings of distrust and the desire for revenge continued to fester below the surface, only to re-emerge following the Popular Consultation in August 1999.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

These initial suspicions and tensions began to fade, however, as each community related its own horrifying history of violations.

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

youth from their village were captured and tortured at the Maliana military post, then forcibly recruited to become militia members. As in the case of Oeleu, Tapo's history of violation ended with villagers suffering from illness and hunger in refugee camps in West Timor.

Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

their accounts of violations in their community, more or less in chronological order, they were invited to show on the map where the violations occurred. This helped give a context for the discussion of specific issues. This approach tended to result in Community Profile reports that charted community histories better than an analysis of the social and economic impact of violations on the community.

Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

216. Sketch Map 14: Beidasi (Fatululik, Covalima) is a reminder that, despite the scope and magnitude of the violence in Timor-Leste, in local communities its impact was never anonymous. The map's poignancy is captured in the names written by each house that give identity by ownership, residency, and community. It is the juxtaposition between this close-knit community, where everyone knows and is connected to each other, and just a few short annotations – "Veronica died here" next to a double black and pink cross to indicate that she was killed by the militia, "82 killed by TNI" written below a pink cross, and "30 children die" written above a black cross to indicate death by starvation – that is striking. It turns an otherwise ordinary neighbourhood map into a document that records a history of violence and suffering in a community: for years violations occurred in the neighbourhood of Alberto and Carlos, Martinho and Mauseu, and to so many other individuals and families.

Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission has made a certain contribution to the nation building process of Timor-Leste in the early years of transition in our new democracy. This transition will be an ongoing and long

process. It is the Commission's view, based on three years of dialogue with local communities, that many aspects of its work should be followed up as part of the national effort to build a society based on acknowledging the truth of the past, non-violence, reconciliation and reparations. The work of recording, preserving and sharing the truth of our history, of continuing the promotion of lasting reconciliation, and of creating a society based on human rights and the rule of law can all be enhanced by the establishment of an institution to carry on aspects of the Commission's work.

Human Rights

References or discussions of human rights or human rights violations

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 19 references coded [0.08% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

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Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

35. The truth contained in this Report comes largely from the words of those who directly experienced the years of conflict. The Commission has attached special importance to listening directly to those who suffered human rights violations throughout the 25-year period, most of whom had not spoken outside the narrow circle of their family. These many voices, from across the country, have given Timor-Leste a priceless asset. They tell us who we are, what we have been through, what we have lost, and show us the value of what we have gained. From the stories of our sisters and brothers we learn that victory is not a simple matter of heroes and villains; that history is more than the listing of major events or the biographies of those who are called leaders. The experiences of "ordinary people", both the many who died and those who survived, tell us where we have come from and help us understand who we are today. From their stories we see more clearly both the extremes of human dignity and of human degradation that were manifested in our country during these 25 years. We must learn from both sides of this human story. We must acknowledge our potential for both extremes, and strive always to bring the best of our humanity into our lives and relationships – our families, our communities and our nation – each day as we build a new future.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

- Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims
- Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television
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- Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in

their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them • Conducting victims' hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for their courage and for the suffering they had endured • Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing • Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance • Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation • Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor • Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders • Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

112. A number of Indonesians testified to CAVR National Public Hearings, and provided written submissions. Members of Komnas Perempuan (the Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women) testified at the CAVR National Public Hearing on Women and Conflict. A group of NGOs from West Timor (Indonesia), The West Timor Humanitarian Team, made a submission to the Commission at this hearing. The Indonesian human rights NGO Elsam (Lembaga Advokasi Masyarakat, Public Policy Studies and Advocacy) made two submissions to the CAVR: one providing detailed research into Indonesian military structures and operations, and the other testimonies from Indonesian military officers and their families titled "Story from the Behind the Lines". In addition, the well-known Indonesian historian Dr Asvi Warman Adam of LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Academy of Science) gave a paper titled "East Timorese History in the New Indonesia" to the CAVR National Public Hearing on Self-Determination and the International Community. A number of other human rights workers and activists also testified at hearings, and their testimonies have been used in relevant chapters of this Report.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

Commission's programmes whether giving statements, testifying at public hearings, attending community reconciliation processes or participating in healing workshops • Facilitating group discussions and recording local histories focusing on the impact of human rights violations on individual communities • Helping victims with urgent needs by assessing their cases, referring them to appropriate agencies and providing modest financial assistance, as part of the Commission's Urgent Reparations scheme.

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

142. In addition to the detailed official Final Report, the Commission produced a range of more accessible related material. A two-and-a-half-hour documentary film version was produced in Tetum, with English, Portuguese and Indonesian sub-titles, as well as a Tetum radio version, a photographic exhibition and a series of books on the thematic national public hearings of the Commission in Tetum, Indonesian and English. A photographic exhibition of survivors of

violations promoted their dignity and aspirations, together with the publication of a photographic book of survivors expressing their hopes for the future. The Commission believes that the report and the associated research material in the CAVR Archive provides a rich source of resources which can become the basis for the production of accessible educational materials about human rights, reconciliation and East Timorese history.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

heritage value of the building would be preserved and that Assepol would be consulted throughout the physical rehabilitation. The plan for the building included its use as the Commission's national office. It was also to house an archive containing documents and other materials relating to the history of human rights violations in TimorLeste history which would be made accessible to the public after the end of the Commission's mandate.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

59. These programmes included Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRPs), local public hearings for victims, participatory workshops on the history of human rights violations in communities, victims' healing workshops, a special reparations scheme for victims with urgent needs, radio programmes focusing on local reconciliation issues, and information programmes aimed at East Timorese people in West Timor, Indonesia.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

7. It is the hope of the Commission that this brief history will both assist the reader to understand the contents of other parts and sections of this Report, and that it will inspire current and future generations of East Timorese historians to work further on understanding our past as part of our constant efforts to build a future based on respect for each other, human rights and the love of peace.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

321. The period from late 1977 to 1979 saw the greatest humanitarian tragedy in Timor-Leste's history. Widespread famine was a consequence of massive Indonesian military operations aimed at destroying the Fretilin Resistance. This military
Meanwhile, military 228 | Chega! - Volume I, Part 3: History of the Conflict

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

489. While this period was notable for the impact of the video image on public awareness, the growth of new organisations and their co-ordination owes much to the advent of the internet age. The general availability of the internet in the 1990s more or less coincided with Indonesia's decision to partially relax access to TimorLeste. This timing was not only a happy coincidence; the internet also perfectly suited the requirements of human rights activists. It was fast, cheap, secure, user-friendly, interactive and had significant carrying capacity and global reach. Information, a scarce commodity on Timor-Leste for the previous 15 years, was now widely

available through the internet thanks to the skills and commitment of civil society members. John MacDougall's pioneering apakabar, a free electronic mailing list which covered both Indonesia and Timor-Leste, was followed by reg.easttimor which became the main clearing house and channel for rapid communication on Timor-Leste across the globe. Established in 1994 and co-ordinated by ETAN/US, reg.easttimor enabled the public and civil society organisations in the Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America to have interactive conferences and to access reports on Timor-Leste and translations from wire services and the Indonesian, Portuguese and other media as well as official documents from the UN, governments and other sources. The relatively few books available on Timor-Leste were now supplemented by publicly accessible websites. TimorNet at the University of Coimbra in Portugal provided links to information on the history, geography and culture of Timor-Leste, key UN documents, human rights violations, articles, publications and suggestions for action. Activists used email to proliferate information and to co-ordinate and organise. Colin Renwick set up Minihub to help small, vulnerable NGOs in Indonesia and Timor-Leste establish cheap, accessible and secure internet access and also gave training to selected East Timorese activists,* increasing the underground's effectiveness. With these skills, East Timorese supporting Xanana Gusmão in Jakarta could send encrypted email messages to colleagues abroad, including to José Ramos-Horta.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

Background 194. Community Profile workshops added a group dimension to the District team victim support and truth-seeking work. Small groups from village communities discussed the impact of human rights abuses at the community level. The workshops were facilitated and recorded by the Victim Support members of the District team. Communities were thus able to examine the history of conflict from their own local perspective. The communal focus of the workshops also acknowledged the fact that communities, just as much as individuals, were victims in the years of conflict and needed support.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

These initial suspicions and tensions began to fade, however, as each community related its own horrifying history of violations.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

their accounts of violations in their community, more or less in chronological order, they were invited to show on the map where the violations occurred. This helped give a context for the discussion of specific issues. This approach tended to result in Community Profile reports that charted community histories better than an analysis of the social and economic impact of violations on the community.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

History teaches us that nations recovering from long conflict face a difficult task to develop the democratic institutions and laws that can protect and guarantee human rights. Some nations fail to meet this challenge and revert to violence. It should not be taken for granted that human rights

will automatically be protected in Timor-Leste. Vigilance against the kind of practices that lead to violations needs to be constant.

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

Timor-Leste's recent history shows how state institutions that are not respectful of the rule of law have a disproportionate capacity to contribute to human rights violations. For most of the period reviewed by the Commission, the East Timorese people lived without the protections of effective rule of law or the functioning of a financially accountable administration. Establishing these as the norm is a significant challenge for the government, civil society and the community.

Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

7.5.3. The archives form an integrated part of an active human rights centre to be developed in the former Balide Comarca whose overall purpose will be to remember, honour and learn from Timor-Leste's recent human rights history.

Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission has made a certain contribution to the nation building process of Timor-Leste in the early years of transition in our new democracy. This transition will be an ongoing and long process. It is the Commission's view, based on three years of dialogue with local communities, that many aspects of its work should be followed up as part of the national effort to build a society based on acknowledging the truth of the past, non-violence, reconciliation and reparations. The work of recording, preserving and sharing the truth of our history, of continuing the promotion of lasting reconciliation, and of creating a society based on human rights and the rule of law can all be enhanced by the establishment of an institution to carry on aspects of the Commission's work.

Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

40. As a result, the questionnaire was organised into the following modules: • A household register • A head of household displacement register • An adult female birth history • An adult male/female sibling history • An adult male/female parental history • A general human rights violation section.

Institutions

References or discussions of institutions (e.g., military, police etc.)

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 27 references coded [0.11% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

24. This provision may have prevented the Commission from gaining some important information that would have assisted its truth-seeking function. However the Commission also recognises that it was established as an institution whose work was in some respects to complement the Serious Crimes process. The provisions of the Regulation reflect a policy decision that the work of the prosecution service should not be compromised by the truth-seeking function of the Commission. This policy is based on recognition of the importance of establishing strong and clear mechanisms to achieve justice and promote respect for the rule of law in the context of a fragile new nation with a history dominated by injustice. The Commission is satisfied that, notwithstanding this limitation, the robust powers it was granted were sufficient to enable it to compile a Report that contains a strong, objective and comprehensive account of the violations that occurred during the period of the political conflicts.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

104. Among East Timorese soldiers who formed the bulk of the army there was a growing perception that Portugal was in the process of turning its back on Timor.¹¹² Many East Timorese members of the armed forces were drawn to political involvement at what they saw as a critical moment in their country's history. Mário Lemos Pires recalled to the Commission:

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

that they were Indonesian forces.

243. Noting the scale of the attack on Dili, Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission that it could be "compared to the attack to put down the PRRI/Permesta rebellion (in 1958), which was the biggest military operation in Indonesian war history."

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

321. The period from late 1977 to 1979 saw the greatest humanitarian tragedy in Timor-Leste's history. Widespread famine was a consequence of massive Indonesian military operations aimed at destroying the Fretilin Resistance. This military
Meanwhile, military 228 | Chega! - Volume I, Part 3: History of the Conflict

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

344. Ataúro has had a history of being used as a prison island by successive regimes in Timor-Leste. The Portuguese colonial administration did so over a long period, as did the Japanese occupying forces in World War II. The Indonesian regime of occupation initiated a similar policy commencing in 1980. The Commission received expert testimony that this was an extension of the policy of separating civilians who were considered a possible future support base for the armed Resistance. Gilman dos Santos testified:

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

578. This international presence was unprecedented in the history of Timor-Leste. In the 25-year period of Indonesian presence it had been unthinkable that the territory could have been so open

to the international community. After the months of bloody violence against civilians leading to the 5 May Agreements, when there was almost no international presence in Timor-Leste, the presence of internationals across the territory provided a level of monitoring that may have contributed to the reduction in large-scale attacks by militia or TNI.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

19. Indonesia's police force was structurally part of the military throughout the New Order. This long history of effective subservience to the leadership of the armed forces had a profound effect on the independence of the police and their capacity to enforce law and order. This history has contributed to the impunity enjoyed by the armed forces and those who work with it. The police force doctrine, founded on a belief that security is the responsibility of the total population, is similar to that of the armed forces. Under its System of Neighbourhood Security (Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan, Siskamling) members of the community have a role in maintaining security in their locality.¹⁰ Like the military, the police force also has a territorial structure, including a presence at the village level (Bintara Polisi Daerah, Binpolda). In addition to its normal duties, the police maintain an armed division called the Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, Brimob). Brimob originally had responsibility for internal security, but as this role was taken over by the military during the New Order this division began to specialise in riot control and was used extensively for this purpose.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

50. In July 1988 the Army Strategic Reserve Command Second Infantry Division was appointed to replace the First Infantry Division within the structure of the Security Operations Command for East Timor. A military history book indicates that at the time of the handover, ABRI considered Falintil to be weak, but acknowledged its capacity to both mount operations and influence the population.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

118. Many of the militias which emerged in 1998-99 had roots in groups formed much earlier in the occupation period. Below is a chart of the history of Timorese militias, including the names of the Timorese leaders, by sector and district, founded from 1975–1999.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

1. The Resistance against Indonesian occupation in Timor-Leste went through a complex development. This part provides an overview of the Resistance movement including: its emergence during the period of Fretilin administration following the coup; the effect of destruction of the Fretilin bases in 1978-79 by the Indonesian military including the loss of a number of Fretilin/Falintil leaders and the end of the protracted people's war strategy; the regeneration of Falintil, the armed front of the Resistance, after 1987 and its structure and strategies until the referendum in 1999; and the structure and strategies of the clandestine front over the course of the occupation. The third front in the Resistance movement, the diplomatic front, is discussed in Vol. II, Part 7.1: Self-Determination, and so has not been considered in

detail here. The Commission notes that this part is only a first step in understanding the complex history of this aspect of Timorese history and that there is considerable scope for further research in the future.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

39. The most common educational activity was political education. Fretilin gave much attention to providing political training for Fretilin cadres to increase their capacity for organising people and their political and ideological knowledge. The commissariat in each sector established a Centre for Political Training (Centro da Formação Política, Ceforpol). Ceforpol was obligatory for quadro medio (mid-level cadres, the regional and zone committees), but sometimes was attended by quadro inferior (menial cadres, administrators of suco and aldeia). Topics covered included the history of Timor-Leste from the arrival of the Portuguese, theories of social development, the philosophy of dialectical materialism, building people-power, the organisational principles of “the mass line” (linha de massa) and democratic centralism (centralismo democrático), women’s emancipation and collective food production. Military strategy and national liberation were also discussed, as well as national liberation wars in other countries such as Guinea Bissau, China and Vietnam. The instructors in the Ceforpol were members of the Fretilin Central Committee and Falintil commanders.³¹ Overall, the Ceforpol were under the supervision of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica, DOPI), which was a department of the Fretilin Central Committee.³²

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

370. On 19 September 1977, the Fretilin Central Committee issued a communiqué announcing Francisco Xavier do Amaral’s arrest ten days earlier and his impending trial. Calling Francisco Xavier do Amaral “the vilest traitor that our history has known”, it recounted a whole range of serious offences that he and his followers were alleged to have committed, including planning the elimination of the leadership of the Central Committee and a number of deviations from Fretilin ideology, including trying to “separate the civil from the military tasks”. The communiqué announced that the President of Fretilin had committed the crime of high treason and had been expelled from the party.³⁷⁸

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

665. At the same time, militia members were asserting their new power over the population through random acts of violence. Militia groups were composed largely of young men who were marginalised and angry, or who had long histories of involvement in Indonesian paramilitary or civil defence groups. Some were also just opportunists and, in this period of lawlessness and heightened tension and violence, were given free rein to do as they pleased with impunity. Indeed, the evidence is clear that the military not only allowed but actively encouraged brutality on the part of the militias.

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

374. Xanana Gusmão's defence statement is a significant document in the history of the Timorese struggle for independence. From a prison cell, Xanana Gusmão crafted a range of arguments that were legally, politically and emotionally powerful. The judges, however, considered this statement to be irrelevant before they had even heard its contents.

Reference 17 - 0.01% Coverage

399. Other organisations, with no history of transferring children from Timor-Leste, became active only after the referendum. The best known of them was the Heart Foundation (Yayasan Hati), which sent some 150 children from camps in West Timor to Central Java. They were placed either in Catholic institutions or in a private institution in Wonosari, 45 km east of Yogyakarta. Wonosari was founded by a former Indonesian Government official who had worked in Dili as head of the local branch of the Department of Education and Culture.²⁹⁸

Reference 18 - 0.01% Coverage

11. Although the events surrounding the ballot were freshest in the minds of all East Timorese at the end of 1999, that violence was in fact inseparable from the entire history of the political conflicts going back to 1974. Many were still divided over their political affiliations during the internal conflict of 1975. Many who had supported independence during the Indonesian occupation nursed anger and resentment towards those who had collaborated with the Indonesian security forces; independence supporters, their friends and family members had suffered violations as a result of such collaboration. The Indonesian withdrawal after the ballot seemed to open up the possibility that these long-standing grievances would flare into violence.

Reference 19 - 0.01% Coverage

Timor-Leste's recent history shows how state institutions that are not respectful of the rule of law have a disproportionate capacity to contribute to human rights violations. For most of the period reviewed by the Commission, the East Timorese people lived without the protections of effective rule of law or the functioning of a financially accountable administration. Establishing these as the norm is a significant challenge for the government, civil society and the community.

Reference 20 - 0.01% Coverage

The Catholic Church has a significant place in East Timorese history and society. Though largely compromised during the Portuguese period, the Church was a strong advocate for human rights in Timor-Leste during the Indonesian occupation consistent with Catholic social doctrine based on the dignity and value of each human person. In partnership with other faith communities, it has a responsibility and resources to continue as a major force for human rights in the new democratic era.

Reference 21 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission addressed these splits through a multi-leveled approach. At the national leadership level, party leaders were asked to publicly explain what took place during the civil

war of 1975. The 4-day CAVR National Public Hearing on the Internal Political Conflict of 1974-76 in December 2003 was a landmark in the history of East Timorese political life, and an important time for all East Timorese people to better understand the events of this tragic period and listen to leaders taking responsibility.

Reference 22 - 0.01% Coverage

71. The system of territorial military command ran parallel to the structures of civilian political authority down to the village level – the Korem Commander shadowed the Governor; the 13 Kodim Commanders looked over the shoulders of the 13 District Heads (Bupati); the 62 Koramil Commanders supervised the 62 Sub-District Heads (Camat); and the 442 Babinsas operated alongside an equal number of Village Heads (Kepala Desa). In this way, the territorial military command effectively ensured military involvement in and dominance over, the formulation and implementation of policy at every level. Thus, even if civilian authorities such as the Governor and the Bupatis were formally in charge, in the final analysis military officers within the territorial command exercised greater power. 72. In addition to the territorial command system that was a feature of Indonesian rule everywhere, in 1999 military power in Timor-Leste had a number of unique features that stemmed from its long history as an area of active military operations. It had, for example, two ‘organic’ infantry battalions permanently based in Timor-Leste. Battalion 744, with its headquarters in Dili, and Battalion 745, based in Lospalos, had been formed in the late-1970s, shortly after Indonesia’s invasion. Though many of the soldiers in these units were East Timorese, the officers were predominantly Indonesian. Both units, moreover, were formally answerable to the Korem commander.‡

Reference 23 - 0.01% Coverage

a legacy of Timor-Leste’s long history as a military operations area, and was evidently maintained to facilitate counter-insurgency operations there. There are indications that it played a key role in mobilising and coordinating the militias in 1999.

Reference 24 - 0.01% Coverage

312. Militias are not a new phenomenon in Timor-Leste. They have existed, in some form, at least since the time of Portuguese rule, and without interruption through the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian invasion. Since 1975, their history has been tightly intertwined with that of the Indonesian army, and especially its counterinsurgency force, Kopassus.

Reference 25 - 0.01% Coverage

of violence committed by soldiers.

314. That history offers compelling evidence that the militias that emerged in TimorLeste in 1999 were part of a carefully prepared and directed military intelligence operation. A glance at that history confirms that virtually everything about the organisation, language, style, and repertoire of the modern militias derives from well-established Indonesian military doctrine and historical practice. It also helps to explain how the militias could have sprung up as quickly as they did all across the country in 1998-99.

Reference 26 - 0.01% Coverage

1028. It is noteworthy that virtually all of the officers on this list were either deployed with Kopassus units in Timor-Leste, or shared career histories in Kopassus or military intelligence.*

Reference 27 - 0.01% Coverage

1076. The problem of international acquiescence and complicity was highlighted by the position taken by key powers on the issue of security for the 1999 Popular Consultation. In spite of the mounting militia violence in early 1999, and credible predictions of worse to come, the most influential states made no serious effort to ensure that there would be effective security arrangements for the referendum. Instead, the 5 May Agreements placed sole responsibility for maintaining law and order in the hands of Indonesian security forces. Even a brief glimpse at the history of the Indonesian armed forces, and its behavior in Timor-Leste, would have indicated what a dangerous approach that was.

Learn or Educate

References or discussions to learning from or educating about the past

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 14 references coded [0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

142. In addition to the detailed official Final Report, the Commission produced a range of more accessible related material. A two-and-a-half-hour documentary film version was produced in Tetum, with English, Portuguese and Indonesian sub-titles, as well as a Tetum radio version, a photographic exhibition and a series of books on the thematic national public hearings of the Commission in Tetum, Indonesian and English. A photographic exhibition of survivors of violations promoted their dignity and aspirations, together with the publication of a photographic book of survivors expressing their hopes for the future. The Commission believes that the report and the associated research material in the CAVR Archive provides a rich source of resources which can become the basis for the production of accessible educational materials about human rights, reconciliation and East Timorese history.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

7. It is the hope of the Commission that this brief history will both assist the reader to understand the contents of other parts and sections of this Report, and that it will inspire current and future generations of East Timorese historians to work further on understanding our past as part of our

constant efforts to build a future based on respect for each other, human rights and the love of peace.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

39. The most common educational activity was political education. Fretilin gave much attention to providing political training for Fretilin cadres to increase their capacity for organising people and their political and ideological knowledge. The commissariat in each sector established a Centre for Political Training (Centro da Formação Política, Ceforpol). Ceforpol was obligatory for quadro medio (mid-level cadres, the regional and zone committees), but sometimes was attended by quadro inferior (menial cadres, administrators of suco and aldeia). Topics covered included the history of Timor-Leste from the arrival of the Portuguese, theories of social development, the philosophy of dialectical materialism, building people-power, the organisational principles of “the mass line” (linha de massa) and democratic centralism (centralismo democrático), women’s emancipation and collective food production. Military strategy and national liberation were also discussed, as well as national liberation wars in other countries such as Guinea Bissau, China and Vietnam. The instructors in the Ceforpol were members of the Fretilin Central Committee and Falintil commanders.³¹ Overall, the Ceforpol were under the supervision of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica, DOPI), which was a department of the Fretilin Central Committee.³²

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

Real ignorance of Timorese history and culture, the geo-strategic context of the territory and its remoteness from the metropolis, as well as the secrecy of negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia, helped keep the discussion about Timor on a lower, mainly ideological plane with little practical value. Portuguese citizens who were interested in the rights of the Timorese people were incapable of imposing on the political powers of the time the fundamental strategic changes that could eventually have changed events, such as reinforcement of the Portuguese presence and action, and the internationalisation of the issue.²³⁶

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

489. While this period was notable for the impact of the video image on public awareness, the growth of new organisations and their co-ordination owes much to the advent of the internet age. The general availability of the internet in the 1990s more or less coincided with Indonesia’s decision to partially relax access to Timor-Leste. This timing was not only a happy coincidence; the internet also perfectly suited the requirements of human rights activists. It was fast, cheap, secure, user-friendly, interactive and had significant carrying capacity and global reach. Information, a scarce commodity on Timor-Leste for the previous 15 years, was now widely available through the internet thanks to the skills and commitment of civil society members. John MacDougall’s pioneering apakabar, a free electronic mailing list which covered both Indonesia and Timor-Leste, was followed by reg.easttimor which became the main clearing house and channel for rapid communication on Timor-Leste across the globe. Established in 1994 and co-ordinated by ETAN/US, reg.easttimor enabled the public and civil society organisations in the

Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America to have interactive conferences and to access reports on Timor-Leste and translations from wire services and the Indonesian, Portuguese and other media as well as official documents from the UN, governments and other sources. The relatively few books available on Timor-Leste were now supplemented by publicly accessible websites. TimorNet at the University of Coimbra in Portugal provided links to information on the history, geography and culture of Timor-Leste, key UN documents, human rights violations, articles, publications and suggestions for action. Activists used email to proliferate information and to co-ordinate and organise. Colin Renwick set up Minihub to help small, vulnerable NGOs in Indonesia and Timor-Leste establish cheap, accessible and secure internet access and also gave training to selected East Timorese activists,* increasing the underground's effectiveness. With these skills, East Timorese supporting Xanana Gusmão in Jakarta could send encrypted email messages to colleagues abroad, including to José Ramos-Horta.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

123. The institutional problems described above and a curriculum in which indoctrination played a major part were not unique to Timor-Leste; they are in fact the rule in Indonesian education more generally. Morning recitals of the five Pancasila principles are a daily ritual in schools throughout the country, and courses on the "Full Understanding and Culturalisation of the Principles of Pancasila" are required for graduation from primary and secondary schools. Rote learning of nationalist slogans and songs, the teaching of an approved version of history, and conformity and unquestioning respect for authority are emphasised at the expense of basic skills development, especially of critical thinking and problem solving.*

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

reflected in a breakdown of the textbooks procured for use in schools: between 1984 and 1989 the government bought 161,560 textbooks on the Indonesian language, 39,926 on the Indonesian governmental and administrative systems, and 9,398 on natural history and physics.¹⁴⁰ There is no doubt that the campaign to teach Indonesian in schools was effective: by 1998, 99% of children aged 10-19 and 85% of those aged 20-29 could speak Indonesian (compared with 20% of those 60 and older).¹⁴¹

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

Recently problems in the development of the social-economic situation have been brought about by the younger generation who seem dissatisfied with the present situation. To handle such social and political unrest, the regional government, among other things, has given guidance to the...students of junior and senior high school by socialising the history of East Timor's integration into the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, guidance has also been given to university students studying at universities in and outside East Timor province... and to youth organisations.¹⁴³

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

I am not keeping the bad things that were done to me hidden in my heart. I will tell them so that they can be recorded in history for our children and grandchildren.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

History teaches us that nations recovering from long conflict face a difficult task to develop the democratic institutions and laws that can protect and guarantee human rights. Some nations fail to meet this challenge and revert to violence. It should not be taken for granted that human rights will automatically be protected in Timor-Leste. Vigilance against the kind of practices that lead to violations needs to be constant.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

1.14. Support, both practical and financial, be given by business, philanthropic bodies, corporations and academic institutions to assist key East Timorese figures and others to document their histories and experiences in order to build up the limited stock of East Timorese-generated literature for future generations.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

on reconciliation and its inquiry into the period 1974-1999 - as a way of enriching East Timorese content in the education curriculum and to assist in the teaching of history, political science, conflict-resolution, international relations and law.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

7.4.2. The Ministry of Education in the Government of Timor-Leste works with the post-CAVR institution to utilise the Final Report and other Commission materials in the development of curricula and other educational resources related to human rights, reconciliation, history, law, gender studies and other relevant disciplines.

Legacy

References or discussions of legacy, consequences, and lasting impact of past events, actions, policy, etc.

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 16 references coded [0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

- Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims
- Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television
- Implementing community reconciliation procedures
- Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them
- Conducting victims' hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for their courage and for the suffering they had endured
- Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing
- Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance
- Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation
- Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor
- Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders
- Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

euphoria and concern. The Commission heard testimony from a range of leading East Timorese figures in its hearing on the Internal Political Conflict of 1974-76. They spoke of the excitement

events in Lisbon and the other colonies generated among the mostly young people who had an interest in politics. But they also generally agreed that East Timorese society was ill-prepared by its history to engage in political activity.³⁵

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

321. The period from late 1977 to 1979 saw the greatest humanitarian tragedy in Timor-Leste's history. Widespread famine was a consequence of massive Indonesian military operations aimed at destroying the Fretilin Resistance. This military
Meanwhile, military 228 | Chega! - Volume I, Part 3: History of the Conflict

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

615. 30 August 1999 dawned as a remarkable day in the history of Timor-Leste. Despite months of intimidation and violence, people across the country came out in droves to cast their ballot.⁷⁷³

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

19. Indonesia's police force was structurally part of the military throughout the New Order. This long history of effective subservience to the leadership of the armed forces had a profound effect on the independence of the police and their capacity to enforce law and order. This history has contributed to the impunity enjoyed by the armed forces and those who work with it. The police force doctrine, founded on a belief that security is the responsibility of the total population, is similar to that of the armed forces. Under its System of Neighbourhood Security (Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan, Siskamling) members of the community have a role in maintaining security in their locality.¹⁰ Like the military, the police force also has a territorial structure, including a presence at the village level (Bintara Polisi Daerah, Binpolda). In addition to its normal duties, the police maintain an armed division called the Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, Brimob). Brimob originally had responsibility for internal security, but as this role was taken over by the military during the New Order this division began to specialise in riot control and was used extensively for this purpose.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

We must speak objectively. That a war took place is part of our history. UDT started it, then Fretilin avenged the killings during the "counter coup". At the time, there was little respect for humanity or justice. Seven people were killed in Darulete.⁴⁷

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

198. Political arguments were also taken up by some defendants. The statement by Jacinto Alves, entitled "Struggle is the Discovery of a Nation that has never Died", drew parallels between the struggles for East Timorese independence and Indonesia's own struggle for freedom. History is a constant and irreversible march, it continues to move forward, never backward, and shapes the human self across generations of people who tune into its rhythm. From this point of view, we

revisit the history of Timor-Leste and draw parallels with the history of the Indonesian Nation.¹⁴⁰

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

reflected in a breakdown of the textbooks procured for use in schools: between 1984 and 1989 the government bought 161,560 textbooks on the Indonesian language, 39,926 on the Indonesian governmental and administrative systems, and 9,398 on natural history and physics.¹⁴⁰ There is no doubt that the campaign to teach Indonesian in schools was effective: by 1998, 99% of children aged 10-19 and 85% of those aged 20-29 could speak Indonesian (compared with 20% of those 60 and older).¹⁴¹

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

70. There was a tendency to see the Commission's truth-seeking mandate as limited to abuses committed in 1999. This was accompanied by demands that history could only be "made straight" if abuses committed in 1974-1975 were also thoroughly investigated.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

Why are we here today? Because of a historical time, because of the wounds of the past, all Timorese people have waited, so that we can make reconciliation. Reconciliation for the past suffering, for our land. All Timorese have suffered. We Timorese people need to be reconciled within ourselves, with our land and with our history. We know this is a good idea, but it is very difficult to do. We hear words of justification and rationalisation: "Because of war I did this"... We need to examine this.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

I am not keeping the bad things that were done to me hidden in my heart. I will tell them so that they can be recorded in history for our children and grandchildren.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

The neighbouring villages of Oeleu, Tapo, and Leber were intentionally chosen for a joint discussion because they had a long history of conflict. For many decades the men of these villages had fought each other over community land and boundaries. During the civil conflict of 1974-1975 the tensions among the three villages exploded into violence. Although the Indonesian invasion and occupation put a stop to open conflict, communal and political differences were expressed through their different relations to the occupier. Feelings of distrust and the desire for revenge continued to fester below the surface, only to re-emerge following the Popular Consultation in August 1999.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

youth from their village were captured and tortured at the Maliana military post, then forcibly recruited to become militia members. As in the case of Oeleu, Tapo's history of violation ended with villagers suffering from illness and hunger in refugee camps in West Timor.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

211. Some maps used colour coding to distinguish events and their impact. For example, in some maps Falintil posts were marked by yellow and white flags so that they could be distinguished from Indonesian military posts that had red and white flags. Pink crosses were used to indicate places where people were murdered by the Indonesian military and blue crosses to mark sites of death due to starvation and illness, or death counts were highlighted by using pink or red markers (see Sketch Map 11 below). Some maps focused on events over a period of only a year or two; for others a longer timeframe was shown in different ways. For example Diagram 1 – Sketch Map Iliomar I (Iliomar, Lautém) used annotation to record period information, whereas Diagram 2 – Sketch Map Pairara Moro, (Lautém) added arrows to record abuses at the same location but at different points in history.

Reference 16 - 0.01% Coverage

216. Sketch Map 14: Beidasi (Fatululik, Covalima) is a reminder that, despite the scope and magnitude of the violence in Timor-Leste, in local communities its impact was never anonymous. The map's poignancy is captured in the names written by each house that give identity by ownership, residency, and community. It is the juxtaposition between this close-knit community, where everyone knows and is connected to each other, and just a few short annotations – “Veronica died here” next to a double black and pink cross to indicate that she was killed by the militia, “82 killed by TNI” written below a pink cross, and “30 children die” written above a black cross to indicate death by starvation – that is striking. It turns an otherwise ordinary neighbourhood map into a document that records a history of violence and suffering in a community: for years violations occurred in the neighbourhood of Alberto and Carlos, Martinho and Mauseu, and to so many other individuals and families.

Nation

References or discussions of nation, nations, nationals, or nation building

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 15 references coded [0.08% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

24. This provision may have prevented the Commission from gaining some important information that would have assisted its truth-seeking function. However the Commission also recognises that it was established as an institution whose work was in some respects to complement the Serious Crimes process. The provisions of the Regulation reflect a policy decision that the work of the prosecution service should not be compromised by the truth-seeking function of the Commission. This policy is based on recognition of the importance of establishing strong and clear mechanisms to achieve justice and promote respect for the rule of law in the context of a fragile new nation with a history dominated by injustice. The Commission is satisfied that, notwithstanding this limitation, the robust powers it was granted were sufficient to enable it to compile a Report that contains a strong, objective and comprehensive account of the violations that occurred during the period of the political conflicts.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

History of the Conflict 3. Introduction

1. This part provides an historical context to events covered in the violations sections of the Report. It is based on primary sources of the Commission itself, from statements, interviews and

testimonies delivered at public hearings; on documentary evidence available to the Commission; and on an analysis of relevant secondary sources. It is generally limited to a quick overview of the key events, moments and turning points in the period of the Commission's mandate relevant to the political conflicts, the efforts to resolve those conflicts and the human rights violations which occurred in those conflicts. Within the scope of this Report, it has not been possible to provide definitive accounts of some of the key issues which remain points of historical conjecture about this period and these events. Nor is it the role of the Commission to make such definitive judgements. The part does attempt at least to identify what some of these issues are, and the Commission encourages further research, writing and analysis of these important aspects of East Timorese history.

2. This analysis and writing of East Timorese history is a critical step in nation building, and how it is done will reflect what kind of society our new nation fosters. The Commission's Report is based largely upon the statements and interviews provided by ordinary East Timorese people from across the country, and seeks to bring their voice into the continuing dialogue for building our new nation. It does not seek to be an exclusive history, recording only the perspectives or achievements of national leaders, or of people from only one side or the other of the political divide. It is based on the idea that the recording and analysis of history must be open to new information and ideas, and to information and perspectives that are not necessarily politically popular. While history is critical for nation building, a simplistic history that seeks to sweep under the carpet unpleasant realities or to make invisible the contributions of people from all walks of life cannot help build a resilient and sustainable nation. History telling that acknowledges complexity, that makes space for the voice of those often silenced, and that opens the way for open-minded reflection can make a contribution to building

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Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

3. The telling of East Timorese history is critical for the foundations of our relationship with our international neighbours, especially Indonesia. As the Indonesian historian Dr Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission at its hearing on Self-Determination and the International Community:

The collective memory of both nations will determine the nature and the strength or weakness of the relationship. This will be reflected in the writing of history of both countries.¹

4. This part begins with a brief overview of the colonial history of Timor-Leste under Portuguese control. It deliberately places the emphasis upon the period leading up to the internal conflict of August–September 1975 and the subsequent Indonesian invasion. This looks at events and relationships surrounding the decolonisation process in Portuguese Timor, within the territory, in Indonesia and in the regional and wider geopolitical context. They are vital to an understanding of the causes of the political conflicts in Timor-Leste, the lost opportunities to avoid war and seek peaceful solutions to political concerns based on the principles of international law, and involved Timorese, Indonesian and international actors.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

104. Among East Timorese soldiers who formed the bulk of the army there was a growing perception that Portugal was in the process of turning its back on Timor.¹¹² Many East

Timorese members of the armed forces were drawn to political involvement at what they saw as a critical moment in their country's history. Mário Lemos Pires recalled to the Commission:

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

that they were Indonesian forces.

243. Noting the scale of the attack on Dili, Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission that it could be “compared to the attack to put down the PRRI/Permesta rebellion (in 1958), which was the biggest military operation in Indonesian war history.”

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

39. The most common educational activity was political education. Fretilin gave much attention to providing political training for Fretilin cadres to increase their capacity for organising people and their political and ideological knowledge. The commissariat in each sector established a Centre for Political Training (Centro da Formação Política, Ceforpol). Ceforpol was obligatory for quadro medio (mid-level cadres, the regional and zone committees), but sometimes was attended by quadro inferior (menial cadres, administrators of suco and aldeia). Topics covered included the history of Timor-Leste from the arrival of the Portuguese, theories of social development, the philosophy of dialectical materialism, building people-power, the organisational principles of “the mass line” (linha de massa) and democratic centralism (centralismo democrático), women's emancipation and collective food production. Military strategy and national liberation were also discussed, as well as national liberation wars in other countries such as Guinea Bissau, China and Vietnam. The instructors in the Ceforpol were members of the Fretilin Central Committee and Falintil commanders.³¹ Overall, the Ceforpol were under the supervision of the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (Departamento da Orientação Política e Ideológica, DOPI), which was a department of the Fretilin Central Committee.³²

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

491. The decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta on International Human Rights Day, 10 December 1996, was an enormous moral, political and organisational boost to civil society's work for self-determination. The prize was given independently by the Nobel Committee and thoroughly earned by the two awardees, Bishop Belo and José Ramos-Horta, but the nomination owed much to civil society's initiative, and particularly to old friends of Timor-Leste working behind the scenes in the United States. The prestigious award confirmed the moral correctness of civil society's work and further weakened the case advanced by the Indonesian government and its co-defenders, including Indonesia's version of the history of the conflict. It was also politically helpful in that it highlighted the necessity of self-determination to resolve the conflict – the centrepiece of civil society advocacy for 20 years – and identified this as the key issue.* The Prize was a bonus to civil society organising. The global media coverage it attracted, which continued as José Ramos-Horta travelled the world in his new role, generated new public interest and support for the civil society campaign in many countries.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

526. The Commission believes that the following lessons can be drawn from this experience: • Civil society's contribution to the resolution of the Timor-Leste question was only possible because civil society existed and was permitted to function freely as an independent sector in many parts of the world or because, as in Indonesia and Timor-Leste itself, civil society asserted itself against repression. Timor-Leste's experience is that a robust civil society is critical to the proper functioning of individual societies and the international community. • During 25 years of struggle, a strong partnership was forged between many of Timor-Leste's current leaders in all walks of life and international civil society that is rare in the history of nation-building. This partnership, which is now in a new phase, should be nurtured on both sides because it is an important longterm asset for Timor-Leste. • Civil society should take from its Timor-Leste experience that, while it has to be strategic, it is most effective when it (a) sticks to principle, (b) is politically disinterested, (c) is non-violent, (d) is open to everybody's contribution and (e) independent but ready to co-operate with government and business when possible.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

It is unfortunate that the defence lawyer's argument did not benefit the security and stability in East Timor, [it] could lead to loss of confidence about the history of integration of East Timor into The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.¹³⁴

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

198. Political arguments were also taken up by some defendants. The statement by Jacinto Alves, entitled "Struggle is the Discovery of a Nation that has never Died", drew parallels between the struggles for East Timorese independence and Indonesia's own struggle for freedom. History is a constant and irreversible march, it continues to move forward, never backward, and shapes the human self across generations of people who tune into its rhythm. From this point of view, we revisit the history of Timor-Leste and draw parallels with the history of the Indonesian Nation.¹⁴⁰

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

123. The institutional problems described above and a curriculum in which indoctrination played a major part were not unique to Timor-Leste; they are in fact the rule in Indonesian education more generally. Morning recitals of the five Pancasila principles are a daily ritual in schools throughout the country, and courses on the "Full Understanding and Culturalisation of the Principles of Pancasila" are required for graduation from primary and secondary schools. Rote learning of nationalist slogans and songs, the teaching of an approved version of history, and conformity and unquestioning respect for authority are emphasised at the expense of basic skills development, especially of critical thinking and problem solving.*

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

112. For many the December 2003 hearing on The Internal Political Conflict of 1974-1976 will remain the indelible moment of the Commission's work. For the first time Timor-Leste's leaders came forward to speak publicly and in an official forum of the violence between Timorese in 1974-1976. Uncertainty as to how political leaders would react to this opportunity surrounded the hearing. In the end the former political foes expressed humility and sorrow at what had occurred, accepted responsibility and gave a public demonstration of the spirit of reconciliation, making the hearing a momentous event in the nation's history.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

History teaches us that nations recovering from long conflict face a difficult task to develop the democratic institutions and laws that can protect and guarantee human rights. Some nations fail to meet this challenge and revert to violence. It should not be taken for granted that human rights will automatically be protected in Timor-Leste. Vigilance against the kind of practices that lead to violations needs to be constant.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission has made a certain contribution to the nation building process of Timor-Leste in the early years of transition in our new democracy. This transition will be an ongoing and long process. It is the Commission's view, based on three years of dialogue with local communities, that many aspects of its work should be followed up as part of the national effort to build a society based on acknowledging the truth of the past, non-violence, reconciliation and reparations. The work of recording, preserving and sharing the truth of our history, of continuing the promotion of lasting reconciliation, and of creating a society based on human rights and the rule of law can all be enhanced by the establishment of an institution to carry on aspects of the Commission's work.

Reconciliation

References or discussions of reconciliation

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 11 references coded [0.04% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

• Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims • Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television • Implementing community reconciliation procedures • Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them • Conducting victims' hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for their courage and for the suffering they had endured • Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing • Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance • Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation • Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor • Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders • Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

119. Continuing disagreement about and denial of historical fact prevents different sides to a conflict from finding a common basis to begin the painful, difficult and slow process of reconciliation. The truth-seeking activities were aimed at providing a history of events which was based on objective information rather than rumour or propaganda. Such a solidly founded version of the truth could in turn open the way to the admission of responsibility, acceptance and forgiveness.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Commission's programmes whether giving statements, testifying at public hearings, attending community reconciliation processes or participating in healing workshops • Facilitating group discussions and recording local histories focusing on the impact of human rights violations on individual communities • Helping victims with urgent needs by assessing their cases, referring them to appropriate agencies and providing modest financial assistance, as part of the Commission's Urgent Reparations scheme.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

142. In addition to the detailed official Final Report, the Commission produced a range of more accessible related material. A two-and-a-half-hour documentary film version was produced in Tetum, with English, Portuguese and Indonesian sub-titles, as well as a Tetum radio version, a photographic exhibition and a series of books on the thematic national public hearings of the Commission in Tetum, Indonesian and English. A photographic exhibition of survivors of violations promoted their dignity and aspirations, together with the publication of a photographic book of survivors expressing their hopes for the future. The Commission believes that the report and the associated research material in the CAVR Archive provides a rich source of resources which can become the basis for the production of accessible educational materials about human rights, reconciliation and East Timorese history.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

59. These programmes included Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRPs), local public hearings for victims, participatory workshops on the history of human rights violations in communities, victims' healing workshops, a special reparations scheme for victims with urgent needs, radio programmes focusing on local reconciliation issues, and information programmes aimed at East Timorese people in West Timor, Indonesia.

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

We believe in human transformation. The history of struggle in other countries has proven that a person considered a revolutionary today can be seen as a traitor tomorrow, and that a person considered a traitor today could be a revolutionary tomorrow...A man's common sense can improve the man. We have to believe in people's ability to transform themselves.²⁴⁴

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

127. Other public hearings aired the experiences of victims from all sides to the conflict and so contributed to a more balanced and accurate public perception of shared history. Victims' Hearings and Healing Workshops helped restore the dignity denied to individual victims, and dispelled some of the residual anger that fuels continuing division. Community mapping exercises promoted a village-level exploration of the past and helped to develop a collective version of events. The weekly radio programme produced by the Commission encouraged reflection and debate on reconciliation. Through the information campaign in West Timor, refugees became aware of the work of the Commission, including the CRP programme for those that returned to Timor-Leste, and that they could give statements that could contribute to a balanced Final Report. It is hoped that this Report will also foster reconciliation by producing a version of events that is based on careful and objective research rather than limited information and rumour.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

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1974-1976. Uncertainty as to how political leaders would react to this opportunity surrounded the hearing. In the end the former political foes expressed humility and sorrow at what had occurred, accepted responsibility and gave a public demonstration of the spirit of reconciliation, making the hearing a momentous event in the nation's history.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

Why are we here today? Because of a historical time, because of the wounds of the past, all Timorese people have waited, so that we can make reconciliation. Reconciliation for the past suffering, for our land. All Timorese have suffered. We Timorese people need to be reconciled within ourselves, with our land and with our history. We know this is a good idea, but it is very difficult to do. We hear words of justification and rationalisation: "Because of war I did this"... We need to examine this.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

on reconciliation and its inquiry into the period 1974-1999 - as a way of enriching East Timorese content in the education curriculum and to assist in the teaching of history, political science, conflict-resolution, international relations and law.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission has made a certain contribution to the nation building process of Timor-Leste in the early years of transition in our new democracy. This transition will be an ongoing and long process. It is the Commission's view, based on three years of dialogue with local communities, that many aspects of its work should be followed up as part of the national effort to build a society based on acknowledging the truth of the past, non-violence, reconciliation and reparations. The work of recording, preserving and sharing the truth of our history, of continuing the promotion of lasting reconciliation, and of creating a society based on human rights and the rule of law can all be enhanced by the establishment of an institution to carry on aspects of the Commission's work.

Resistance

References or discussions of resistance

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 3 references coded [0.01% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

1. The Resistance against Indonesian occupation in Timor-Leste went through a complex development. This part provides an overview of the Resistance movement including: its emergence during the period of Fretilin administration following the coup; the effect of destruction of the Fretilin bases in 1978-79 by the Indonesian military including the loss of a number of Fretilin/Falintil leaders and the end of the protracted people's war strategy; the regeneration of Falintil, the armed front of the Resistance, after 1987 and its structure and strategies until the referendum in 1999; and the structure and strategies of the clandestine front over the course of the occupation. The third front in the Resistance movement, the diplomatic front, is discussed in Vol. II, Part 7.1: Self-Determination, and so has not been considered in detail here. The Commission notes that this part is only a first step in understanding the complex history of this aspect of Timorese history and that there is considerable scope for further research in the future.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

145. The history of the clandestine movement during the Indonesian occupation is highly complex and, because of the nature of the movement, there has been very little written on the structures and strategies of the movement. The following overview has been compiled from interviews with former members of the Resistance, but the Commission notes that there is much scope for further research into this fascinating aspect of Timorese history.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

We believe in human transformation. The history of struggle in other countries has proven that a person considered a revolutionary today can be seen as a traitor tomorrow, and that a person considered a traitor today could be a revolutionary tomorrow...A man's common sense can improve the man. We have to believe in people's ability to transform themselves.²⁴⁴

True or Accurate

References or discussions of the truth and true, genuine, or accurate history

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 11 references coded [0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

35. The truth contained in this Report comes largely from the words of those who directly experienced the years of conflict. The Commission has attached special importance to listening directly to those who suffered human rights violations throughout the 25-year period, most of whom had not spoken outside the narrow circle of their family. These many voices, from across the country, have given Timor-Leste a priceless asset. They tell us who we are, what we have been through, what we have lost, and show us the value of what we have gained. From the stories of our sisters and brothers we learn that victory is not a simple matter of heroes and villains; that history is more than the listing of major events or the biographies of those who are called leaders. The experiences of "ordinary people", both the many who died and those who survived, tell us where we have come from and help us understand who we are today. From their stories we see more clearly both the extremes of human dignity and of human degradation that were manifested in our country during these 25 years. We must learn from both sides of this human story. We must acknowledge our potential for both extremes, and strive always to bring the best of our humanity into our lives and relationships – our families, our communities and our nation – each day as we build a new future.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried

out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

events during the conflict which had previously remained hidden to them. This fostered a feeling of solidarity among victims and their communities. It helped to clarify the local history of the conflict. It also reinforced the determination that these painful events of the past should never be repeated.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

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Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

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Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

70. There was a tendency to see the Commission's truth-seeking mandate as limited to abuses committed in 1999. This was accompanied by demands that history could only be "made straight" if abuses committed in 1974-1975 were also thoroughly investigated.

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

I am not keeping the bad things that were done to me hidden in my heart. I will tell them so that they can be recorded in history for our children and grandchildren.

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

197. The Commission trained two district Victim Support staff, one woman and one man in each district, in participatory methods for facilitating the Community Profile workshops. Teams aimed to hold five community discussions in each sub-district. Participants in at least one of the five discussions were to be recent returnees, with priority given to those who were being ostracised by the communities to which they had returned. Another discussion group was to consist exclusively of women. The purpose of having women-only groups was to overcome women's

reticence about taking an active part in group discussions, especially when what is under discussion is the traditional male preserve of recounting history,

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

The Commission has made a certain contribution to the nation building process of Timor-Leste in the early years of transition in our new democracy. This transition will be an ongoing and long process. It is the Commission's view, based on three years of dialogue with local communities, that many aspects of its work should be followed up as part of the national effort to build a society based on acknowledging the truth of the past, non-violence, reconciliation and reparations. The work of recording, preserving and sharing the truth of our history, of continuing the promotion of lasting reconciliation, and of creating a society based on human rights and the rule of law can all be enhanced by the establishment of an institution to carry on aspects of the Commission's work.

UN Security Council

References or discussions of the UN security council

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Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

32. As a result of these initiatives, the decade of the 1960s is often described as the decade of decolonisation and independence. No fewer than 42 countries, mostly in Africa, gained independence and membership of the UN during the 1960s, more than any other decade during the history of the UN. However, Timor-Leste was not to join them for another 40 years.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

221. The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a close ally of both Portugal and Indonesia based on a long history of relationships with both peoples dating back several hundreds of years. However, successive British Governments took only a limited interest in the question of Timor-Leste during most of the territory's nearly 40-year history of decolonisation.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

Chomsky's words on this matter had a real influence, sometimes indirect, and history should record it, because it was of vital importance in helping alter the state of widespread ignorance about East Timor that then existed in the United States and elsewhere.²³⁹

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

196. Legal argument by defence teams were based on the claim that Timor-Leste's integration into Indonesia was illegal, and would continue to be so until the East Timorese were given an opportunity to participate in a free and fair choice concerning their political status. This was argued in a number of ways, for example through detailed accounts of East Timorese history from the pre-colonial period up until the Indonesian invasion and occupation; by disputing the validity of the Balibó declaration; by arguing that self-determination was supported by the 1945 Indonesian Constitution; as well as arguments based on international law and UN Security Council resolutions. If the Indonesian claim over Timor-Leste was illegal then there could be no substance to charges that East Timorese had committed treason by not supporting the sovereignty of Indonesia in Timor-Leste.

Victims

References or discussion of the accounts or experiences of victims who died or survived

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 15 references coded [0.07% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

35. The truth contained in this Report comes largely from the words of those who directly experienced the years of conflict. The Commission has attached special importance to listening directly to those who suffered human rights violations throughout the 25-year period, most of whom had not spoken outside the narrow circle of their family. These many voices, from across the country, have given Timor-Leste a priceless asset. They tell us who we are, what we have been through, what we have lost, and show us the value of what we have gained. From the stories of our sisters and brothers we learn that victory is not a simple matter of heroes and villains; that history is more than the listing of major events or the biographies of those who are called leaders. The experiences of “ordinary people”, both the many who died and those who survived, tell us where we have come from and help us understand who we are today. From their stories we see more clearly both the extremes of human dignity and of human degradation that were manifested in our country during these 25 years. We must learn from both sides of this human story. We must acknowledge our potential for both extremes, and strive always to bring the best of our humanity into our lives and relationships – our families, our communities and our nation – each day as we build a new future.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Vo

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

• Conducting targeted research interviews with witnesses and victims • Conducting national public hearings on themes that were central to the mandate and giving them the widest possible publicity by broadcasting them on radio and television • Implementing community reconciliation procedures • Providing communities with opportunities to record the history of the conflict in their villages and sub-villages and its specific impact on them • Conducting victims' hearings at the sub-district level, thereby enabling them to share their experiences, to be acknowledged for their courage and for the suffering they had endured • Conducting healing workshops at the national office for victims who had been seriously affected by the conflict. They shared experiences and participated in group counselling and other activities designed to promote healing • Providing urgent reparations to some of the victims who were in greatest need of medical or other immediate assistance • Producing and broadcasting a weekly radio programme on issues relating to reconciliation • Designing and promoting an information programme in the refugee camps of West Timor • Organising visits of National Commissioners to West Timor to meet proautonomy leaders • Establishing an archive and a library of documents and materials relating to human rights violations and the history of the conflict generated by the Commission's work.

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

events during the conflict which had previously remained hidden to them. This fostered a feeling of solidarity among victims and their communities. It helped to clarify the local history of the conflict. It also reinforced the determination that these painful events of the past should never be repeated.

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

112. A number of Indonesians testified to CAVR National Public Hearings, and provided written submissions. Members of Komnas Perempuan (the Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women) testified at the CAVR National Public Hearing on Women and Conflict. A group of NGOs from West Timor (Indonesia), The West Timor Humanitarian Team, made a submission to the Commission at this hearing. The Indonesian human rights NGO Elsam (Lembaga Advokasi Masyarakat, Public Policy Studies and Advocacy) made two submissions to the CAVR: one providing detailed research into Indonesian military structures and operations, and the other testimonies from Indonesian military officers and their families titled "Story from the Behind the Lines". In addition, the well-known Indonesian historian Dr Asvi Warman Adam of LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Academy of Science) gave a paper titled "East Timorese History in the New Indonesia" to the CAVR National Public Hearing on SelfDetermination and the International Community. A number of other human rights workers and activists also testified at hearings, and their testimonies have been used in relevant chapters of this Report.

11

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

142. In addition to the detailed official Final Report, the Commission produced a range of more accessible related material. A two-and-a-half-hour documentary film version was produced in Tetum, with English, Portuguese and Indonesian sub-titles, as well as a Tetum radio version, a photographic exhibition and a series of books on the thematic national public hearings of the Commission in Tetum, Indonesian and English. A photographic exhibition of survivors of violations promoted their dignity and aspirations, together with the publication of a photographic book of survivors expressing their hopes for the future. The Commission believes that the report and the associated research material in the CAVR Archive provides a rich source of resources which can become the basis for the production of accessible educational materials about human rights, reconciliation and East Timorese history.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

59. These programmes included Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRPs), local public hearings for victims, participatory workshops on the history of human rights violations in communities, victims' healing workshops, a special reparations scheme for victims with urgent needs, radio programmes focusing on local reconciliation issues, and information programmes aimed at East Timorese people in West Timor, Indonesia.

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

26. The Commission was acutely aware of the sensitivity and importance of the estimation of total and disaggregated mortality patterns. Other truth commissions (particularly those in El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru) benefited from the existence of extensive, if still partial, registries of deaths that had been documented before the commissions began their work. Information of this kind was not available to the CAVR, and so three new datasets were created: a qualitative survey of respondents self-motivated to give testimony to the Commission; a probability sample of 1,396 households from which retrospective conflict-related mortality histories were taken; and a census of public graveyards in Timor-Leste. These sources fit Cribb's second and third definitions of data sources that could be used to analyse mortality

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

by deprivation [of food and medication] and killings of civilians. The respondents selected themselves to give reports to the Commission. Therefore, the results of this project may not represent the entire universe of all people who suffered human rights violations. • The Retrospective Mortality Survey (RMS) recorded the mortality histories of a probability sample of 1,396 households. In each household, two adult respondents were chosen at random. For male respondents, the respondent's parents and siblings were enumerated, including whether they are living or dead. If they were dead, the date, place, and manner of death were recorded. For female respondents, the respondent's children were enumerated in a similar fashion. In 60% of the households, only respondents of one sex were available at the time of the interview, and so one respondent gave information about parents, siblings and children. • A census of public graveyards in Timor-Leste, documenting more than 319,000 graves (denoted GCD).

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

Resistance in Timor-Leste and the women had been calling for their cancellation for three years during which time Britain had become Indonesia's second largest arms supplier. The women – Andrea Needham, Lotta Kronlid, Joanna Wilson and Angie Zelter – informed the company of their action and were arrested. Their trial in 1996 made legal history: they were acquitted by a jury in Liverpool who found that they had acted in order to prevent the greater crime of genocide.²⁴³

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Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

374. Xanana Gusmão's defence statement is a significant document in the history of the Timorese struggle for independence. From a prison cell, Xanana Gusmão crafted a range of arguments that were legally, politically and emotionally powerful. The judges, however, considered this statement to be irrelevant before they had even heard its contents.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

127. Other public hearings aired the experiences of victims from all sides to the conflict and so contributed to a more balanced and accurate public perception of shared history. Victims' Hearings and Healing Workshops helped restore the dignity denied to individual victims, and dispelled some of the residual anger that fuels continuing division. Community mapping exercises promoted a village-level exploration of the past and helped to develop a collective version of events. The weekly radio programme produced by the Commission encouraged reflection and debate on reconciliation. Through the information campaign in West Timor, refugees became aware of the work of the Commission, including the CRP programme for those that returned to Timor-Leste, and that they could give statements that could contribute to a balanced Final Report. It is hoped that this Report will also foster reconciliation by producing a version of events that is based on careful and objective research rather than limited information and rumour.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

164. In addition to the large number of individuals who were successfully reintegrated into their communities, the CRP produced a number of other benefits. It created a mechanism for communities to explore their own part in the history of the conflict and to clarify the role of individual perpetrators and victims in these events.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

Background 194. Community Profile workshops added a group dimension to the District team victim support and truth-seeking work. Small groups from village communities discussed the impact of human rights abuses at the community level. The workshops were facilitated and recorded by the Victim Support members of the District team. Communities were thus able to examine the history of conflict from their own local perspective. The communal focus of the

workshops also acknowledged the fact that communities, just as much as individuals, were victims in the years of conflict and needed support.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

197. The Commission trained two district Victim Support staff, one woman and one man in each district, in participatory methods for facilitating the Community Profile workshops. Teams aimed to hold five community discussions in each sub-district. Participants in at least one of the five discussions were to be recent returnees, with priority given to those who were being ostracised by the communities to which they had returned. Another discussion group was to consist exclusively of women. The purpose of having women-only groups was to overcome women's reticence about taking an active part in group discussions, especially when what is under discussion is the traditional male preserve of recounting history,

Violence

References or discussions of violence

<Files\\Truth Commission Reports\\Asia\\TimorLeste.CAVR_.Report-FULL> - § 15 references coded [0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.01% Coverage

Though a graphic medium for the voices of Timor-Leste's many victims, the Report is the result of impartial and painstaking inquiry and research. Our mandate required the CAVR to establish trends, patterns and factors. It also required the CAVR to establish accountability and to identify which persons, authorities, institutions and organisations were responsible for human rights violations. In carrying out these tasks, the CAVR has had no political agenda and has studiously avoided embellishment or the impulse to humiliate or take revenge. Human rights violations may have been utilised in the past to mobilise political support and score points against an adversary. The CAVR's sole objective has been to record the truth so that the shocking consequences of violence recorded in this document will serve to deter its repetition in the future and end impunity. The result is not perfect and it was beyond the CAVR's capacity to investigate every case or to establish the definitive truth on all issues. We believe, however, that the Report gives the people of Timor-Leste the big picture of what happened over the 25 years in question and that it will help the community understand our history and the forces that shaped our destiny.

Reference 2 - 0.01% Coverage

Truth-seeking and justice: 1. There should be justice for those responsible for serious crimes. 2. It was necessary for the future of Timor-Leste to learn from the history of the conflict. Investigating the past and establishing the truth should be seen as fundamental to sound nation building. However, opening up old wounds carried risks, and probing the past had to be carried out with great sensitivity. Otherwise the airing of past grievances could simply create anger and recrimination, and even renewed violence. 3. Although the incidence of violations was greatest during the long period of occupation by the Indonesian security forces, there was a real risk that reopening the chapter of the party conflict of 1974-75 would fuel strong emotions. Investigating and reporting the truth concerning violations committed by members of UDT, Fretilin and Falintil, including individuals now holding senior positions in government, the armed forces and the police, would also be particularly challenging. 4. There was residual anger on the part of many pro-independence supporters towards those who sided with the Indonesian occupation forces and former members of militia groups. Practical steps needed to be taken to try to reduce these tensions. 5. Many pro-autonomy supporters identified a need for popular education in the principles of political tolerance. Supporting the political goal of autonomy was not a crime and individuals should not be punished in any way for taking that political position. 6. Many women survivors of rape supported the idea of a commission with a truth-seeking function. 7. Families of those who had disappeared asked for help in discovering the fate of their loved ones.

Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage

104. Among East Timorese soldiers who formed the bulk of the army there was a growing perception that Portugal was in the process of turning its back on Timor.¹¹² Many East Timorese members of the armed forces were drawn to political involvement at what they saw as a critical moment in their country's history. Mário Lemos Pires recalled to the Commission:

Reference 4 - 0.01% Coverage

that they were Indonesian forces.

243. Noting the scale of the attack on Dili, Asvi Warman Adam told the Commission that it could be “compared to the attack to put down the PRRI/Permesta rebellion (in 1958), which was the biggest military operation in Indonesian war history.”

Reference 5 - 0.01% Coverage

321. The period from late 1977 to 1979 saw the greatest humanitarian tragedy in Timor-Leste's history. Widespread famine was a consequence of massive Indonesian military operations aimed at destroying the Fretilin Resistance. This military

Meanwhile, military 228 | Chega! - Volume I, Part 3: History of the Conflict

Reference 6 - 0.01% Coverage

578. This international presence was unprecedented in the history of Timor-Leste. In the 25-year period of Indonesian presence it had been unthinkable that the territory could have been so open to the international community. After the months of bloody violence against civilians leading to the 5 May Agreements, when there was almost no international presence in Timor-Leste, the presence of internationals across the territory provided a level of monitoring that may have contributed to the reduction in large-scale attacks by militia or TNI.

Reference 7 - 0.01% Coverage

615. 30 August 1999 dawned as a remarkable day in the history of Timor-Leste. Despite months of intimidation and violence, people across the country came out in droves to cast their ballot.⁷⁷³

Reference 8 - 0.01% Coverage

by deprivation [of food and medication] and killings of civilians. The respondents selected themselves to give reports to the Commission. Therefore, the results of this project may not represent the entire universe of all people who suffered human rights violations. • The Retrospective Mortality Survey (RMS) recorded the mortality histories of a probability sample of 1,396 households. In each household, two adult respondents were chosen at random. For male respondents, the respondent's parents and siblings were enumerated, including whether they are living or dead. If they were dead, the date, place, and manner of death were recorded. For female respondents, the respondent's children were enumerated in a similar fashion. In 60% of the households, only respondents of one sex were available at the time of the interview, and so one

respondent gave information about parents, siblings and children. • A census of public graveyards in Timor-Leste, documenting more than 319,000 graves (denoted GCD).

Reference 9 - 0.01% Coverage

We must speak objectively. That a war took place is part of our history. UDT started it, then Fretilin avenged the killings during the “counter coup”. At the time, there was little respect for humanity or justice. Seven people were killed in Darulete.⁴⁷

Reference 10 - 0.01% Coverage

665. At the same time, militia members were asserting their new power over the population through random acts of violence. Militia groups were composed largely of young men who were marginalised and angry, or who had long histories of involvement in Indonesian paramilitary or civil defence groups. Some were also just opportunists and, in this period of lawlessness and heightened tension and violence, were given free rein to do as they pleased with impunity. Indeed, the evidence is clear that the military not only allowed but actively encouraged brutality on the part of the militias.

Reference 11 - 0.01% Coverage

11. Although the events surrounding the ballot were freshest in the minds of all East Timorese at the end of 1999, that violence was in fact inseparable from the entire history of the political conflicts going back to 1974. Many were still divided over their political affiliations during the internal conflict of 1975. Many who had supported independence during the Indonesian occupation nursed anger and resentment towards those who had collaborated with the Indonesian security forces; independence supporters, their friends and family members had suffered violations as a result of such collaboration. The Indonesian withdrawal after the ballot seemed to open up the possibility that these long-standing grievances would flare into violence.

Reference 12 - 0.01% Coverage

70. There was a tendency to see the Commission’s truth-seeking mandate as limited to abuses committed in 1999. This was accompanied by demands that history could only be “made straight” if abuses committed in 1974-1975 were also thoroughly investigated.

Reference 13 - 0.01% Coverage

youth from their village were captured and tortured at the Maliana military post, then forcibly recruited to become militia members. As in the case of Oeleu, Tapo’s history of violation ended with villagers suffering from illness and hunger in refugee camps in West Timor.

Reference 14 - 0.01% Coverage

211. Some maps used colour coding to distinguish events and their impact. For example, in some maps Falintil posts were marked by yellow and white flags so that they could be distinguished

from Indonesian military posts that had red and white flags. Pink crosses were used to indicate places where people were murdered by the Indonesian military and blue crosses to mark sites of death due to starvation and illness, or death counts were highlighted by using pink or red markers (see Sketch Map 11 below). Some maps focused on events over a period of only a year or two; for others a longer timeframe was shown in different ways. For example Diagram 1 – Sketch Map Iliomar I (Iliomar, Lautém) used annotation to record period information, whereas Diagram 2 – Sketch Map Pairara Moro, (Lautém) added arrows to record abuses at the same location but at different points in history.

Reference 15 - 0.01% Coverage

216. Sketch Map 14: Beidasi (Fatululik, Covalima) is a reminder that, despite the scope and magnitude of the violence in Timor-Leste, in local communities its impact was never anonymous. The map's poignancy is captured in the names written by each house that give identity by ownership, residency, and community. It is the juxtaposition between this close-knit community, where everyone knows and is connected to each other, and just a few short annotations – “Veronica died here” next to a double black and pink cross to indicate that she was killed by the militia, “82 killed by TNI” written below a pink cross, and “30 children die” written above a black cross to indicate death by starvation – that is striking. It turns an otherwise ordinary neighbourhood map into a document that records a history of violence and suffering in a community: for years violations occurred in the neighbourhood of Alberto and Carlos, Martinho and Mauseu, and to so many other individuals and families.